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Abstract 
Entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial activities influence the development and well-
being of both economies and societies to a large extent. At the heart of all entrepreneur-
ial activities are new ventures - vehicles which entrepreneurs use in order to exploit 
opportunities through the commercialization of newly developed products or services. 
In addition to the many obstacles entrepreneurs face when creating a new venture and 
entering new markets, the financing of these entrepreneurial initiatives becomes a large 
obstacle. In particular, uncertainties regarding market acceptance of the identified op-
portunity and thus survival and ultimately growth limit the financing options of new 
ventures notably. Further, the financing decisions made at the beginning of the entre-
preneurial process have a lasting impact on the development of the new venture once 
a certain type of financing is acquired. Hence, securing the necessary financing is not 
only a major challenge for the entrepreneur at the beginning of the entrepreneurial 
career. The selection of the right amount of financing from the right source also influ-
ences the development of the new venture over and beyond the early days of existence.  
In line with this argumentation and while acknowledging the limited number of financ-
ing options available to new ventures, venture capital is often identified as a viable 
option for firms during in their early stages of development. This form of financing is 
characterized to be provided by institutional investors that jointly invest financial 
means, experience, and networks into the firms they consider to be able to generate the 
desired growth in return. Given the large array of new ventures however, only a few 
are considered a potential investment, and thereof only a fraction receives the necessary 
funding. Regarding the latter group of investees however, a venture capital investment 
has empirically proven to positively influence new venture survival and growth, trans-
lating into increased performance of venture capital-backed over non-venture capital-
backed firms. Given the fact that venture capital itself is a fascinating field of research 
but likewise of great importance for the financing of new ventures at the same time, 
this dissertation develops new empirical insights about the role of venture capital in the 
context of new ventures that were created in an academic context. Further, crowdfund-
ing as a new means of entrepreneurial finance is analyzed against the background of its 
signaling value in the investment decision of venture capitalists.  
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The first empirical contribution uses a proprietary dataset of 98 German research-based 
spin-offs founded between 1997 and 2012 and assesses which firm-specific and system-
inherent factors are decisive for the spin-offs’ growth while drawing on the resource-
based view of the firm as theoretical framework. Specifically, this dissertation aims to 
evaluate whether venture capital-backed research-based spin-offs outperform non ven-
ture capital-backed research-based spin-offs and whether a performance difference is 
explained by venture capitalists’ scouting or coaching capabilities. The empirical find-
ings suggest that a homogeneous educational background of the academic entrepre-
neurs is positively associated with the research-based spin-off’s growth. Similarly, a 
training provided by the parent research organization intended to develop entrepre-
neurial skills and to establish a network to outside professionals as well as the commer-
cialization of a novel technology have a positive impact on a research-based spin-off’s 
growth. Concerning the involvement of venture capitalists, venture capital-backed re-
search-based spin-offs show a superior employment and revenue growth compared to 
non-venture capital-backed research-based spin-offs. As a possible cause for this supe-
rior performance, the empirical findings support the view that this growth difference 
can be attributed to venture capitalists’ coaching rather than their scouting capabilities. 
The second empirical contribution addresses the increasing popularity of crowdfunding 
as a new means to finance new ventures. In particular, this dissertation assesses 
whether and how crowdfunding campaign-specific signals that affect campaign success 
influence venture capitalists’ selection decisions in new ventures’ follow-up funding 
rounds. By doing so, this empirical contribution relies on cross-referencing a proprietary 
dataset of 66,000 crowdfunding campaigns that ran on Kickstarter between 2009 and 
2016 with 100,000 investments in the same period from the Crunchbase dataset. Using 
this approach, 267 new ventures with at least one crowdfunding campaign could be 
identified. While drawing on signaling theory and the venture capital and microfinance 
literature, the empirical findings reveal that a successful crowdfunding campaign leads 
to a higher likelihood to receive follow-up venture capital financing, and that an in-
verted U-shaped relationship exists between the funding received compared to the fund-
ing desired and the probability to receive venture capital funding. Further, the analyses 
provide statistical evidence that a special endorsement of campaigns by the crowdfund-
ing platform provider as well as social media presence in the form of word-of-mouth 
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volume has a likewise positive impact on the receipt of follow-up venture capital. Inter-
preting these findings, this dissertation concludes that the results support the view that 
venture capitalists apparently rely on the decision of the crowd in order to evaluate the 
potential of the entrepreneurial initiative when selecting new investment opportunities.  
Over and beyond the signals that a crowdfunding campaign produces and that are ap-
parently factored into the investment decision of venture capitalists, this dissertation 
also elaborates on how the presence of a crowdfunding campaign itself, disregarding 
all its campaign-relevant aspects, influences the investment decision of venture capital-
ists in terms of their decision to form syndicates. For the purpose of this research ques-
tion, this dissertation relies again on signaling theory and builds on the syndication 
literature. The overarching empirical finding is that crowdfunding seems to influence 
the syndication behavior of venture capitalists. For one thing, the presence of a crowd-
funding campaign negatively influences both the likelihood of a syndicated investment 
as well as the number of syndicate partners. For another, the findings reveal that crowd-
funding positively influences the formation of international syndicates. Hence, the re-
sults support the assumption that the importance of crowdfunding is also factored into 
the investment decision of venture capitalists in terms of their decision to syndicate.  
This dissertation concludes with the major contributions for both theory and practice. 
In essence, the results derived provide novel insights about growth factors of research-
based spin-offs by widening the focus of analysis. This is done by incorporating venture 
capital into the research scope so as to advance the resource-based view of the firm. 
Also, this dissertation shows that crowdfunding serves as a catalyst reducing the per-
ceived risk in the form of information asymmetries related to new ventures. Thus, this 
dissertation advances signaling theory and also provides important implications for the 
microfinance and VC literature. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Das Unternehmertum hat einen wesentlichen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung von Wirt-
schaft und Gesellschaft. Eine der essentiellsten Ausprägungen des Unternehmertums ist 
dabei die Gründung von neuen Unternehmen durch eine oder mehrere Personen um 
neue, zum Teil innovative, Geschäftsgelegenheiten in der Form von Produkten und/o-
der Dienstleistungen auf lokalen wie internationalen Märkten abzuschöpfen. Ungeach-
tet der zahlreichen Herausforderungen, mit welchen Unternehmensgründer in Folge 
des heterogenen Aufgabenspektrums vor, während und nach einer Unternehmensgrün-
dung insgesamt konfrontiert sind, ist die Finanzierung eines neuen Unternehmens mit-
unter eine der zentralen Herausforderungen die es für den Unternehmer zu bewältigen 
gibt. Aufgrund der großen Unsicherheit hinsichtlich der Erfolgsaussichten neuer Pro-
dukte und Dienstleistungen ist das Überleben und Wachstum einer Neugründung alles 
andere als selbstverständlich und auch ein wesentlicher Grund dafür, dass die Finan-
zierungsoptionen für Unternehmensgründer beschränkt sind. Darüber hinaus ist die 
Wahl der Finanzierung insofern von großer Bedeutung, da wissenschaftliche Erkennt-
nisse nahelegen, dass die Entscheidung über die Wahl einer bestimmten Finanzierungs-
form eine nachhaltige Auswirkung auf die Entwicklung des Unternehmens hat. Aus die-
sem Grund ist nicht nur die Wahl der Finanzierungsform eine große Herausforderung 
für den angehenden Unternehmer, sondern wird zudem durch die nachhaltige Wirkung 
derselben zu einer großen Herausforderung für Unternehmensgründer insgesamt.  
Aufgrund der Unsicherheit über die zukünftige Entwicklung der Unternehmung und 
einer kurzen bis kaum vorhandenen Unternehmenshistorie einer Neugründung wird 
Risikokapital in Form von sog. Venture Capital Investoren oftmals als die am geeig-
netste Form der Finanzierung gesehen. Diese Risikokapitalinvestoren zeichnen sich 
durch ihren professionell-institutionellen Charakter aus und bieten dem finanzierten 
Portfoliounternehmen nicht nur finanzielles Kapital, sondern vielmehr auch ein breites 
Spektrum an nicht-monetären Zusatzleistungen wie beispielsweise den Zugang zu Netz-
werken. Zeitgleich ist die Akquisition von Risikokapital durch den Unternehmer auf-
grund der hohen Anzahl an möglichen Neugründungen als Investitionsobjekt sehr kom-
petitiv und daher schwierig. Dies zeigt sich dadurch, dass nur wenige Neugründungen 
den selektiven Auswahlprozess eines Risikokapitalgebers überstehen, und davon nur 
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ein Bruchteil die notwendige Finanzierung nach einer detaillierten Prüfung erhält. Die-
jenigen Unternehmen, die den Selektionsprozess erfolgreich durchlaufen haben, weisen 
jedoch eine erhöhte Überlebenswahrscheinlichkeit und ein stärkeres Wachstum gegen-
über denjenigen Unternehmen auf, die kein Risikokapital erhalten haben. Dahingehend 
bestätigen wissenschaftliche Ergebnisse, dass das Vorhandensein von Risikokapital eine 
positive Auswirkung auf die Leistungsfähigkeit und das Wachstum eines Unternehmens 
hat. Ausgehend von dieser Besonderheit von Risikokapital und dem damit verbundenen 
faszinierenden Forschungsfeld widmet sich diese Dissertation der Frage, welche Rolle 
das Risikokapital im Rahmen von Neugründungen im akademischen Kontext spielt. Zu-
dem untersucht diese Arbeit, welche Auswirkung eine Schwarmfinanzierung auf die 
Selektions- und Investitionsentscheidung von Risikokapitalgebern hat. Der Fokus hin-
sichtlich der Investitionsentscheidung liegt dabei auf der Fragestellung, ob die Investi-
tionsentscheidung eines Schwarmfinanzierungskollektivs die Entscheidung eines Risi-
kokapitalinvestors beeinflusst und falls ein Effekt nachweisbar ist, inwieweit die Bil-
dung eines Syndikats von Risikokapitalinvestoren durch das Vorhandensein einer 
Schwarmfinanzierungskampagne berührt wird.  
Aufbauend auf dieser grundlegenden Fragestellung untersucht diese Dissertation an-
hand eines proprietären Datensatzes von 98 Ausgründungen aus dem akademischen 
Umfeld im Zeitraum 1997 bis 2012, sog. research-based spin-offs, welche Faktoren ei-
nen wesentlichen Einfluss auf das Wachstum dieser Unternehmungen haben. Im Detail 
untersucht diese Dissertation dabei, ob risikokapitalfinanzierte akademische Ausgrün-
dungen eine erhöhte Leistungsfähigkeit gegenüber nicht-risikokapitalfinanzierten aka-
demischen Ausgründungen aufweisen und ob eine mögliche Leistungsdifferenz auf den 
Selektionsprozess des Risikokapitalgebers zurückzuführen oder bedingt durch seine ak-
tive Teilnahme am Unternehmensgeschehen entstanden ist. Aufbauend auf der Res-
sourcentheorie belegen die empirischen Ergebnisse dieses Forschungsbeitrages, dass 
ein homogener Bildungshintergrund des akademischen Gründerteams einen positiven 
Einfluss auf das Wachstum von akademischen Ausgründungen hat. Darüber hinaus zei-
gen die Ergebnisse, dass Schulungsmaßnahmen der Forschungseinrichtung mit der 
Zielsetzung der Generierung von unternehmerischen Fähigkeiten und Netzwerken ei-
nen ebenso positiven Einfluss auf das Wachstum haben. Die empirischen Analysen be-
legen zudem, dass die Kommerzialisierung einer innovativen Technologie einen ebenso 
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positiven Beitrag zum Wachstum der akademischen Ausgründung leistet. Das Vorhan-
densein von Risikokapital wirkt sich ebenfalls positiv auf das Wachstum aus. So zeigen 
die Ergebnisse, dass akademische Ausgründungen mit Risikokapital deutlich schneller 
wachsen als vergleichbare akademische Ausgründungen ohne Risikokapital. Die Analy-
sen lassen den Schluss zu, dass diese gesteigerte Leistungsfähigkeit eher dem aktiven 
Mitwirken der Investoren im Tagesgeschäft und nicht der Fähigkeit der Investoren bei 
der Auswahl der Unternehmung geschuldet ist.  
Über die Fragestellung der Rolle von Risikokapital bei akademischen Ausgründungen 
hinausgehend untersucht diese Dissertation ebenfalls, welche Rolle eine Schwarmfinan-
zierung bei der Selektions- und Investitionsentscheidung bei Risikokapitalinvestoren 
hat. Dies ist dem Umstand geschuldet, dass die Wichtigkeit von Schwarmfinanzierun-
gen in den vergangenen Jahren deutlich an Volumen und Wichtigkeit zugenommen hat. 
Im Detail untersucht diese Dissertation, ob und welche spezifischen Eigenschaften einer 
Schwarmfinanzierungskampagne einen Einfluss auf die Selektionsentscheidung eines 
Risikokapitalgebers haben. Die Untersuchung basiert auf einem proprietären Datensatz 
bestehend aus 66.000 Schwarmfinanzierungskampagnen auf der Kickstarter Plattform 
im Zeitraum 2009 bis 2016. Diese Datenbasis wurde mit der Crunchbase Firmendaten-
bank mit ca. 100.000 Unternehmen kombiniert. Insgesamt konnten dadurch 267 Neu-
gründungen mit mindestens einer Schwarmfinanzierungskampagne identifiziert wer-
den. Aufbauend auf der Signaltheorie belegen die empirischen Ergebnisse, dass eine 
erfolgreich abgeschlossene Schwarmfinanzierungskampagne einen positiven Einfluss 
auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Risikokapitalanschlussfinanzierung hat. Zweitens zei-
gen die Ergebnisse, dass es einen inversen U-förmigen Zusammenhang zwischen dem 
Verhältnis aus Finanzierungsziel und tatsächlich eingeworbener Finanzierung und der 
Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Risikokapitalanschlussfinanzierung gibt. Drittens kann diese 
Dissertation empirisch belegen, dass eine Hervorhebung einer Schwarmfinanzierungs-
kampagne auf der Kickstarter Plattform ebenfalls eine erhöhte Wahrscheinlichkeit nach 
sich zieht, Risikokapital zu erhalten. Viertens zeigen die Analysen einen ebenso signifi-
kant positiven Zusammenhang zwischen der elektronischen Mundpropaganda auf Fa-
cebook und der Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Anschlussfinanzierung durch Risikokapitalge-
ber.  
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Hinsichtlich der Investitionsentscheidung eines Risikokapitalgebers ein Syndikat zu bil-
den zeigen die Ergebnisse einen ebenso signifikanten wie negativen Zusammenhang 
zwischen dem Vorhandensein einer Schwarmfinanzierungskampagne und der Syndi-
katsbildung. Zum einen bestätigen die Ergebnisse, dass sich sowohl die Wahrscheinlich-
keit einer Syndikatsbildung als auch die Größe eines Syndikats reduziert, wenn das 
Investitionsobjekt eine Schwarmfinanzierungskampagne abgeschlossen hat. Gegeben 
der möglichen globalen Aufmerksamkeit einer Schwarmfinanzierungskampagne wei-
sen die Ergebnisse zum anderen nach, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines internationa-
len Syndikats durch das Vorhandensein einer solchen Kampagne positiv beeinflusst 
wird. Ausgehend von diesen Ergebnissen kommt die Dissertation zu dem Schluss, dass 
sowohl das Selektions- als auch das Investitionsverhalten in Teilen durch die Entschei-
dung eines großen Kollektivs aus Unterstützern von Schwarmfinanzierungskampagnen 
beeinflusst werden. Ausgehend davon schließt diese Dissertation mit der Erkenntnis, 
dass eine Schwarmfinanzierung nicht nur eine neue und wichtige Form der Unterneh-
mensfinanzierung darstellt, sondern diese auch einen wesentlichen und nachhaltigen 
Effekt auf mögliche Folgefinanzierungsrunden durch Risikokapitalinvestoren hat. Diese 
Dissertation schließt mit einer Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten theoretischen wie 
praktischen Erkenntnisse. Im Kern beziehen sich die wesentlichen Beiträge dieser Dis-
sertation darauf, dass die Ressourcentheorie mit Schwerpunkt auf Wachstumsfaktoren 
akademischer Ausgründungen um die Berücksichtigung von Wagniskapital erweitert 
wird. Zum anderen zeigt diese Arbeit, dass Crowdfunding die Informationsasymmetrien 
zwischen Investor und Unternehmen reduzieren kann und somit einen wichtigen Bei-
trag zur Reduktion von Unsicherheiten im Investitionsprozess leistet. Diese Erkenntnis 
erweitert die Signaltheorie um einen weiteren wichtigen Baustein. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Topic and Motivation 
The importance of entrepreneurship has increased tremendously given the fact that its 
contributions to market economies are considered indispensable in an environment as 
dynamic as the 21st century. Ever since the early days of Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 
1934), entrepreneurs are considered agents of creative destruction “who introduce 
change to the economic landscape by constantly undermining and challenging estab-
lished industry incumbents” (Acs, Autio, & Szerb, 2014, p. 1). Thus, the entrepreneur 
can be considered as catalyst or missing link between economic integration and growth 
(Alhorr, Moore, & Payne, 2008). Given the particular importance of entrepreneurial 
activities for both the economic and societal well-being, a large array of benefits such 
as innovation (Acs & Audretsch, 1988; Kuratko, 2005), job creation (Blanchflower, 
2000; Parker, 2009), or productivity increases (van Praag & Versloot, 2007) have been 
attributed to originate from entrepreneurial activities. However, the relationship be-
tween the technological process, innovation, and growth appears to have changed par-
ticularly in the 1990s as a result of the emergence of new and unprecedented techno-
logical opportunities that heavily rely on the introduction of the personal computer (and 
similar digital peripheral products), as well as the ever-increasing availability of the 
internet. As a consequence, innovation has become more market-driven, more rapid 
and intense, and more closely linked to scientific progress (OECD, 2000). An example 
for the changing landscape is provided by technologies such as the telephone or the 
radio which took about 75 and 38 years respectively to reach its first 50 million users. 
Instagram, a social media platform, on the other hand achieved twice the amount of 
active users and needed only 28 months (TechCrunch, 2017).  
However, the terms entrepreneur and entrepreneurial activity are applied to a variety 
of contexts and are used synonymously for many activities that involve the engagement 
of one or more individuals, organizations, or activities (Acs et al., 2014). As Lumpkin 
and Dess (1996) point out, the concept of entrepreneurship evolves from various com-
binations of individual, organizational, and environmental factors. Hence, entrepre-
neurship can be defined as an activity that circumscribes a type of self-employment 
and/or new venture creation (Reynolds et al., 2005). Another dimension includes the 
cognitive attribute of one or more individuals in recognizing new and unprecedented 
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opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Given these dimensions and following 
Shane (2003), entrepreneurship can be considered an activity that involves the discov-
ery, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities in order to introduce new goods 
and/or services as well as ways of organizing through processes that previously had not 
existed or were not available to the individual.  
Within the large array of activities that lead to, or benefits that result from entrepre-
neurial efforts, new entry is an essential part of the entrepreneurship activity and hence 
the central idea that underlies this concept. In other words, once the individual has 
discovered and evaluated a new opportunity, exploitation of the same is realized 
through entering a new or established market with a new or existing product or service 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). The vehicle used through which the act of new entry is per-
formed is an entrepreneurial entity in the form of a new venture, an existing firm or via 
internal corporate venturing (Burgelman, 1983). Given the focus of this dissertation on 
entrepreneurship rather than intrapreneurship, the formation of a new venture is thus 
at the heart of the entrepreneurial activity considered in remainder of this thesis, while 
the formation process itself is heavily influenced by a variety of parameters. As Gartner 
(1985) highlights, “the creation of a new venture is a multidimensional phenomenon; 
each variable describes only a single dimension of the phenomenon and cannot be taken 
alone. […] entrepreneurs and their firms vary widely; the actions they take or do not 
take and the environments they operate in and respond to are equally diverse and all 
these elements form complex and unique combinations in the creation of each new 
venture” (Gartner, 1985, p. 697).  
Combining the many definitions and dimensions just outlined, this dissertation refers 
to a new entrepreneurial entity as an independent and newly created legal entity 
founded by one or more entrepreneur(s) focusing on exploiting a newly identified com-
mercial opportunity through the sale of a physical product or service while simultane-
ously aspiring survival and particularly growth. Given this definition, it has to be 
acknowledged that not all new firm foundations are referred to with this dissertation. 
For example, newly created entities that do not focus on growth are not considered. 
These firms are often referred to as lifestyle entities (i.e. a yoga boutique or a restau-
rant) and do not necessarily follow the idea of opportunity exploitation and growth. 
Further, company foundations that emerge from situations of unemployment are also 
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not considered. Lastly, partnerships such as tax, law, or doctoral offices are also beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. This exclusion restriction rests on two primary assump-
tions. On the one hand, the exclusive focus on new ventures with substantial growth 
entities is justified with the above-mentioned economic and societal advantages these 
firms offer. On the other hand, the restrictive focus is also necessary to interpret the 
findings of this dissertation in the context of the broader entrepreneurial finance liter-
ature elaborated on in more detail in the following section and which shares a similar 
focus (Achleitner & Braun, 2014).  
Following the more detailed characterization of a new venture given the exclusion re-
strictions outlined, and considering the imperative importance of entrepreneurial enti-
ties for the technological progress and economic growth as outlined above, an increas-
ing effort towards understanding the antecedents and consequences of entrepreneurial 
activities is observable when viewing the ever-increasing number of both theoretical 
and practical research contributions devoting their attention towards entrepreneurship. 
At the heart of the literature devoted to new venture creation are research contributions 
explaining the prerequisites and antecedents of entrepreneurial intentions that lead to 
new venture creation (e.g. Ajzen 1991; Aldridge and Audretsch 2011; and Parker 
2009), as well as contributions that elucidate the requirements for survival and growth 
(e.g. Clarysse, Wright, and van de Velde 2011; Hayter 2016; and Santarelli and Hien 
Thu Tran 2013). This trend of understanding the concept of entrepreneurship from a 
pure research perspective is accompanied by multiple efforts that align the interests of 
the so called quadruple helix, a collaborative view including academia, the business 
sector, policy makers, and the civil society (GEM, 2017). In that regard, one perspective 
combines the views from both policy makers and universities who address the topic of 
entrepreneurship from various angles. For example, the introduction of government 
funding schemes in Germany (i.e. EXIST)1 represent only a fraction of supportive means 
that have the intention to actively encourage and foster the creation of entrepreneurial 
activities and ultimately new venture creation (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs 
                                            
1 EXIST is a program supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs 
and Energy (BMWi) and aims at encouraging technology transfer activities from re-
search institutions and universities to the private sector by commercializing new prod-
ucts and services. According to the BMWi (2017), the program supports students, grad-
uates and scientists both with monetary and non-monetary aid. 
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and Energy, 2017). A further result of a more collaborative approach between policy 
makers and academia is the fact that universities nowadays complement their tradi-
tional activities of teaching and research with supporting schemes and newly developed 
curricula that address the topic of entrepreneurship both theoretically and practically 
(Munari, Pasquini, & Toschi, 2015). This approach translates for instance into new 
study courses offering a specialization or complete degrees in entrepreneurship. In ad-
dition, public and private research organizations as well as universities established so 
called technology transfer offices (TTOs), training programs, and other practically-ori-
ented support schemes that are intended to smoothen and accelerate the process from 
research discovery to technology commercialization (Colombo, Mustar, & Wright, 
2010). Further, the changing landscape of required skills and knowledge from the busi-
nesses’ perspective is another critical viewpoint that is addressed when referring to the 
quadruple helix model. In particular, the mismatch of an increasing demand for math, 
science and IT-education and the currently available curricula is critical in order to al-
low young people to identify and exploit unprecedented opportunities. Lastly, the view-
point of the civil society highlights for example the constantly low number of female 
entrepreneurs and encourages a higher participation rate of females in the entrepre-
neurship process (GEM, 2017). Hence, the collaborative perspective of the quadruple 
helix with the various stakeholders clearly allows to view the specific demands and 
supplies of skills and capabilities not in isolation but rather on a much broader and also 
more complex scale.  
Yet, and despite the ever increasing amount of both theoretical and practical knowledge 
that explain the development and growth of new ventures as well as incentives from 
the various stakeholders involved that actively encourage the creation of new ventures 
and support their survival and growth, the concept of new venture creation is far from 
being understood. This is exacerbated when referring to the total entrepreneurship ac-
tivity (TEA). Whilst innovation-driven economies such as the United States of America 
(USA), Australia, Estonia, and Canada have a relatively high proportion of the 16 to 64 
year-old adult population who are in the process of having founded (nascent entrepre-
neurs) or currently founding a new business (new business owners) in the years 
2016/2017, other nations lack far behind. Thereof, particularly the leading and pre-
sumably strongest economies in the European Union (EU), notably Italy, Germany, 
Spain, and France, show the lowest number of entrepreneurship activity amongst all 
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innovation-driven economies globally (GEM, 2017). This outcome is especially relevant 
given that these countries, notably Germany, contributed largely towards the growth of 
the common market within the EU. However, when considering the changing techno-
logical landscape in terms of innovation processes as mentioned before, it is only a 
matter of time until the competitive advantages developed during the past are fully 
exploited and other, likely new, market participants from countries outside the EU be-
come large industry incumbents and replace the current market leaders. This viewpoint 
is particularly important for the German economy as it is often referred to be the engine 
of European growth and leading in many industries. Hence, combining the low level of 
the total entrepreneurship activity with the importance of a sustainable development of 
the German economy in the future, the prospects are far from optimal.  
In that regard, figure 1 summarizes the absolute number of founders in Germany and 
also shows the founder ratio in comparison to the total population in the same period. 
Regarding the development of both indicators from the beginning of the 21st century to 
the recent past, a negative trend is indistinguishable. In particular, the trend shows that 
initiatives that are intended to foster entrepreneurship and growth are offset by a flour-
ishing German economy paired with a strong demand for corporate employees (KfW, 
2017c). Exceptions are periods after financial crisis, notably in the years after 2001, 
2008/2009, and 2013. These years are characterized by market turmoil. Based on the 
countercyclical dynamics of new venture creation and economic downturns, both the 
founder ratio as well as the absolute number of entrepreneurs increased in the post-
crisis period as a result of new opportunities that emerged - or simply as a result of a 
decreasing need for corporate employment. However, when considering the recent 
years of strong economic growth, the latest research evidence on causes and conse-
quences of entrepreneurial activities, and the fact that public and private supporting 
schemes are well developed and available in a variety of forms, the ratio of founders 
relative to the total population as well as the absolute number of founders has reached 
its lowest level in the year 2016. This trend demonstrates an undeniable fact that the 
concept of entrepreneurship is far from being understood and that the above-mentioned 
advantages of economic- and societal well-being are at risk. As this dissertation devel-
ops a considerable contribution suited to entrepreneurial activities in a German context, 
and also provides new empirical insights relevant for German entrepreneurs as well as 
investors, the particular focus on Germany is justified.  
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Figure 1: Founder Ratio and Number of Absolute Founders in Germany 
The figure shows the trend of the absolute number of founders (in thousands) as well as 
the ratio of founders in relation to the total population (in percent) in Germany in the 
years 2000 through 2016 (KfW, 2017a; KfW, 2017b). 
 
Given this unsatisfactory trend regarding the decreasing number of entrepreneurs while 
referring to the ever-increasing amount of research contributions that explain anteced-
ents and consequences of entrepreneurship, aspects that address requirements for sur-
vival and growth are often named simultaneously with one decisive resource important 
for the well-being of new ventures - financial capital. Put differently, in order to exploit 
the identified opportunity, a new venture requires financial capital in order to start 
business operations (Binks & Ennew, 1996; Cassar, 2004; Ebben & Johnson, 2006). 
Based on this central importance of financial capital, this dissertation focuses on the 
financing of new ventures as it is one of the crucial issues entrepreneurs face when 
forming a new venture. Furthermore, the focus on the financing of new ventures is 
insofar important given that the financing decision made at the beginning has a lasting 
imprint on the development of the new venture in the future (Berger & Udell, 1998; 
Cassar, 2004). Thus, from a practical point of view, understanding the financing deci-
sions of new ventures is an important prerequisite regarding the new venture’s devel-
opment in terms of survival and growth. The latter is particularly relevant for the benefit 
for both the economy and society given that the advantages in terms of innovation, job 
creation, and societal well-being heavily depend on the success of the new venture as 
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outlined before. Additionally, from a theoretical point of view, the financing issue of 
new ventures is a major topic in the entrepreneurial finance research given that the 
causes and consequences of new venture financing are not well understood (Colombo 
& Murtinu, 2017; Denis, 2004). In other words, this dissertation explores the role of 
the financing of new ventures and develops new empirical insights from both a theo-
retical and practical perspective. In particular, a specific form of entrepreneurial finance 
is devoted special attention to - venture capital (VC). Thereby, this dissertation focusses 
on understanding the role of venture capital in regard to growth issues of new ventures 
within an academic context drawing on the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 
1991; Barney, Wright, & Ketchen, 2001; Penrose, 1996; Wernerfelt, 1984). Further, 
this dissertation also evaluates how new means of entrepreneurial finance such as 
crowdfunding influence the selection of new ventures by venture capitalists. Lastly, this 
dissertation elaborates on the question if and how crowdfunding influences the syndi-
cation behavior of venture capitalists. The latter research focus on crowdfunding draws 
on the theory of information asymmetries (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) as well as signal-
ing theory (Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2005; Spence, 1973, 2002) and thereby provides 
novel insights to the microfinance and VC literature.   
Given the general research topic and motivation in providing an advancement of the 
theoretical frameworks just mentioned, as well as developing novel practical implica-
tions against the background of new venture creation and VC financing, the core re-
search focus of this dissertation is devoted to understanding if and how venture capital 
influences the growth of new ventures in an academic context as well as if and how 
crowdfunding as a new means of entrepreneurial finance affects the investment behav-
ior of VC investors. Following this research question, this dissertation sheds light on the 
relevance of financing towards the survival and growth of new ventures in order to 
provide new insights that positively contribute to understanding the financing issues of 
new ventures. Ultimately, these findings shall support, both theoretically and practi-
cally, investors and entrepreneurs alike in their decision-making regarding the financ-
ing of new ventures in order to foster survival and growth, and ultimately ensure that 
the economic and societal benefits associated with entrepreneurial activities are less at 
risk.  
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1.2 Structure of the Dissertation 
Based on the theoretical and practical contribution this dissertation aims to develop, 
the structure is set up as follows. Section 2 gives a detailed literature overview about 
means of entrepreneurial finance while focusing on the context of new ventures, ven-
ture capital, and crowdfunding. Further, the section also elaborates on the theoretical 
reasoning of the investment decision of venture capitalists against the background of 
signals of quality. Given the literature overview presented, this dissertation continues 
with developing three research questions that build the foundation of this thesis in sec-
tion 2.  
In section 3, the role of venture capital towards the growth of research-based spin-offs 
is elucidated in greater detail. The section starts with summarizing the theoretical and 
empirical findings that address the growth of new ventures that have emerged from an 
academic environment and discusses how various resources are, both theoretically and 
practically, related to growth. Further, the venture capitalist’s role as coach or scout is 
discussed. Afterwards, the data and methodology are introduced as well as the empiri-
cal results presented and discussed. The section concludes with a summary of limita-
tions and suggestions for further research on growth issues in the context of academic 
entrepreneurship.  
Thereafter crowdfunding as a new form of entrepreneurial finance is devoted special 
attention to. In that regard, section 4 discusses the signaling value of crowdfunding in 
the venture capital investment context. The section addresses the value of crowdfund-
ing campaign related signals towards the receipt of post-campaign venture capital fund-
ing. Further, the signaling value of a crowdfunding campaign itself is evaluated and 
analyzed against the background of the syndication behavior of venture capitalists. Fol-
lowing an extensive summary of the latest theoretical and empirical findings on VC 
selection and VC syndication, the data and methodology is introduced. Furthermore, 
section 4 presents the empirical results derived as well as discusses the findings in a 
greater context. Finally, section 4 concludes with the limitations of the findings and 
highlights avenues for further research in the area of the VC selection and syndication 
process while considering the ever-increasing importance of crowdfunding as a new 
means of entrepreneurial finance. Section 5 provides an overall conclusion and summa-
rizes both theoretical and practical contributions of this dissertation.  
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2 Theoretical Background 
Based on the theoretical foundation developed in the following section, three research 
questions are derived which represent the core of this dissertation. First however, a 
literature overview about the means of entrepreneurial finance and the role of venture 
capital is given. Thereafter, the investment process of venture capitalists in the context 
of new ventures is analyzed against the background of the theory of information asym-
metries with particular attention devoted to signaling theory. Further, crowdfunding as 
a new means of entrepreneurial finance is introduced.  
Based on these theoretical foundations, the respective research questions are derived. 
More precisely, the last section will elaborate on the role of a venture capital involve-
ment in the growth of new ventures that have risen from an academic context. Second, 
a new form of entrepreneurial finance, i.e. crowdfunding, is considered and its signaling 
value is analyzed against the background of the allocation of post-crowdfunding ven-
ture capital financing. Third, the role of a crowdfunding campaign is evaluated regard-
ing the syndication behavior of venture capital investors. 
2.1 Literature Review on Entrepreneurial Finance 
The development and growth of new ventures is subject to an array of factors, yet access 
to capital is key to the survival and growth of these firms (Binks & Ennew, 1996; Ebben 
& Johnson, 2006). Although means of entrepreneurial finance exist in a variety of 
forms, the sourcing of capital is nevertheless amongst the most challenging tasks an 
entrepreneur is confronted with when financing a new venture (Carter, Shaw, Wilson, 
& Lam, 2006; Neeley & van Auken, 2010).  
In general, entrepreneurial finance research covers the financing issues of all entrepre-
neurial entities that are not publicly listed and that have growth ambitions. Thus, en-
trepreneurial finance research coverage is not limited to financing issues of new ven-
tures only, but rather takes a much broader perspective (Achleitner & Braun, 2014). As 
a result, research on entrepreneurial finance considers a heterogeneous landscape of 
entrepreneurial entities with equally heterogeneous alternative ways of financing 
means. In order to classify the large array of both stakeholders and financial options 
available, Achleitner and Braun (2014) suggest analyzing the concept of entrepreneur-
ial finance along two dimensions. The first dimension relates to the life cycle the firm 
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is currently situated in. The second dimension refers to the respective stakeholders in-
volved. These two perspectives allow addressing the respective requirements of the in-
volved parties while simultaneously paying attention to the specific financial circum-
stances the entrepreneurial entity is confronted with. Following Achleitner and Braun 
(2014), figure 2 summarizes the two dimensions along which research on entrepre-
neurial finance is concerned with and addresses the core issues of the respective stake-
holders respectively.  
Figure 2: Dimensions of Entrepreneurial Finance 
The figure illustrates the two dimensions along which research on entrepreneurial finance 
is concerned with (Achleitner & Braun, 2014). 
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“How to successfully invest in a 
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C. Asset Manager 
Venture Capital and Buyout as an asset class 
“How to maximize returns as an asset manager in venture 
capital and buyout funds?” 
 
Within the first dimension, each life cycle is characterized by different financial needs 
as well as different sources of capital (Rossi, 2014). In the early stages of development, 
research commonly refers to the term new venture given that the entrepreneurial entity 
is not a legal entity (i.e. seed stage) or has just been legally created (i.e. start-up stage) 
(Achleitner & Braun, 2014). Hence, the early stage is characterized by new ventures 
that have no, or if at all, a very short history of existence. In addition, their product or 
service is still in its infancy (Grichnik, Brettel, Koropp, & Mauer, 2017). Further, follow-
ing the opportunity recognition, market research is usually complete so that market 
entry (i.e. the commercialization of the opportunity identified) can be commenced. 
Once market entrance was successful, the growth phase describes the expansion of the 
business where the business model is scaled by entering new markets or developing 
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new products or services. For very successful entrepreneurial entities with a strong his-
tory of growth, the later stage circumscribes their need for additional finance drawing 
on, for instance, initial public offerings (IPO), or financing strategies of the established 
entrepreneurial entity to buy back shares from investors in order to gain independence 
with the use of dedicated (leveraged) buyout funds (Achleitner & Braun, 2014).  
The second dimension addresses the perspective of the different stakeholders - the en-
trepreneur, the investor, and the asset manager. When regarding the perspective of an 
entrepreneur, the core question, independent of the life cycle of the firm, deals with the 
question of how to receive the right means of financing to support the (further) growth 
of the new venture. In that regard, the majority of entrepreneurs typically draws on 
personal resources in combination with financial means from family, friends, and fools 
first (Kotha & George, 2012). This is, at least partially, owed to the pecking order the-
ory, a theoretical concept that is found to be also applicable for new venture creation 
(e.g. Achleitner, Braun, and Kohn 2011 and Watson and Wilson 2002). In the context 
of financing new ventures, the pecking order theory describes that entrepreneurs typi-
cally draw on internal resources with capital from family, friends, and fools first, and 
then choose external funding as the second preferred alternative given their unwilling-
ness to give-up ownership and control of their new venture (Myers, 1984; Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). However, in case the new venture does not develop as intended and for 
instance ceases to exist, funds owed to family, friends, and fools are likely irrecoverable 
and the entrepreneur is both financially and morally indebted with his closer peers 
(Grichnik et al., 2017). Yet, and although entrepreneurs prefer internal over external 
financing, the financing of new ventures with exceptional growth ambitions but low 
levels of revenues and equally low levels of cash-flows is nevertheless challenging. In 
this context, bootstrapping circumscribes the ability of entrepreneurs to cover their fi-
nancial needs by internally generated funds. Beyond the provision of capital by friends, 
family, and fools, Achleitner and Braun (2014) highlight for example the ability to gen-
erate sufficient cash through revenues or simply through the provision of private sav-
ings. However, the authors also argue that bootstrapping is rare and internally gener-
ated funds are largely insufficient in the context of new ventures with exceptional 
growth ambitions and/or high-tech oriented business models. In this circumstance, in-
ternally generated funds can hardly cover the financing demands during the first weeks 
of operation (Achleitner & Braun, 2014). In case internally generated funds are not 
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available or insufficient in quantity, debt or equity capital from external sources may 
serve as additional means of entrepreneurial capital (Berger & Udell, 1998).  
When considering both the high risk of failure and the missing track record of first-time 
entrepreneurs as well as the unavailability of assets that may serve as collateral how-
ever, traditional debt financing provided by banks is unlikely an option for new ventures 
particularly in their seed and start-up stage of development (Jeng & Wells, 2000; 
Knockaert, Wright, Clarysse, & Lockett, 2010). A second alternative of debt-like financ-
ing is the provision of public funding schemes supplied by governments or government-
sponsored institutions as outlined in the introductory section of this dissertation. Ullrich 
(2011) argues that the main rationale for the provision of public funding is the belief 
of policy makers that the pure provision of capital can alleviate the financial constraints 
of new ventures and thus positively support the creation and growth of new entrepre-
neurial entities. However, given that the landscape of public funding instruments is 
immense in quantity and largely heterogeneous in quality, a clear categorization is dif-
ficult to achieve (Achleitner & Braun, 2014). Hence, an in-depth discussion of the large 
universe of public-funding schemes in the context of entrepreneurial finance would go 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. Given the inherent shortcoming of new ventures 
in regard to risk-mitigating collateral combined with the large importance of new ven-
ture creation regarding the societal well-being and economic growth, this dissertation 
particularly focuses on the entrepreneur in the seed and start-up stages of development.  
Within the second dimension, the perspective of the investor is dealt with, too. At its 
core, the investor’s perspective deals with the question how a successful investment is 
identified. When considering the shortage of collateral and the high probability of new 
venture failure, a viable option is financing in the form of risk capital that may serve as 
a suitable alternative to internally generated funds for newly created ventures (Bertoni, 
Colombo, & Grilli, 2011; Croce, Marti, & Murtinu, 2013; Sapienza, 1992). This form of 
capital is particularly suited for innovative young firms with both, a high growth poten-
tial but also great risk inherent to the business model (Engel & Keilbach, 2007). Yet, 
two basic types of investors are commonly referred to in the context of new venture 
financing - business angels and venture capitalists. Despite the fact that no regulatory 
definition exists in regard to business angels and venture capitalists (Amit, Brander, & 
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Zott, 1998), both terms are often used interchangeably, and hence the definition of 
either is rather blurry.  
Usually, the first type of investors, business angels, are individual investors who provide 
private equity capital to new ventures (Mason & Harrison, 1995). The business angel is 
typically a former executive of a large corporation or business owner having collected 
substantial experience that is, in combination with capital, invested in new ventures 
(Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, & Mueller, 2013; Sudek, 2006). Given their extensive expe-
rience, business angels normally invest in the seed and start-up stages of the newly 
created venture as their knowledge offers the biggest leverage and the price (i.e. value 
of the new venture) is low suiting their financial abilities (Elitzur & Gavious, 2003; 
Maxwell, Jeffrey, & Lévesque, 2011). Further, the non-monetary support in the form of 
experience is particularly important in the early stages of development. Said differently, 
the business angel’s experience is positively related to new venture success (Brettel, 
2004). However, business angels have a smaller financial scope compared to venture 
capitalists who invest larger financial resources of multiple lenders (Grichnik et al., 
2017). In addition, due to the fact that business angels comprise a single investor, the 
available managerial expertise is limited to the entrepreneurial skills and capabilities of 
the same person or the network of business professionals this person has access to. 
Lastly, business angels frequently pursue non-economic objectives when supporting 
new ventures such as hedonistic and altruistic motives (Wright, 1998).   
As such, a business angel’s investment objective does not necessarily coincide with that 
of a venture capitalist, who can be considered the second type of risk capital investor 
suited for new ventures. Although the field of seed and start-up stage investments has 
traditionally been covered by business angels, the number of dedicated VC funds tar-
geting new ventures is growing (Dimov, Shepherd, & Sutcliffe, 2007; Kim & Wagman, 
2016). VC per se is a private equity financial intermediary, primarily suitable for firms 
being in the early and expansion stage and which do not only lack financial resources, 
but also managerial experience and a network of business professionals (Jeng & Wells, 
2000). Based on definitions of prior literature, VC is characterized as an institutional 
(Bessler & Kurth, 2007), formal (Bruton, Chahine, & Filatotchev, 2009), and a profes-
sional type of investment (da Silva Rosa, Velayuthen, & Walter, 2003; Gompers & Ler-
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ner, 2001; Hellmann & Puri, 2000). Moreover, a venture capital investment is charac-
terized with an active involvement in the new venture (Sahlman, 1990). Nowadays, 
forms of VC include corporate VC (CVC), bank-affiliated VC (BVC), governmental VC 
(GVC), and individual VC (IVC) (Bertoni, Colombo, & Quas, 2015). Hence, venture 
capitalists do either appear in the form of a corporate/government-backed investor or 
as an independent investment entity. In essence, CVC, BVC, and GVC are a subdivision 
of a larger non-financial corporation (e.g. Siemens Venture Capital (“Next47”), Google 
Ventures), financial corporation (e.g. CommerzVentures), or government institution 
(e.g. High-Tech Gründerfonds) investing in new ventures for financial and strategic 
reasons (Hopp, 2010; Keil, Maula, & Wilson, 2010). Individual venture capitalists on 
the contrary appear in the form of sole partnerships that rise capital from outside inves-
tors in return for the promise of wealth appreciation for the funds invested. Hence, 
venture capitalists act as a financial intermediary by investing and managing funds pro-
vided by large corporates or government institutions and third-party individuals such 
as pension funds and wealthy individuals. The objectives pursued with the investments 
are broad; risk diversification, capital appreciation and strategic investing are amongst 
the most important ones, however. Whereas corporate or government venture capital-
ists are rather structured as a subdivision in an organizational chart, the organizational 
structure of a VC fund is different and thus outlined in figure 3.  
Following Geigenberger (1999), the investment vehicle (i.e. the VC fund) is formally 
managed by the fund’s management referred to as the general partners. During the 
inception phase of a new VC fund, the general partners collect capital from investors 
such as wealthy individuals, large corporations, or institutional investors such as family 
firms or pension funds. The capital providing individuals are referred to as limited part-
ners. Once the capital collected corresponds to the planned size of the fund, the general 
partners then start to screen and select potential portfolio investments that coincide 
with the fund’s strategy that is defined when the capital is collected from the limited 
partners in a process called fundraising. Potential strategies might include a certain 
industry focus, a specific stage in the new venture’s life cycle or a certain valuation 
range of the portfolio firms at acquisition. Once the screening of potential portfolio 
firms is complete and the funds available are invested, the general partners commence 
to monitor the development of the investee firms. The holding period normally lasts 
between 3 to 14 years and is mainly characterized with an active engagement of the 
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general partners in terms of providing management support to the portfolio firm 
(Agarwal & Bayus, 2002; Cumming & Macintosh, 2001). The management support ven-
ture capitalists provide in addition to their financial support is commonly referred to as 
‘smart money’ and includes various supporting mechanisms. Exemplary mechanisms are 
the installation of accounting systems, searching for consultants or key executives, as 
well as giving strategic advice (Arque-Castells, 2012; Balboa, Marti, & Zieling, 2011; 
Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 2003; Sørensen, 2007). Overall, these measures are naturally 
intended to foster a new venture’s positive development and thus avoid the risk of bank-
ruptcy. The general partners receive a certain percentage (i.e. usually 2 percent) of the 
fund’s volume for their supervisory role in order to cover the administrative expenses 
related to the management of the portfolio firms. During or at the end of the fund’s 
predefined lifetime, the portfolio firms are sold and the proceeds are returned to the 
limited partners. Any profit in the form of capital appreciation of the funds invested is 
shared between the general and limited partners and distributed according to the agree-
ments defined at the fund’s initiation.  
Figure 3: Structure of a VC Fund 
The figure illustrates the basic structure of a VC fund and its stakeholders along the invest-
ment process (Geigenberger, 1999). 
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Since the limited partners invest with the purpose of increasing their capital provided, 
the portfolio firms are meant to increase in value during the holding period as a result 
of accessing new markets and/or commercializing new products and services. Despite 
the important role of the new venture’s management team itself, venture capitalists are 
also held accountable for the superior firm performance, measured with multiple di-
mensions of performance, of portfolio firms they invest in over those who did not re-
ceive VC financing (Alperovych & Hubner, 2013; Bertoni et al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013; 
Engel, 2002; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998). As such, venture capitalists “can identify firms 
with hidden value and provide them with the necessary financing” (Bertoni et al., 2011, 
p. 1028). However, empirical evidence is inconclusive so far whether this superior per-
formance is the result of inherent firm characteristics prior to a VC engagement or ra-
ther the result of VC-related post investment monitoring and coaching (e.g. Bertoni et 
al., 2011; Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy 2011; and Croce et al. 2013). Thus, the 
prevailing question concerning VC investing is whether venture capitalists are scouting 
promising new ventures based on a reproducible manner that would also grow in the 
absence of VC (i.e. a selection effect), or if the superior performance of investee firms 
is attributable to the value adding services venture capitalists provide to the firms they 
have chosen to invest in (i.e. a treatment effect).  
In line with this question, empirical evidence towards the treatment and selection effect 
of VC investments is versatile. For example, Croce et al. (2013) investigated a total of 
696 firms and testify that VC-backed firms’ productivity is not statistically different from 
that of non-VC-backed firms before their first round of financing. They state however, 
that productivity increases as a result of a VC involvement leaving them to believe that 
the investee firms’ performance is attributable to a treatment effect rather than a selec-
tion effect. A similar conclusion is also supported by Balboa et al. (2011), Bertoni et al. 
(2011), and Colombo and Grilli (2010). They provide empirical evidence that the sales 
and employee growth of the firms investigated is the result of the involvement of VC. 
In line with those findings is the outcome of studies performed by Davila et al. (2003) 
and Engel (2002), however limited to an increase in employee growth and total factor 
productivity respectively that was deemed to be the result of a VC involvement. Further, 
Colombo and Murtinu (2017) investigate whether there is a performance difference of 
individual and corporate VC firms in terms of the portfolio firms’ performance. Using a 
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sample of 259 VC-backed firms, they argue that investee firms of both types of VC in-
vestors increase their performance primarily in regard to their sales volume. The au-
thors argue that this performance increase is the result of the involvement of either type 
of VC and not the result of a potential selection effect (Colombo & Murtinu, 2017).  
On the contrary, Chemmanur et al. (2011) found in their study of 1,881 VC-backed and 
185,882 non-VC-backed manufacturing firms that efficiency in both states, prior to and 
after a VC investment is higher for firms having received VC compared to those having 
not. This result clearly supports the hypothesis of the existence of a selection effect, too. 
However, they also find that growth in efficiency for VC-backed firms is higher com-
pared to non-VC-backed firms. In this regard, venture capitalists apparently do select 
higher quality firms over others, allegedly being of lesser quality. Nonetheless, the 
value-addition provided by VC investments is not to be overlooked, thus supporting the 
existence of a treatment effect as well. Similarly, Di Guo and Kun Jiang (2013) compare 
the research & development and performance attributes of VC-backed over non-VC-
backed firms in the case of China. Based on their analysis, both a higher performance 
of VC-backed over non-VC-backed firms is found in terms of financial as well as research 
& development performance prior to and after a VC investment. In addition, Baum and 
Silverman (2004) came to the same conclusion in their study on 204 new ventures in 
the biotechnology sector justifying the existence of both a treatment as well as a selec-
tion effect in VC financing. Noteworthy is the fact that all authors have used unequal 
samples in terms of size, industry allocation, time, and geographical area. This supports 
the indication that both, a treatment and/or selection effect could be determined over 
and beyond one random sample size, thus supporting the existence of an external va-
lidity of the hypothesis regarding the venture capitalists value-add claimed. Given the 
importance of this yet not thoroughly researched question however, a sizable part of 
this dissertation evaluates the role of a VC involvement in new ventures, too.  
Irrespective of a potential treatment or selection effect that can be considered respon-
sible for the superior performance of new ventures backed by VC over new ventures 
without VC, the VC fund is obliged to provide the return to its investors. Hence, those 
portfolio firms that have survived and grown during the time the fund was invested (i.e. 
3 to 14 years), are sold to other financial institutions or corporations, or taken public 
via an IPO. This process of divestment is commonly referred to as “exit” (Grichnik et 
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al., 2017) and the funds collected are redistributed to the investors. During the time the 
fund is invested in the portfolio firms, the management of the fund is compensated for 
its non-monetary support by a so-called management fee, a flat percentage fee usually 
in the range of 2 percent of the fund’s volume. In addition, the VC fund also receives 
part of the value increase of the investee firms from the time they are included in the 
fund until the exit. The actual percentage of the so called carried interest is subject to 
negotiation during the fundraising with the limited partners, has on average been 
around 20 percent of the capital gain generated.   
A third type of investor considered within the second dimension is the buyout investor. 
In contrast to a VC fund, buyout funds primarily leverage the purchase of an established 
firm with the use of a high amount of debt capital, however. As a result of the debt 
financing instrument, the subject firm is required to have substantial cash flow in order 
to be able to return both principal and interest to the capital provider - a criterion that 
VC investors do not necessarily demand from new ventures (Rosenbusch et al., 2013). 
Another difference with regard to VC is that buyout funds normally assume control of 
the investee without assuming an active role in the firm (Sahlman, 1990). Despite the 
tremendous importance of business angels in the context of new venture financing and 
the importance of buyout funds for established firms, this dissertation will focus exclu-
sively on venture capital funds and combine the perspective of the VC investor with the 
perspective of the entrepreneur seeking funding for a newly created venture in the seed 
and start-up stage of development. This viewpoint is of particular importance given the 
fact that the role of a VC investment in new ventures is not well understood (Baum & 
Silverman, 2004), and also in line with prior literature focusing on the perspective of 
both the entrepreneur and the investor in the early stages of a new venture’s develop-
ment (Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine, & Wright, 2009; Gompers, 1999).  
A fourth type of investor, however not considered by Achleitner and Braun (2014), is 
the individual investor characterized as a so-called “backer” in the context of crowd-
funding. This individual investor, e.g. the average person, has only recently been given 
access to investing opportunities in new ventures based on the sudden but notable in-
troduction of various forms of crowdfunding platforms. At its core, crowdfunding rep-
resents a relatively new means of funding that individuals and new ventures alike col-
lect in the form of small amounts from a large group of individuals through the use of 
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online platforms acting as intermediaries (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013; Ahlers, 
Cumming, Günther, & Schweizer, 2015; Bruton, Khavul, Siegel, & Wright, 2015; Chola-
kova & Clarysse, 2015; Mollick, 2014). The success of crowdfunding as a serious alter-
native to the before-mentioned rather traditional forms of funding has particularly man-
ifested after the financial crisis in the years 2008/2009. Ever since, the number of plat-
forms, projects funded, and amounts invested have increased exponentially (Dushnit-
sky, Guerini, Piva, & Rossi-Lamastra, 2016). This increasing trend translated into more 
than USD 16 billion of funding provided via crowdfunding across the globe in 2014 and 
is expected to increase to USD 34 billion in 2015 (Barnett, 2017). On average, the au-
thor continues, the total investment volume provided by venture capitalists sums up to 
USD 30 billion per year. Hence, crowdfunding has established itself as a serious alter-
native to the traditional means of financing such as venture capital. 
Today, various forms of crowdfunding exist, yet reward-based (e.g. Colombo, Franzoni, 
and Rossi-Lamastra 2015; Mollick 2014; Wessel, Thies, and Benlian 2015; and Wessel, 
Thies, and Benlian 2016), lending-based (e.g. Dushnitsky et al. 2016), and equity-based 
(e.g. Ahlers et al. 2015; Lukkarinen, Teich, Wallenius, and Wallenius 2016; Roma, Mes-
seni Petruzzelli, and Perrone 2017; and Vismara 2016) crowdfunding campaigns have 
been subject to increased attention in the context of financing entrepreneurial initiatives 
lately. This is mainly owed to the fact that these forms of crowdfunding are simultane-
ously seen as crowd-investing as the supporting process strictly requires a certain return 
in exchange for the financing provided. This prerequisite is clearly in contrast to dona-
tion-based crowdfunding platforms that do not necessarily provide a material return in 
the form of interest (lending-based), capital appreciation (equity-based) or a product 
or service (donation-based). Donation-based platforms rather provide the opportunity 
for individuals to donate monetary support for the good cause by supporting, for in-
stance, cultural projects (Dushnitsky et al., 2016; Mollick, 2014). Given this circum-
stance, the latter form is not in line with the traditional entrepreneurial finance per-
spective of new venture growth and shall therefore not be further considered.  
In contrast, the remaining forms of crowdfunding suit to the context of entrepreneurial 
finance research as the financing motive clearly prevails. Hence, the individual and non-
professional (i.e. amateur) investor using equity-, lending, and reward-based crowd-
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funding platforms shall therefore represent an augmented group of investors to be con-
sidered within the discipline of entrepreneurial finance research. In particular, the re-
ward-based model is the most popular form of crowdfunding amongst all forms (Dush-
nitsky et al., 2016). In this form, individuals (i.e. backers) provide financial means in 
exchange for a product prototype or token-item gifts such as coffee-mugs, t-shirts or 
Facebook likes (Antonenko, Lee, & Kleinheksel, 2014; Xu, Zheng, Xu, & Wang, 2016). 
According to Dushnitsky et al. (2016), the second largest form are lending based plat-
forms. The lending concept circumscribes that individuals can support new ventures 
financially by expecting a predefined return similar to interest on a government bond. 
Lastly, equity crowdfunding platforms most closely match the view and objectives of, 
for instance, business angels and venture capitalists in the second entrepreneurial fi-
nance perspective. Using equity crowdfunding, individual investors can invest in new 
ventures directly in exchange for ownership or ownership-like equity instruments 
(shares, preferred shares, mezzanine capital). The latter form is however largely de-
pendent on the legislative environment given that many countries nowadays have very 
strict investor protection laws and regulations (Vismara, 2016). As a result, pure equity 
crowdfunding platforms are rare and have only until recently gained importance. A 
reason for the increased importance are for example initiatives such as the Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups Act (JOBS) act in the United States that decreased investor pro-
tection regulations and hence, opened new investment opportunities for amateur inves-
tors (Roma et al., 2017). Despite the fact that equity and lending based platforms 
closely imitate the objectives of risk diversification and capital appreciation with new 
venture investing, these forms are nevertheless not available to a broad range of inves-
tors given the many legal restrictions to protect small and amateur investors still in 
place. Hence, given that reward-based platforms are available to a broad range of indi-
viduals and also mimic the entrepreneurial finance perspective in terms of growth as 
well as the investment objective of the individual investor in requiring a material return 
in exchange for his investment, this form is at the heart of this dissertation.  
The last perspective of the entrepreneurial finance perspective concerns the view of the 
asset manager in assessing an investment in terms of how the returns of the investment 
can be maximized (Achleitner & Braun, 2014). Given that this dissertation will focus 
on the allocation of investments in the early stages of a new venture, the perspective of 
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the asset manager is beyond the scope of this dissertation and shall hence not be dealt 
with.  
2.2 Investment Selection, Information Asymmetries, and Quality Signals 
Referring to the above mentioned high risk of failure and the start-up nature of new 
ventures, information asymmetries play a crucial role between the investor and the in-
vestee when investment proposals are evaluated. Due to the fact that the entrepreneur 
possesses private information that the investor may find valuable in the decision making 
process, the available information to the investor is limited (Moss, Neubaum, & 
Meyskens, 2015). Private information represents for example the technical feasibility of 
the product or the entrepreneur’s personal intent towards the venture’s development 
(Stiglitz, 1990). Put differently, this problem of information asymmetry, a concept ini-
tially developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and formally known as the Principal-
Agent theory, addresses in essence the availability of different amounts of information 
to the investor (i.e. the principal) and the investee (i.e. the agent) and the resulting 
implications this situation inherits. According to Amit et al. (1998), information asym-
metries take the form of hidden information and hidden action. Hidden information is 
for instance related to the entrepreneur being more likely able to assess whether or not 
a newly developed technology will work as suggested. Hidden action on the contrary is 
based on the assumption that the new venture’s management team may pursue other 
objectives with the growth of the venture compared to the investor during the time 
when both parties are dependent on each other.  
In order to mitigate the investment risk ex-ante, a venture capitalist would usually go 
through multiple stages of venture screening in order to collect as much (private) in-
formation as possible and to support the decision for or against an investment (Rosen-
busch et al., 2013). This investigative process normally begins with an intensive due 
diligence, a process in which the new venture’s business plan and management team is 
intensively scrutinized (Fried & Hisrich, 1994; Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001). Given 
the large array of information available, venture capitalists primarily focus on the en-
trepreneurial team, the target market including the product or service as well the in-
vestment risk that a new venture has compared to other available investment opportu-
nities (Brettel, 2002; Petty & Gruber, 2011). Given the high number of new ventures 
seeking funding as well as the rigorous screening process of venture capitalists, about 
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90 percent of deals get rejected, and from the remaining ones, only a fraction receives 
the needed funding (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Ferrary, 2010). Further, and with time 
being a scarce resource during a due diligence investigation process, Zacharakis and 
Meyer (1998) found that venture capitalists tend to face a negative correlation between 
fully comprehending the new venture as well as its products or services and the amount 
of information they receive. This finding is based on the assumption that the more in-
formation a potential investor receives, the less clear und understandable the investee 
becomes. Kunze (1990) even argues that if venture capitalists tried to analyze every 
potential information related to the new venture, a VC would never be fully confident 
about investing the available funds. This coherence will allegedly lead to venture capi-
talists judging the investment opportunity intuitively, resulting in decisions being made 
under the assumption of overconfidence (Gimmon & Levie, 2010; Zacharakis & Shep-
herd, 2001). According to Griffin and Varey (1996), this overconfidence takes either 
the form of overestimating the likelihood of a desired outcome (i.e. optimistic overcon-
fidence) or by simply overestimating one’s own knowledge during the decision-making 
process. Either way, the decision whether a new venture is worth investing leaves the 
area of a rational and reproducible decision-making rather aligned with gut feeling 
(Macmillan, Zemann, & Subbanarasimha, 1987). Another complementary evaluation 
process performed by venture capitalists in order to reduce information asymmetries is 
the provision of financial means in stages (i.e. ‘staging’). Given that new ventures are 
subject to reaching agreed milestones in order to receive agreed resources, venture cap-
italists can withdraw their engagement as agreed milestones are not met and thus limit 
their investment risk (Dahiya & Ray, 2012; Gompers, 1995).  
Based on the intensive due diligence that precedes a VC investment, venture capitalists 
would evaluate seminal signals that portray the potential and superiority of the new 
venture above others in order to reduce informational asymmetries ex-ante (Moss et 
al., 2015; Vismara, 2016). Particularly in the early stages of a screening process, signals 
are an important means to reduce initial information asymmetries between the investor 
and the investee (Busenitz et al., 2005). Nevertheless, a venture capitalist is unable to 
fully judge and comprehend all aspects of the investee before acquiring an ownership 
stake and receiving access to the new venture’s internals. Although venture capitalists 
have means through which the risk of investment failure can be reduced as discussed 
above, it is in essence their experience and expert knowledge about the new ventures 
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they invest in which makes venture capitalists “better able to address information asym-
metry problems than other financial firms” (Croce et al., 2013, p. 491). When early 
stage investments are screened, investors largely rely on signals that reduce information 
asymmetries und uncertainties about the future potential of the firm. In other words, 
decision makers such as venture capitalists often rely on informational cues in situations 
in which decisions have to be made in the absence of perfect information in order to 
assess what future outcomes to expect - the concept of signaling theory (Busenitz et al., 
2005; Spence, 1973, 2002). Signaling theory describes efforts of the capital-seeking 
party (i.e. the entrepreneur) to reduce information asymmetries by providing infor-
mation for the inherent quality and future development of a new venture to the capital-
providing or assessing party (i.e. the venture capitalist). Hence, signaling theory cir-
cumscribes that entrepreneurs signal the quality and viability of their venture to a ven-
ture capitalist in order to stand out and suggest superior quality and ability compared 
to other capital-seeking ventures (Arthurs, Busenitz, Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2009; Buse-
nitz et al., 2005; Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). In order to be valuable, 
“signals must be freely accessible (i.e., observable), understood in advance, and costly 
to imitate” (Hopp & Lukas, 2014, p. 638).  
Empirical evidence towards the value of different signals in the context of VC investing 
is versatile. For instance, venture capitalists focus on the investee firm’s apparent char-
acteristics in terms of products and services, the potential of the target market, the firm’s 
financial potential, as well as the management teams’ set-up (Petty & Gruber, 2011). 
Most importantly however, Petty and Gruber (2011) conclude that a good management 
team with sufficient business experience pursuing a promising business idea might al-
ready be valued as a good signal. Thus, human capital characteristics play an important 
role in VC decision making since human capital is also positively associated with venture 
growth (Baeyens, Vanacker, & Manigart, 2006; Knockaert et al., 2010; Zacharakis & 
Meyer, 2000). In essence, human capital refers to a set of skills, capabilities, and 
knowledge that individuals acquire during their formal education, on-the-job training, 
and job experience (Shrader & Siegel, 2007; Unger, Rauch, Frese, & Rosenbusch, 2011). 
Further, venture capitalists are in clear favor of product-oriented business models in-
stead of service businesses that are fully dependent on their founding team (Munari & 
Toschi, 2011). The latter aspect is particularly relevant if the management team breaks 
up, or if the venture capitalist decides to replace the management team (Elitzur & 
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Gavious, 2003; Hellmann & Puri, 2002). Further, patents are commonly referred to 
have a strong and positive signaling value to outside investors (Conti, Thursby, & 
Rothaermel, 2013; Haeussler, Harhoff, & Mueller, 2014; Hoenig & Henkel, 2015). The 
value of patents is particularly relevant for new ventures since they allow the new ven-
ture to exclusively exploit a new technology providing them a competitive advantage 
(Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013). Lastly, venture capitalists can reduce information asymmetries 
concerning a new venture by mainly investing in ventures that have already been eval-
uated (i.e. undergone due diligence) by a preceding investor, such as business angels 
or other VC funds (Bertoni et al., 2011; Davila et al., 2003). This practice implies that 
prior investors had already assessed the new venture to be of high-quality what may 
reduce the perceived investment risk from a venture capitalist’s perspective (Bonardo, 
Paleari, & Vismara, 2010; Lerner, 1999, 2002). In particular for early stage firms, third 
party signaling may be of large importance given the lack of other informational cues 
to be assessed (Plummer, Allison, & Connelly, 2016).  
Although the task of signal evaluation is common practice, the scarcity and heteroge-
neity of signals in the context of new ventures may impose the difficulty that individual 
investors assess signals differently. In essence, investments in new ventures are charac-
terized with greater information asymmetries compared to later stages firms (Kirsch, 
Goldfarb, & Gera, 2009) and investors are confronted with less reliable, selected, and 
unregulated information (Plummer et al., 2016). Given the scarcity of reliable signals 
as well as the need to have the few signals available objectively assessed from multiple 
perspectives, this dissertation strives to provide empirical evidence how the selection 
process is influenced while considering crowdfunding as a new means of entrepreneur-
ial finance attesting the quality of a new product or service. Further, this dissertation 
will elaborate in more detail on the investment process regarding new ventures in an 
academic spin-off context as well as the role of VC in the growth process of these firms.  
2.3 Development of Research Questions 
2.3.1 VC Investments in Research-Based Spin-offs 
In recent years, academic entrepreneurship has gained both momentum and the atten-
tion from academics, governments, and researchers at the same time (Urbano & Guer-
rero, 2013). An understanding of success factors of these important firms is essential in 
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order to develop policy measures that effectively support new venture creation from 
academics in terms of their survival and growth, and which foster technology transfer 
as well as the creation of jobs. These are firms founded by academics (i.e. current and 
prior researchers) who aim to fill the gap between scientific research and its commer-
cialization by exploiting technological innovations in the form of marketable products 
or services (Colombo et al., 2010). Further, research-based spin-offs (RBSOs) are also 
very important regarding the transfer of knowledge from research organizations - both 
public and privately-sponsored - to the private sector (Czarnitzki, Rammer, & Toole, 
2014; Festel, 2013; Fryges & Wright, 2014; Urbano & Guerrero, 2013; Wright, 2014). 
When considering the relatively few contributions that deal with the concept of aca-
demic entrepreneurship, one can conclude that not much research has been dedicated 
to this fascinating niche of the overall entrepreneurial activities. However, understand-
ing the peculiarities of RBSOs is nonetheless essential since these new ventures have 
very special characteristics that distinguish them from regular new ventures. Amongst 
them is for example a homogeneous founding team and radically new technologies 
which encompass the possibilities to transfer their technologies into commercial prod-
ucts (Colombo & Piva, 2012). In addition, RBSOs often have large capital needs for the 
construction of prototypes and the frequently required testing facilities in the form of, 
for example, well-equipped laboratories. Given that the capital-intensive development 
and testing procedure cannot solely be covered by public funding or debt capital, and 
the fact that academic spin-offs often lack sufficient collateral, the available financing 
options are reduced notably (Jeng & Wells, 2000; Knockaert et al., 2010; Wright, Lock-
ett, Clarysse, & Binks, 2006).  
However, an exception to the scarce landscape of financing options still available is VC. 
In other words, VC is often the remaining financing option for academic entrepreneurs 
who have already completed initial research or developed first prototypes (Bertoni et 
al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013; Sapienza, 1992). In addition to the provision of equity-
capital, a VC involvement may additionally entail management support such as the in-
stallation of accounting systems, searching for consultants or key executives, as well as 
giving strategic advice as previously mentioned (Arque-Castells, 2012; Balboa et al., 
2011; Davila et al., 2003; Sørensen, 2007). As a result, acquiring VC can be a beneficial 
financing option for RBSOs when considering a) their resource-scarcity and b) their 
large capital need given the high-tech nature of their products and services. In line with 
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the generic advantages of VC, a large array of scientific research provides strong support 
that VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms (Alperovych & Hubner, 2013; 
Bertoni et al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013; Engel, 2002; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998). How-
ever, the various findings are inconclusive so far whether this superior performance is 
the result of the inherent characteristics of the venture prior to a VC engagement or 
rather the result of VC-related post investment monitoring and coaching once the ven-
ture has become a portfolio firm (e.g. Bertoni et al. 2011; Chemmanur et al. 2011; and 
Croce et al. 2013).  
Against this background, the empirical contribution of this dissertation is twofold. First, 
new insights on the peculiarities of RBSO-specific resources and their association with 
firm performance are generated by contributing to advancing the resource-based view 
of the firm (Barney, 1991; Barney et al., 2001; Penrose, 1996; Wernerfelt, 1984). Fur-
ther, this dissertation seeks to identify if VC-backed RBSOs outperform non-VC-backed 
RBSOs and if so, disentangle the effects of RBSOs’ growth by evaluating whether ven-
ture capitalists contribute to growth by choosing the right investment objects (i.e. se-
lection effect) or by providing additional resources (i.e. treatment effect). Given the 
intended research scope addressing the role of VC towards the growth of RBSOs, the 
first research question is formulated as follows: 
Research Question 1: What drives growth in research-based spin-offs and how is growth 
affected by VC?  
2.3.2 The Signaling Value of Crowdfunding and VC Investing 
As a result of dried-up financial resources after the global financial crisis in the years 
2008/2009, crowdfunding became a popular source of funding for cultural and com-
mercial ventures (Antonenko et al., 2014; Bruton et al., 2015). As above-mentioned, 
crowdfunding represents a relatively new means of funding that allows the individual, 
i.e. backer, to support new ventures in the form of small amounts through online plat-
forms that act as intermediaries (Agrawal et al., 2013; Ahlers et al., 2015; Bruton et al., 
2015; Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; Mollick, 2014). Given the increasing popularity 
amongst amateur investors and entrepreneurs alike, crowdfunding turned into a viable 
source of entrepreneurial finance for commercially-oriented ventures, too (Schwien-
  27 
bacher & Larralde, 2010). For instance, 45 out of the 50 largest crowdfunding cam-
paigns in 2012 turned into new firms after they had collected their first funds through 
individual investors (Mollick, 2014). Hence, crowdfunding may trigger the establish-
ment of new ventures and also serve as initial bridge-financing to support entrepreneurs 
in reaching first milestones during the development of their business models (e.g. con-
struction of prototypes) (Bruton et al., 2015). However, follow-up costs for the actual 
commercialization of the product, including costs for patenting or production ramp-up, 
usually exceed the funds collected with a crowdfunding campaign. In particular, tech-
nology-intensive products often have a lengthy development process and consume 
much of the required capital up-front (Achleitner & Braun, 2014). Thus, in case the new 
venture cannot compensate those expenses by internal financial means, the founding 
team is obliged to find a way to fill the so called ‘equity gap’, a financial shortcoming of 
a new venture that has to be covered by alternative sources of funding (Murray, 1999). 
Given that entrepreneurial initiatives lack sufficient collateral regarding the provision 
of debt-capital from traditional lending institutions, the available financing options are 
limited in the early stages of these firms (Jeng & Wells, 2000; Knockaert et al., 2010). 
In this context, risk-capital such as venture capital is often the natural next financing 
option for young ventures with first prototypes and/or sales and promising market out-
looks (Bertoni et al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013; Sapienza, 1992). In addition to the pro-
vision of financial capital, an important advantage of a VC involvement is the manage-
rial support (i.e. ‘smart money’) that comes along with the financing (Arque-Castells, 
2012; Balboa et al., 2011; Davila et al., 2003; Sørensen, 2007). Beyond the advantages 
VC offers to new ventures in their seed and early stages of development, investments in 
these firms are characterized particularly by high information asymmetries and uncer-
tainties regarding survival and future development (Clarysse & Moray, 2004; Colombo, 
Grilli, & Verga, 2007; Knockaert et al., 2010; Lockett, Murray, & Wright, 2002). In order 
to mitigate the investment risk ex-ante, venture capitalists seek informational cues that 
support their assessment for or against an investment proposal. This setting is in line 
with signaling theory, assuming that information asymmetries can be reduced by signals 
that are observable and accessible before a decision is made (Spence, 1973; Spence, 
2002). Although scholarly work highlights a variety of signals such as the human capital 
of the venture (Petty & Gruber, 2011), patents (Baeyens et al., 2006; Knockaert et al., 
2010; Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000), or a product-oriented business model (Munari & 
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Toschi, 2011), signals in the context of crowdfunding as informational cue have not yet 
been thoroughly assessed in this context. When considering recent examples, however, 
crowdfunding seems to matter in the allocation of VC. A striking example thereof is 
Lifx, a crowdfunded hardware new venture that raised a record financing round led by 
Sequoia Capital with USD 12m investment after it had raised USD 1.3m in a very suc-
cessful Kickstarter campaign (CB Insights, 2014). This example demonstrates that a 
venture capitalist’s decision-making may be influenced by the funding decision of many 
individuals (i.e. the crowd) in order to infer whether the venture and its product or 
service is worth investing (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2016; Mollick & Nanda, 
2016). Against this backdrop, the focus lies on the question if and how a crowdfunding 
campaign influences the decision-making process of venture capitalists. Drawing on sig-
naling theory and the microfinance literature, this dissertation seeks to advance signal-
ing theory by assessing if signals relevant for non-expert investors such as the crowd 
have an equal value to expert investors such as venture capitalists and thus ultimately 
reduce information asymmetries between the investor and the investee. Despite the fact 
that both crowdfunding and VC have been subject to increased academic attention (Xu 
et al., 2016), research evidence on a combined view of these two forms of entrepre-
neurial finance is scarce. Hence, this dissertation derives the second research question 
as follows: 
Research Question 2: If, and how, are signals of a crowdfunding campaign factored into 
the investment decision-making process of venture capitalists? 
2.3.3 The Signaling Value of Crowdfunding and VC Syndication  
Given this initial intuition about crowdfunding and its positive signaling value towards 
venture capital investors in post-campaign financing rounds, this dissertation addition-
ally focuses on a particular niche of the financing process - the syndication behavior of 
venture capital investors. Taking this view is of particular importance given the fact that 
many venture capital investments are organized in syndicates in order to better assess 
the investment risk ex-ante (Ferrary, 2010; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007; Manigart 
et al., 2006; Wang & Zhou, 2004). In this context, syndicates comprise a joint equity 
investment of at least two venture capitalists (Hopp & Lukas, 2014; Terjesen, Patel, 
Fiet, & D'Souza, 2013; Wright & Lockett, 2003). When joining a syndicate, its members 
  29 
take advantage of an increase in deal flow, possible portfolio diversification, and repu-
tation gains that would otherwise be inaccessible (Altintig, Chiu, & Goktan, 2013; By-
grave, 1987; Hopp & Lukas, 2014; Sahlman, 1990). Yet, the most striking motivation 
to join a syndicate is based on the fact that an investee’s potential and investment risk 
is evaluated from multiple perspectives (Altintig et al., 2013; Bygrave, 1987; Lehmann, 
2006). When evaluating the potential of a new venture, the amount of information 
available to the assessing party (i.e. the syndicate members) is limited and largely sub-
ject to observable cues that can have the potential to reduce information asymmetries 
between the investor and the investee. As above-mentioned, empirical studies highlight 
for example that the human capital of the venture (Petty & Gruber, 2011), the availa-
bility of patents (Baeyens et al., 2006; Knockaert et al., 2010; Zacharakis & Meyer, 
2000), or the business model (Munari & Toschi, 2011) have a significant impact on the 
investment decision of venture capitalists. Yet, these signals tell little about the market 
acceptance of the product or service and thus the market potential of the venture is still 
unknown. In this regard, few empirical studies have devoted their attention towards 
the role of crowdfunding in the post-campaign financing of new ventures (e.g. Mollick 
and Kuppuswamy 2014 and Roma et al. 2017). Additionally, VC syndication in partic-
ular, with a few exceptions (Dimov & Milanov, 2010; Lehmann, 2006; Manigart et al., 
2006) has received relatively little attention. Furthermore, research on a combined view 
of both the crowdfunding literature and VC syndication is, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, still missing. In light of this research gap, this dissertation focuses on the 
question if, and how, a crowdfunding campaign influences the syndication behavior of 
venture capitalists while drawing on signaling theory and the syndication literature. 
Hence, this dissertation derives the third research question as follows.  
Research Question 3: If, and how, does a crowdfunding campaign influence the syndication 
behavior of venture capitalists? 
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3 Research-based Spin-offs and the Role of VC 
This first empirical contribution intends to develop an understanding of financing issues 
of new ventures that have emerged from an academic context. In order to elaborate on 
the research question one derived before, the analyses rest upon a proprietary dataset 
of 98 German research-based spin-offs founded between 1997 and 2012 and assess 
which firm-specific and system-inherent factors are relevant for the spin-offs’ growth 
while simultaneously drawing on the resource-based view of the firm as theoretical 
framework.2 For one thing, this research aims to evaluate whether venture capital-
backed RBSOs show a superior performance over non venture capital-backed RBSOs 
and if a possible difference in both revenue and employment growth can be explained 
by venture capitalists’ scouting or coaching capabilities. Using a variety of well-re-
spected econometric approaches such as the instrumental variables and control function 
method, the empirical results find for example that a homogeneous educational back-
ground of the academic founders is positively associated with RBSO growth. In addi-
tion, the results show that a training provided by the parent research organization in-
tended to develop entrepreneurial skills and to establish a network to outside profes-
sionals has a positive impact on RBSO growth. Likewise, the analyses also find that the 
commercialization of a radically new, instead of an incrementally new innovation, has 
a positive impact on the growth of RBSOs. Concerning the involvement of venture cap-
italists, venture capital-backed RBSOs show a superior employment and revenue growth 
compared to non-venture capital-backed RBSOs. The results support the view that this 
                                            
2 This empirical contribution has been presented at various conferences and has been 
accepted for publication at The Journal of Technology Transfer. The conference con-
tributions are as follows: Bock, C., Huber, A., & Jarchow-Pongratz, S. (2015) - Growth 
of VC-Backed Research-Based Spin-Offs – A selection or a treatment effect. Economics 
of Entrepreneurship and Innovation, Trier – Germany. Bock C., Huber, A., & Jarchow-
Pongratz, S. (2016) - Growth Factors of Research-based Spin-offs and the Role of Ven-
ture Capital Investing. Interdisziplinäre Jahreskonferenz Entrepreneurship, Innova-
tion und Mittelstand („G-Forum“), Leipzig – Germany. Bock, C., Huber, A., & Jar-
chow-Pongratz, S. (2017) - Growth Factors of Research-based Spin-offs and the Role of 
Venture Capital Investing. Economic, Technological and Societal Impacts of Entre-
preneurial Ecosystems, Augsburg – Germany. Bock, C., Huber, A., & Jarchow-
Pongratz, S. (2017) - Growth Factors of Research-based Spin-offs and the Role of Ven-
ture Capital Investing. Academy of Management Annual Meetings, Atlanta (Georgia) 
– United States of America. 
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superior performance can be attributed to the venture capitalists’ role as coaches rather 
than scouts. The remainder of the empirical contribution is structured as follows. Sec-
tions 3.1 and 3.2 give a literature review to develop an understanding of the RBSOs’ 
characteristics and their influence on performance. Further, this contribution identifies 
gaps in the prevailing literature and derives a coherent set of hypotheses. In section 3.4, 
the sample is introduced and the methods used for the empirical analysis are outlined. 
Thereafter, section 3.5 presents the empirical results as well as a discussion followed by 
a summary of the limitations and suggestions for further research (section 3.5 and 3.6). 
Section 3.7 concludes this empirical contribution. 
3.1 Literature Review on Academic Entrepreneurship 
Universities and public research institutes disseminate their scientific insights in the 
form of technology licensing, research co-operations with industry partners, or through 
the formation of RBSOs (Landry, Amara, & Rherrad, 2006). In particular, RBSOs be-
came a popular and important instrument to achieve the universities’ and public re-
search institutes’ “third mission” (Munari et al., 2015). This term circumscribes the ded-
ication of universities and public research institutes to entrepreneurship and business-
related activities that exceed their regular mission of providing teaching and research 
respectively. Another factor why these institutions increase their efforts towards actively 
encouraging entrepreneurial activities within is given by Bray and Lee (2000) and Feld-
man, Feller, Bercovitz, and Burton (2002). The authors for example argue that research 
organizations, both public and private, have the opportunity to increase income beyond 
the receipt of public funds through equity holdings from spin-offs they create. A third 
important aspect Bray and Lee (2000) and Feldman et al. (2002) name is that the in-
stitutions can foster prestige and legitimacy through the creation of RBSOs. Beyond the 
advantages of RBSO creation for the institutions themselves, the development of 
knowledge spillovers in the form of RBSOs is also a valuable instrument to transfer 
technological innovations from research organizations to the private sector (Czarnitzki 
et al., 2014; Festel, 2013; Fryges & Wright, 2014; Urbano & Guerrero, 2013; Wright, 
2014). These knowledge spillovers lead to for example the commercialization of new 
products or processes, an increase in innovative solutions and behavior, and ultimately 
job creation as a result of the new firms created (Colombo & Grilli, 2010; Criaco, Mi-
nola, Migliorini, & Serarols-Tarres, 2014; Minniti, 2008; Knockaert et al., 2010).  
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In order to develop a better understanding of RBSOs, the discipline of entrepreneurship 
research provides a large array of insights on the causes and consequences for instance 
why and especially when academics decide to become entrepreneurs (e.g Goel, Gok-
tepe-Hulten, and Ram 2015 and Guerrero, Urbano, Cunningham, and Organ 2014), or 
how the ecosystem surrounding the research institution influences the founding process 
of RBSOs (e.g McAdam and McAdam 2008). In addition, many studies also address the 
question which and how RBSO-specific resources influence the academic spin-offs’ sur-
vival or development in terms of for example growth (e.g. Klofsten and Jones-Evans 
2000 and Stam, Arzlanian, and Elfring 2014). When regarding the multi-facetted liter-
ature covering this specific field of entrepreneurship, a variety of overlapping defini-
tions can be found. For example, common to the definitions of research-based spin-offs 
is that at least one founder of the RBSO is a (former) employee of the research institu-
tion (Bonardo et al., 2010; Clarysse, Wright, Lockett, Mustar, & Knockaert, 2007; Co-
lombo & Piva, 2012). A second criterion often applied is that the technology transferred 
to the newly established spin-off has to be researched and developed within the parent 
research organization (Carayannis, Rogers, Kurihara, & Allbritton, 1998; Steffensen, 
Rogers, & Speakman, 2000). Given these commonly accepted boundary conditions used 
to better define RBSOs, this dissertation refers to RBSOs as firms that have emerged 
from an academic environment which meet the major criteria just outlined. This clear 
definition is essential since RBSOs can be considered a subgroup of NTBFs as they are 
commonly prevalent in the high-tech sector. Yet, both firm-types differ. For one thing, 
RBSOs are primarily founded by academics that are better educated and have an in-
depth technological background. For another, academic entrepreneurs possess the skills 
and networks relevant for their career in academia, whereas their experience from prior 
industrial and entrepreneurial activities is very limited or not existing at all (Agarwal & 
Shah, 2014; Colombo, Croce, & Murtinu, 2014; Lockett, Wright, & Franklin, 2003; Mur-
ray, 2004; Wright et al., 2006). Thus, while NTBFs are normally founded by business 
professionals without a history of research experience, RBSOs are founded by academ-
ics who are primarily science-oriented. A third criterion often named is that the tech-
nology invented often follows a problem-solving research-perspective (i.e. basic or ap-
plied research) whilst not being ready for commercialization or meeting the demand of 
customer needs at the time the RBSO is created (Clarysse, Wright, Lockett, van de 
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Velde, & Vohora, 2005; Colombo et al., 2014). This is in clear contrast to NTBFs as they 
usually commercialize a product or service that has a predefined and intended use. 
Based on the fact that academic entrepreneurs often lack the basic business-relevant 
capabilities, outside support is often named a prerequisite for their survival and growth. 
In line with this important basic condition and in order to smoothen the spin-off process 
and increase the RBSO’s chances of survival and growth, many research organizations 
created supporting schemes for their spin-offs as outlined in the introductory section of 
this dissertation. Amongst them are technology transfer offices, training programs, and 
other support mechanisms (Colombo et al., 2010). A clear understanding of the causes 
and consequences of these supporting schemes is however very important as they are 
costly to implement and important regarding the recipient’s development. When ac-
knowledging that the majority of studies focus on NTBFs, one has to admit that simul-
taneously only a small amount of scientific research is devoted towards understanding 
the before-mentioned peculiarities of RBSOs as a subgroup. Thus, the knowledge of 
factors being decisive for the survival and growth of these firms is still fragmentary or 
missing at all. In order to shed light on this issue, this empirical contribution provides 
novel insights about growth factors of RBSOs by analyzing RBSO-specific resources con-
cerning the founding team or resources provided by the ecosystem. Against this back-
ground, it has to be acknowledged that a firm’s resource base is crucial in developing a 
competitive advantage necessary to survive and grow. Another important aspect is re-
lated to the fact that the available resources at firm foundation have a long-lasting effect 
on its development and performance (Colombo & Piva, 2012). Hence, this empirical 
contribution relies on the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; Barney et al., 
2001; Penrose, 1996; Wernerfelt, 1984). This framework allows to generate an under-
standing how RBSO-specific resources affect the development of a competitive ad-
vantage in order to survive and grow. 
3.2 Overview of Research-based Spin-off’s Resources and Hypotheses 
In order to view the concept of academic entrepreneurship in terms of RBSO creation 
and growth, Mustar et al. (2006) give a comprehensive overview of RBSO-specific re-
search. Based on an extensive literature review, the authors develop a categorization of 
particular resources available and unavailable to RBSOs. In particular, Mustar et al. 
(2006) suggest to categorize the RBSO-specific resources into human, social, financial, 
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and technological capital. They argue that these categories are well suited for studying 
RBSOs since they offer the right degree of preciseness while being mutually exclusive. 
Given that the categorization is well-respected and the categories derived are also suit-
able for the objective of this study, this dissertation uses the suggested categorization 
of RBSO-specific resources for the purpose of this empirical contribution.  
3.2.1 Human Capital 
Within their first categorization, Mustar et al. (2006) focus on the human capital of the 
academic founding team. By definition and as before-mentioned, human capital refers 
to a set of skills, capabilities, and knowledge that individuals develop during their edu-
cation, on-the-job training, and job experience (Shrader & Siegel, 2007; Unger et al., 
2011). Human capital is often referred to have the largest impact on firm success 
amongst the resources a founding team can employ. In line with that, Colombo and 
Grilli (2010) and Shane and Venkataraman (2000) explain that human capital in the 
form of knowledge, skills, and capabilities allows the founding team to discover and 
exploit business opportunities. Said differently, without the right mix of knowledge, 
skills, and capabilities, entrepreneurs are not able to spot changing trends in markets 
and exploit the existing opportunities thereof. Another argument that supports the im-
portance of human capital is based on the fact that it also affects business planning and 
the development of a strategy. Hence, once the entrepreneur possesses the adequate 
and right amount of human capital to exploit the identified opportunity by developing 
a suitable strategy, the new venture’s success is positively influenced (Baum, Locke, & 
Smith, 2001). Third, knowledge also helps to acquire relevant resources such as finan-
cial means or physical assets which are necessary for the new venture to grow (Brush, 
Greene, Hart, & Haller, 2001). In line with that and based on a meta-analytic study on 
human capital and firm performance, Unger et al. (2011) highlight that founding teams 
with heterogeneous human capital are more efficient than founding teams with homo-
geneous human capital when the management of a new venture is considered. 
Although the human capital is amongst the most important resources for a new ven-
ture’s growth, it has surprisingly received only little attention in the literature concern-
ing RBSOs (Criaco et al., 2014; Nielsen, 2015). However, understanding the human 
capital resources of RBSOs is crucial since RBSO founding teams are very likely homo-
geneous and would thus not be subject to the advantages resulting from heterogeneity 
  35 
just outlined. The homogeneous nature of RBSOs results primarily from the founding 
members often sharing a similar educational background and career path within a re-
search organization while working as a scientist in a research group. Hence, academic 
entrepreneurs are rather homogeneous considering both, their research experience 
within the research organization but also considering their non-existent experience in 
management tasks. Second, the academic founders’ in-depth technological knowledge 
is often based on a scientific career in the field of engineering or natural sciences. Thus, 
if scientists decide to become entrepreneurs by commercializing their newly invented 
technology in the form of an RBSO, the founders will likely be homogeneous regarding 
their academic career, too.  
The particular human capital base of RBSOs is also confirmed by studies that address 
their specific context. In line with Unger et al. (2011), some studies find that heteroge-
neity in terms of prior education and professional experience has, in multiple contextual 
settings, a large positive influence on a new venture’s development (Knockaert, Ucbasa-
ran, Wright, & Clarysse, 2011; Visintin & Pittino, 2014). One reason Knockaert et al. 
(2011) mention is that a heterogeneous management team is more likely capable of 
realizing changes in a new venture’s environment and is better equipped to positively 
anticipate these changes. Based on this argumentation, the RBSO’s homogeneous 
founding teams are less likely prepared to react to changes in the RBSO’s environment 
due to a lack of adequate experience in areas not related to the technology invented 
(i.e. accounting, marketing, etc.). Based on that, the following hypothesis is derived.  
Hypothesis 1a: Homogeneity amongst academic founders has a negative influ-
ence on the RBSO’s growth. 
On the contrary, a founding team with a homogeneous educational background can 
also be beneficial to the RBSO’s development as the very specific high-tech develop-
ments involve a deep technical understanding and background of the founding team 
members (Tsui, Egan, & O'Reilly, 1992). Academic entrepreneurs with a similar educa-
tional background commonly share a collective ‘mindset’ (Knockaert et al., 2011) based 
on similar knowledge and experience in their specific field of research (Beckman, Bur-
ton, & O'Reilly, 2007; Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003). In RBSOs, this common ground 
is likely to prevail since scientific research groups often comprise academics from the 
same or a similar discipline while working on research projects in a specific area (i.e. 
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biotechnology). In addition, an equal educational background amongst scientists eases 
communication since all team members share a common understanding and vocabu-
lary. Thus, founders who share a similar educational background are also likely to share 
a mutual understanding and respect which leads to better team integration (Amason & 
Sapienza, 1997). Further, founders with unequal educational backgrounds may pursue 
varying objectives with the new venture created. For example, founders with a business-
oriented degree might give more priority to business-oriented goals aiming at selling 
products fast in order to develop profit whereas founders with a research-oriented de-
gree such as engineering or a similar one may be more focused on technology develop-
ment leading to team conflicts (Meyer, 2003). In other words, a homogeneous founding 
team can be beneficial in the complex high-tech environment in which RBSOs operate 
so that a technological understanding is crucial considering successful product devel-
opment. Based on that, the following hypothesis is derived:  
Hypothesis 1b: Homogeneity amongst academic founders has a positive influ-
ence on the RBSO’s growth.  
3.2.2 Social Capital 
The second resource category suggested by Mustar et al. (2006) deals with the social 
capital of the founding team. Brush et al. (2001) defines a firms’ social capital to consist 
of its contacts to industrial and financial partners. According to Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
(1998), social capital can be distinguished from human capital by referring to the net-
work of people outside the firm. Beyond the importance of human capital, social capital 
is seen as another elementary resource important for entrepreneurs (Hayter, 2016). In 
line with this, Stam et al. (2014) argue that network diversity of small firm founders 
has the strongest impact on firm growth considering different aspects of social capital 
such as the network size or the strength of the network. In line with that, Scholten, 
Omta, Kemp, and Elfring (2015) find in their empirical study on 70 university spin-offs 
that a broad network of the founding team has a significantly positive influence on 
employee growth. Likewise, Walter, Auer, and Ritter (2006) found in their study on 
149 university spin-offs a positive relation of networks on a firm’s sales, the realized 
competitive advantage, and its perceived quality of customer relationships.  
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The knowledge contribution provided by external partners is certainly one reason for 
the positive effect of social capital on firm performance. Thus, the more contacts the 
founders have in their network, the more information can be used and exploited in 
order to build a competitive advantage (Batjargal, 2003; Huang, Lai, & Lo, 2012; Yli-
Renko, Autio, & Sapienza, 2001). Based on these findings, strong network alliances are 
crucial for RBSOs in order to expand their businesses. 
However, when referring to the latest research on RBSOs, these firms are characterized 
to have a rather homogeneous social capital (i.e. network) with a majority of ties in the 
academic community and only a few connections to industry professionals (Agarwal & 
Shah, 2014; Colombo et al., 2014; Lockett et al., 2003; Murray, 2004; Wright et al., 
2006). In order to alleviate this inherent shortcoming of academic founders, research 
institutions often adopt measures to mitigate the RBSO’s suboptimal resource endow-
ments regarding their network ties. Thereof, one measure to foster stronger ties to part-
ners outside academia is certainly the provision of support schemes (Mosey & Wright, 
2007). These allow the academic entrepreneurs to artificially create important network 
contacts with professionals from outside academia and establish ties to them through 
specially designed venues. These support schemes often take on the form of trainings 
and events that help extend the academic entrepreneur’s network to for example ac-
countants, consultants, investors, or a variety of knowledgeable industry experts. In 
addition, these trainings teach a basic understanding of entrepreneurship and manage-
ment. In other words, these supporting schemes are undertaken to increase the found-
ers’ managerial competencies and their personal network. In accordance with the em-
pirical findings of the positive role of social networks towards firm survival and growth, 
the following hypothesis is derived: 
Hypothesis 2: Supporting schemes offered by the parent research organization 
intended to develop a broader social capital for the RBSOs have a positive effect 
on the RBSO’s growth.  
3.2.3 Financial Capital 
The third resource category important to RBSOs are the financial resources available to 
the academic founding team. Mustar et al. (2006) define financial resources as the 
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amount and type of financing available to the entrepreneur necessary to fund for exam-
ple business operations. The authors distinguish between capital, bank loans, subsidies, 
and reserved profits.  
Within the context of academic entrepreneurship, the related inventions are often the 
result of basic research, resulting in a technology being in a seed or start-up stage when 
spinning out (Colyvas, Crow, Gelijns, Mazzoleni, Nelson, Rosenberg, & Sampat, 2002; 
Jensen & Thursby, 2001). Given this high-tech nature, RBSOs are typically capital-in-
tense and need large amounts of financing before actually entering the market, gener-
ating revenues, and ultimately retaining profits. Hence, RBSOs usually start with an 
incumbent technology requiring large efforts and a costly and lengthy development 
process in order to create a marketable product or service and start generating profits. 
For example, RBSOs in the early development stages need capital to develop first pro-
totypes, fund costly laboratories and laboratory equipment, or conduct product testing 
using state of the art facilities. Given this immense burden that academic entrepreneurs 
have to overcome before generating first revenues, the founders’ private financial re-
sources are often insufficient in order to cover the costs for these financial deployments 
(Wright et al., 2006). Given the high risk involved with new ventures in general and 
new technologies in particular, debt financing is not an option in the seed and early 
stages of RBSOs since they lack assets that might serve as collateral (Grilli & Murtinu, 
2015; Jeng & Wells, 2000; Knockaert et al., 2010; Revest & Sapio, 2012). As a result, 
academic entrepreneurs have two alternative sources of financing available: subsidies 
or equity investments.  
Nonetheless, private investors such as venture capitalists are often hesitant to invest at 
this stage due to high transaction costs, information asymmetries, and uncertainties 
concerning the successful transfer of a highly innovative technology to a marketable 
product or service (Clarysse & Moray, 2004; Colombo et al., 2007; Knockaert et al., 
2010; Lockett et al., 2002). As a result, subsidies as well as funding from the parent 
research organization are likely the only real alternative to fill the funding gap when 
creating an RBSO and spinning out. However, the allocation of subsidies can be subject 
to a lengthy approval process involving multiple individuals and the amounts provided 
then are often not very high and thus insufficient. In order to circumvent the potentially 
exhausting process of gaining funding from various public and private sources, public 
  39 
research institutes can support their spin-offs by investing equity directly. This unique 
circumstance may have two advantages for the academic entrepreneur. For one thing, 
the equity financing acts as bridge-financing intended to overcome the financial gap in 
early development stages and stimulate growth. For another, it can serve as a quality 
signal to outside investors, such as for example venture capitalists (Bertoni et al., 2011; 
Gubitta, Tognazzo, & Destro, 2016). Unfortunately however, research on the effect of 
equity from universities and public research institutes towards the performance of the 
awardees is limited (Munari et al., 2015). Nightingale et al. (2009) are an exception 
while studying the effect of government-backed and university-oriented VC schemes in 
the United Kingdom using empirical data. Their findings attest a positive, yet modest 
impact of university-oriented seed funds (USF) on firm performance. Further Munari et 
al. (2015) find in their study on 1,497 new ventures that those backed by USFs perform 
better in follow-up funding rounds and in acquiring capital by syndicates. Further, the 
authors find that new ventures are more likely to attract follow-up funding once they 
are backed by internally managed USFs that have a connection to a university with a 
high scientific reputation. 
Yet, a pure equity engagement by a USF cannot be compared to the structure and ob-
jectives of an independent investment fund. As mentioned before, the financial means 
provided by the research institutes mainly serve as the initial spark to fill the equity gap 
in order to accelerate technology commercialization. The intention is not however, to 
aim for substantial capital provision with the funds provided. Thus, the provision of 
financing by a research institute may translate into optimized research processes, faster 
development of new products and services, as well as market access and commerciali-
zation, which in turn positively affect the growth of the RBSO. Based on that, the fol-
lowing hypothesis is derived: 
Hypothesis 3: A financial investment from the parent research organization has 
a positive effect on the RBSO’s growth.  
3.2.4 Technological Capital 
When referring to the heterogeneous landscape of RBSOs and their varying technolog-
ical resources such as R&D capabilities, the degree of innovation, and the scope and 
quality of the product or service, one can conclude that their technological resources 
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have been less explored in literature (Mustar et al., 2006). Understanding the role of 
technological resources and firm growth is of particular importance for RBSOs, how-
ever. The technological innovations that are commercialized by RBSOs are often the 
result of a problem-solving research-perspective but at the same time do not necessarily 
meet customer needs at the time when the firm is founded (Baum & Silverman, 2004; 
Colombo et al., 2014). This is owed to the fact that academic entrepreneurs work in an 
environment of basic or applied research. In other words, many such academic inven-
tions may just meet the demand of a specific group (i.e. lightweight products in the 
automotive sector), while other inventions require that existing market participants 
adapt to the new technology (i.e. additive manufacturing instead of milling). In addi-
tion, many scientific endeavors may be so radical in nature that they are disruptive and 
need a lengthy development phase until first use-cases are found so that the new tech-
nology can be scaled. As a result, RBSOs may have the potential to develop ground-
breaking innovations on the one hand, while facing the challenge of finding applications 
for their innovations on the other (Gruber, Macmillan, & Thompson, 2013). In line with 
this argumentation are Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, and Lyman (1990) who state that the 
more radical an innovation is, the higher the technological uncertainty when transfer-
ring the invention to a usable product or service. 
Empirical studies on the innovation-performance relationship of small and medium-
sized enterprises show inconclusive results, though (Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, & 
Bausch, 2011). For instance, Clarysse et al. (2011) found in a study on 73 university 
spin-offs that the degree of newness of the technology is negatively associated with firm 
growth. The authors give as explanation that the development and commercialization 
of a novel technology requires extensive time and major effort to understand the cus-
tomer’s need and thus satisfy various interest groups so that generating first revenues 
is not the foremost activity performed by the academic entrepreneur. Thus, RBSOs face 
the challenge to find potential users that believe in the benefit of the (radically) new 
technology and who are willing to complement or even replace their existing technol-
ogy. Thus, the more radical the invention is, the more difficult it will be for the RBSO’s 
founders to convince potential users. Based in this argumentation, the following is hy-
pothesized: 
  41 
Hypothesis 4a: A higher degree of novelty of the technology commercialized has 
a negative effect on the RBSO’s growth. 
On the contrary, RBSOs often develop radically new technologies that have the poten-
tial to complement or even substitute other prevailing technologies existing on the mar-
ket. These radically new technologies are often referred to as being disruptive. An ex-
ample thereof is the rise of applications for additive manufacturing (i.e. 3D-printing) in 
the recent past. For example, traditional processes such as milling and casting have 
been around for years and are the workhorse-processes of many industries. However, 
with the availability of new technologies concerning laser-guidance and computer pro-
graming, these processes face a serious competitor once the end-users have thoroughly 
considered all the (dis-)advantages that come along with the new technology. In that 
regard, Clarysse et al. (2011) find that a broad scope (i.e. applicability) of a technology 
is positively associated with growth as more potential customers can use the new in-
vention as would be for example the case of additive manufacturing. In addition, 
Aspelund, Berg-Utby, and Skjevdal (2005) found in their study of Norwegian and Swe-
dish technology-based new ventures that a greater degree of innovativeness leads to a 
higher probability of survival. Aspelund et al. (2005) argue that incremental inventions 
in contrast to radical inventions offer only a minor competitive advantage to the firm. 
Technologies that are less radical are more likely to find imitators, which in turn will 
diminish the initial competitive advantage of the new invention. On the other hand, 
highly radical innovations raise the entry barriers for potential competitors and leave 
the RBSO more time to exploit the value of the product or service. Hence, the following 
is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 4b: A higher degree of novelty of the technology commercialized has 
a positive effect on the RBSO’s growth. 
3.3 Overview of VC Investing in Research-based Spin-offs 
As mentioned before, venture capitalists typically support entrepreneurs who have al-
ready completed initial research or developed first prototypes and have a certain history 
regarding sales (Bertoni et al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013; Sapienza, 1992). When refer-
ring to the literature on entrepreneurial finance, both theoretical and empirical findings 
argue that firms backed by venture capitalists outperform their non-VC-backed peers 
(Alperovych & Hubner, 2013; Bertoni et al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013; Engel, 2002; 
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Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998). Yet, the causality for this finding is not solved to the last 
extent. Two primary views exist in that regard. First, the increased performance of VC-
backed over non-VC-backed firms may be the result of a venture capitalist simply scout-
ing promising firms that would also grow in the absence of VC (i.e. scout function). The 
contrary viewpoint argues that a VC investment also inherits a coaching function by 
providing management services that go beyond the provision of pure equity. For exam-
ple, venture capitalists support the professionalization of the internal organization of 
the firm, i.e. installing a suitable governance structure or the introduction of stock op-
tion plans as part of their coaching role (Hellmann & Puri, 2002). Thus, a VC involve-
ment is beneficial to the investee in terms of a management team professionalization 
leading to increased chances of survival and growth (Alperovych & Hubner, 2013; Ber-
toni et al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013; Engel, 2002; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998). Hence, 
the coaching role may also serve as an explanation why VC-backed firms demonstrate 
a higher performance compared to firms without such support.  
When referring to the peculiar characteristics of RBSOs, high information asymmetries 
between the venture capitalist and the founding team are of particular importance. 
These are for example characterized by a high uncertainty about the technology or the 
product’s market potential as well as a founding team lacking commercial skills. Said 
differently, when referring to the often developed platform technologies that do not 
necessarily target a specific user group, the success of the technology is difficult to assess 
ex-ante. Hence, venture capitalists may hesitate to invest in RBSOs (Knockaert et al., 
2010; Munari et al., 2015; Munari & Toschi, 2011). An investment in RBSOs can on the 
other side be attractive for VC investors. First, they possess experience in screening the 
future growth potential of new ventures so that they dispose of the abilities to pick the 
most promising investments given their extensive experience (Amit et al., 1998; Chan, 
1983). Second, venture capitalists can influence an RBSO’s development after having 
invested by e.g. taking a seat on the board and influencing the new venture’s strategy. 
Amongst the first to disentangle the growth of VC-backed firms into a treatment and 
selection effect were Davila et al. (2003) and Engel (2002). As above-mentioned, Engel 
(2002) confirmed - based on a sample of 1,074 German new ventures - that firm growth 
is rather the result of the financial involvement and the services provided by the venture 
capitalist than the firm-specific characteristics before a venture capitalist’s involvement. 
Davila et al. (2003) came to a similar conclusion concerning employee growth. They 
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state that the VC-backed firms’ employment growth is larger compared to the employ-
ment growth of firms without VC after their first round of VC financing. Further, they 
find that the employment growth of VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms show no dif-
ference before VC is allocated. A further confirmation of a coaching effect was also 
supported by Balboa et al. (2011), Bertoni et al. (2011), and Colombo and Grilli (2010). 
The authors link the sales and employee growth of the firms investigated to the active 
involvement of venture capitalists rather than their ability to select firms with outstand-
ing characteristics. 
Over and beyond the existence of a coaching effect, Baum and Silverman (2004) came 
to the conclusion that the superior performance of VC-backed over non-VC-backed firms 
is the result of both a scouting and a coaching effect. Their study refers to a sample of 
204 biotechnology firms. The authors find for instance that venture capitalists act as 
scouts by investing only in firms with a strong technology. However, they continue, 
venture capitalists also act as coaches at the same time by providing important man-
agement skills to the entrepreneurs. Further, Chemmanur et al. (2011) found in their 
study on 1,881 firms that the efficiency, measured by total factor productivity, for VC-
backed firms prior to and after receiving financing was higher than that of non-VC-
backed firms. The authors deem this finding to venture capitalists being able to screen 
and select better-performing firms. Further, the authors also find that efficiency growth 
for VC-backed firms is larger compared to similar non-VC-backed industry-peers. Sum-
marizing these studies who try to disentangle the value increase by venture capitalists 
into a scouting or coaching effect, the majority of studies confirms that it is likely the 
venture capitalists’ ability to influence firm performance rather than their ability to pick 
firms that would also grow in the absence of VC. However, this phenomenon has not 
been investigated in the context of RBSOs. Hence, this empirical contribution aims at 
disentangling the causality of a venture capitalist’s involvement in RBSOs and its effect 
on RBSO growth. 
3.4 Data and Research Methodology 
3.4.1 Dataset and Descriptive Statistics  
In order to answer the first research question derived and to test the hypotheses just 
outlined, this empirical contribution rests upon a sample of 98 German RBSOs founded 
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in the period 1997 through 2012 that spun out from the ‘Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’, a 
German public research organization. Based on a study by Acatech (2010), the ‘Fraun-
hofer Gesellschaft’ accounted for a total of 432 RBSOs as of 2007 and is thus the insti-
tution with the highest number of spin-offs amongst the largest public research insti-
tutes in Germany.3 Beyond the high number of spin-offs, the ‘Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’ 
is also amongst the largest public research organizations in Europe providing applied 
research in the areas of health, security, communication, mobility, energy, and the en-
vironment (Fraunhofer, 2016). Figure 4 indicates that the number of RBSOs created 
peaked in the years 2001 and 2009, each representing years when the economy 
slumped due to major market turmoil. Further, the number of VC equity awardees fol-
lows the number of research institute equity awardees. The latter circumscribes the 
number of equity contributions the ‘Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’ has invested into its own 
RBSOs. The highest level of equity investments provided by the ‘Fraunhofer Gesell-
schaft’ peaked in the year 2009 and declined notably thereafter. 
Figure 4: History of Research-based Spin-off Creation 
The figure shows the trend of the absolute number of RBSOs created, the number of research 
institute equity awardees, and the VC equity awardees in the period 1997 through 2012. 
 
                                            
3 The largest public research institutes in Germany include the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft 
zur Förderung der angewandten Forschung e. V., the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur 
Förderung der Wissenschaften e. V., the Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft Deutscher For-
schungszentren e. V., and the Wissenschaftsgemeinschaft Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz e. 
V. 
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With the help of Fraunhofer Ventures, the research institute’s TTO, detailed firm-rele-
vant data on 243 spin-offs could be collected using a questionnaire. The questionnaire 
was developed in order to fit to the context of RBSOs and collected information con-
cerning the RBSO in general (i.e. business sector, founding year), the financing history 
(i.e. forms of financing such as subsidies, VC, and other), information about the aca-
demic founding team (i.e. number of founders, educational background, or professional 
experience), as well as information concerning the business model, the technology 
transferred, and the competitive environment (i.e. use of patents, number of competi-
tors). The questionnaire was sent directly to the founders of the 243 identified spin-
offs. The founders and the top management teams were directly addressed and asked 
to answer the survey as these individuals can best judge the aspects considered in the 
survey. In order to increase the response rate, the data collection process comprised 
important elements recommended by the ‘Total Design Methodology’ of Dillman 
(2000). In cooperation with Fraunhofer Ventures, an introductory letter explaining the 
context, the timeline, and the main purpose of the study and stressing the importance 
of the respondents’ input concerning the improvement of Fraunhofer’s spin-off process 
was sent. The questionnaire was distributed mid-April 2013 using both e-mail and phys-
ical delivery and non-respondents were reminded using e-mail and telephone contact 
until the end of the survey period in May 2013. Finally, this procedure helped to receive 
answers from 100 respondents, corresponding to a response rate of about 41 percent. 
This response rate is rather high contacting founders and top management team mem-
bers in the context of research-based spin-offs and technology transfer (see e.g. similar 
contexts and comparable or lower response rates in the surveys of Aldridge, Audretsch, 
Desai, and Nadella 2014; Grimm and Jaenicke 2015; Munari, Rasmussen, Toschi, and 
Villani 2016; and Sellenthin 2009). Having used elements such as a well-structured 
cover letter and reminders as suggested by Dillman (2000), and having the additional 
advantage of the ‘Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’ supporting the project, the response rate is 
very satisfactory. After excluding two incomplete questionnaires, the final sample com-
prises 98 RBSOs.  
All firms in the sample comply with the definition of an RBSO as outlined before. In 
order to verify the answers received and to mitigate potential single respondent bias, 
this dissertation additionally controlled and complemented the quality of the answers 
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with an internal spin-off database provided by Fraunhofer Ventures. This complemen-
tary database, comprising the entire population of spin-offs from the ‘Fraunhofer Ge-
sellschaft’, ensures that fundamental data provided by survey respondents (firm age, 
the number of founders, outside investors, etc.) is verified. The surveyed firms operate 
in a variety of industries and have received either equity finance from the research or-
ganization, from venture capitalists, a combination of both or have no investor at all. 
Overall, the sample comprises 31 RBSOs having received VC. More information about 
the financing of the RBSOs is provided by figure 5. The figure illustrates that 56 RBSOs 
indicated that they have not received an equity investment from the ‘Fraunhofer Gesell-
schaft’. On the contrary, 42 RBSOs indicated to have received an equity investment from 
‘Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’. Thereof, 22 RBSOs indicated to also have received VC and 20 
RBSOs did not.  
Figure 5: Distribution of FhG and VC Equity Involvements in RBSOs 
The figure shows the allocation of equity investments provided by the ‘Fraunhofer Gesell-
schaft’ as well as equity investments from venture capitalists in RBSOs. 
 
 
When regarding the distribution of the business model, 73 RBSOs indicated to follow a 
product-oriented business model and only 25 indicated to provide a service (figure 6). 
When regarding the reduced sample of RBSOs that have received a VC equity financing 
(i.e. 31 RBSOs), the distribution remains unchanged. In other words, 27 out of 31 
RBSOs and thus the overwhelming majority follows a product-oriented business model. 
In addition to the distribution of the business model, table 1 reports the number and 
ratio of VC-backed and non-VC-backed RBSOs across industries.  
56
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Figure 6: Business Model Distribution amongst RBSOs 
The figure shows the allocation of product- and service-oriented business models of the 
RBSOs regarding the total sample as well as the RBSOs having received VC. 
  
Table 1: Industry Overview of VC-backed and non-VC-backed RBSOs 
The table shows an overview of industry affiliation separated by the total sample (column 
1), RBSOs with VC (column 2) and RBSOs without VC (column 3). 
Industry 
All RBSOs  VC-backed       
RBSOs 
 Non-VC-backed  
RBSOs 
N. of  
firms  
(abs.) 
N. of 
firms  
(in %) 
  N. of 
firms  
(abs.) 
N. of  
firms  
(in %) 
  N. of  
firms  
(abs.) 
N. of    
firms  
(in %) 
Biotechnology 5 5% 
 
5 16% 
 
0 0% 
Commerce 1 1% 
 
0 0% 
 
1 1% 
Consulting 9 9% 
 
0 0% 
 
9 13% 
Energy 11 11% 
 
5 16% 
 
6 9% 
Construction/            
Architecture/Planning 
2 2% 
 
0 0% 
 
2 3% 
Mechanical-/Automo-
tive Engineering 
23 23% 
 
7 23% 
 
16 24% 
Electrical Engineering/ 
Telecommunications 
17 17% 
 
8 26% 
 
9 13% 
Chemicals/               
Pharmaceuticals 
6 6% 
 
0 0% 
 
6 9% 
Marketing/Media 1 1% 
 
1 3% 
 
0 0% 
Research 3 3% 
 
0 0% 
 
3 4% 
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Environment Water 4 4% 
 
1 3% 
 
3 4% 
IT/Internet/Web2.0 9 9% 
 
2 6% 
 
7 10% 
Medical Technology 7 7% 
 
2 6% 
 
5 7% 
Total 98 100%   31 100%   67 100% 
3.4.2 Variables and Methods 
To investigate which resources influence the growth of RBSOs, the employee and reve-
nue growth rates of the respective RBSOs are calculated. Both employee and revenue 
growth rates are expressed as the compound average annual growth rate (CAGR) cov-
ering the period from the year the RBSO has been founded in to the survey date. These 
measures are often used as proxies for firm growth in the context of studies focusing on 
new ventures as well as RBSOs (e.g. Colombo and Grilli 2010 or Visintin and Pittino 
2014). The use of these measures is appropriate since an increase in employees attests 
growth even if the RBSO does not generate any revenues from sales of its products or 
services given the sometimes lengthy development process outlined before. Further, an 
increase in employees results in growing managerial complexity which is also consid-
ered a proxy of firm growth in the entrepreneurship literature (Delmar, Davidsson, & 
Gartner, 2003). Considering revenue growth, this measure is a direct indicator of mar-
ket acceptance for the RBSOs (Clarysse et al., 2011). The use of two independent 
measures of firm growth adds robustness to the results.  
Independent and Control Variables 
In addition to the dependent variables used, the independent and the control variables 
are summarized in table 2. In order to analyze the resource type ‘human capital’, the 
educational background of the academic founding team is used. The survey allowed the 
respondents to choose from the following educational categories: MINT (Mathematics, 
Informatics, Natural sciences, and Technology), law, business, and the subject “other”. 
Using that information, a dummy variable Educational Homogeneity was generated. The 
dummy variable was coded with the value of one if all academic founders share a similar 
educational background. If the educational background was heterogeneous however, 
the variable was coded with the value of zero. The resource category ‘Social capital’ 
comprises the two dummy variables TrainingI and TrainingII. While TrainingI focuses 
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on the process of technology transfer and coaches academic entrepreneurs about basic 
concepts of entrepreneurial activities (i.e. firm foundation, technology commercializa-
tion), TrainingII aims at developing entrepreneurial and managerial skills as well as 
strong network ties in order to find financial investors such as venture capitalists. Each 
variable was coded with a value of one if the founding team participated in the respec-
tive training and zero otherwise. As afore-mentioned, the parent research organization 
has the possibility to invest equity in their RBSOs directly alleviating the academic 
founding team from financial constraints when spinning out. In order to depict whether 
or not the ‘Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’ provided equity to the academic founding team, the 
variable PRO-Equity was used in order to account for the third resource category, finan-
cial capital. The variable was coded to take the value of one if the research organization 
invested equity in the RBSO and zero otherwise. The last resource category covered is 
related to the technological capital. Hence, a dummy variable Noveltechnology was em-
ployed indicating whether the academic founding team developed a technology that is 
free of competition and absolute novel to the market when the RBSO was created. In 
case this technological prerequisite is met, the variable Noveltechnology was coded with 
the value of one and zero otherwise.  
In addition to the independent variables used, this dissertation also controls for several 
effects that might influence the RBSOs’ growth in addition to the independent variables. 
First, the RBSO’s age as well as the number of academic founding team members is 
accounted for using the variables Firm Age and Founders (e.g. Criaco et al. 2014 and 
Scholten et al. 2015). The variables show the RBSO’s age and number of founding 
members as a numeric value respectively. Second, the respective economic condition is 
controlled for with the variable gross domestic product (GDP). The variable measures 
the average GDP development from the new venture’s foundation to the survey date in 
order to accommodate possible positive or negative trends in the economic develop-
ment that would provide an alternative explanation of RBSO development such as a 
growth or a decline in sales. Third, the dummy variables B2B and Patent take the value 
of one in case the RBSO generates its revenues primarily with business partners (instead 
of private consumers), or if the RBSO commercializes a patented technology and zero 
otherwise. Fourth, the dummy variable Product Business indicates the value of one in 
case the RBSO follows a product-oriented instead of a service-oriented business model. 
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Fifth, the founders’ prior experience in entrepreneurship is controlled for with the var-
iable Entrepreneurship Experience. The variable represents a numeric value between zero 
and five, whilst five indicates the highest level of knowledge for entrepreneurship ex-
perience and zero indicates the lowest level. Sixth, the variable High-Tech is employed 
in order to account for the industry in which the RBSO operates. The variable takes the 
value of one if the RBSO operates in the following industries: Biotechnology, Chemi-
cals/Pharmaceuticals, Electrical Engineering/Telecommunications, Medical Technol-
ogy, or IT/Internet/Web2.0 and zero otherwise (see Colombo et al. 2014; Kile and Phil-
lips 2009; and Tether and Storey 1998 for a similar classification of high-technology 
industries). Lastly, the receipt of VC is controlled for with the dummy variable VC-Equity 
taking the value of one in case the RBSO received VC and zero otherwise. A summary 
of variables used is outlined in table 2. 
Table 2: Definition of Variables 
The table describes the independent and control variables used. 
Variable Description 
 
 
Dependent Variables  
  
Employee CAGR Variable indicating the compound average annual employee growth 
rate from RBSO foundation until 2012 
Revenue CAGR Variable indicating the compound average annual revenue growth 
rate from RBSO foundation until 2012 
  
Control Variables 
 
 
 
Firm Age Variable indicating the age of the company in the year 2012 
Founders Variable indicating the team size at firm foundation 
GDP Variable indicating the average GDP of the period the RBSO has op-
erated in until 2012 
B2B A dummy variable indicating the value of one if the RBSO gener-
ates revenues primarily with B2B customers and zero otherwise 
Entrepreneurship                  
Experience 
Variable indicating the level of entrepreneurship-related experience 
within the founding team 
Patent A dummy variable indicating the value of one if the RBSO’s tech-
nology is protected by a patent and zero otherwise 
Product Business A dummy variable indicating the value of one if the RBSO follows a 
product-oriented business model and zero otherwise 
High-Tech A dummy variable indicating the value of one if the RBSO operates 
in the High-Tech industry and zero otherwise 
Inverse Mill's Ratio Variable controlling for a potential selection bias of venture capital-
ists    
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Independent          
Variables 
 
Educational             
Homogeneity 
A dummy variable indicating the value of one if the founding team 
shares an equal educational background and zero otherwise 
TrainingI A dummy variable indicating the value of one if the founder(-s) 
was/were granted participation in the training and zero otherwise 
TrainingII A dummy variable indicating the value of one if the founder(-s) 
was/were granted participation in the training and zero otherwise 
PRO-Equity A dummy variable indicating the value of one if the RBSO received 
equity from the parent research organization and zero otherwise 
Noveltechnology A dummy variable indicating the value of one if the RBSO intro-
duced a more radical technology to the market and zero otherwise 
VC-Equity A dummy variable indicating the value of one if the RBSO received 
venture capital and zero otherwise   
Instrumental Variable 
 
Average IPO USA Variable indicating the average amount of IPOs in the USA from 
RBSO foundation until 2012 
 
Econometric Methods 
In order to analyze which resources influence the growth and development of an RBSO, 
three approaches are used. First, a multivariate regression analysis (OLS) is employed 
to account for the effect the independent and control variables have on RBSO growth. 
Since VC finance is likely endogenous to RBSO growth, this dissertation abstains from 
using the dummy variable VC-Equity within the set of covariates when using OLS. This 
is owed to the fact that the presence of endogeneity, if not adequately controlled for, 
might result in inconsistent estimates. Hence, in order to account for the endogenous 
nature of VC investing and to avoid generating inconsistent estimates, a two-step in-
strumental variables (IV) approach is used (see Colombo and Grilli 2010 for a similar 
application of the IV method). In order to use the IV approach correctly, this dissertation 
first estimates a selection equation by calculating the RBSO’s probability to receive VC. 
Thereby, this dissertation empirically verifies if RBSO-specific resources (i.e. the selec-
tion equation) have an effect on the receipt of VC. In the selection equation, all inde-
pendent variables that serve as proxies for the categories of human, social, financial, 
and technological capital are included. Given that these variables are supposed to have 
a positive influence on firm growth, they should also be appealing to venture capitalists 
(Colombo & Grilli, 2010). In addition, the above-mentioned control variables that have 
empirically proven to affect the receipt of VC for new ventures are added. For example, 
  52 
the dummy variable Product Business is included since the investment risk can be judged 
by looking at the product’s characteristics (Petty & Gruber, 2011). In other words, a 
physical product is more likely to decrease the risk of uncertainty from a venture capi-
talist’s perspective compared to a service-oriented product, which VC investors are less 
in favor of (Munari & Toschi, 2011). In addition, the dummy variable Patent is also 
included. The availability of a patent may serve as a positive signal to venture capitalists 
(Haeussler et al., 2014), since it allows the academic founding team to exploit its com-
petitive advantage while being protected from the entrance of new rivals (Hsu & Ziedo-
nis, 2013). Further, the academic founders’ entrepreneurship related experience is also 
accounted for with the variable Entrepreneurship Experience. Finally, the RBSO’s age 
(i.e. Firm Age), the number of academic founders (i.e. Founders), whether or not the 
RBSO operates in a high-tech industry (i.e. High-Tech), the economic condition (i.e. 
GDP), and whether or not the RBSO serves business clients (i.e. B2B) is accounted for 
in the context of the VC investment decision. In addition, the IV approach also requires 
the use of a so-called instrumental variable. In order to meet this essential criteria of 
this method, the instrument used represents the average number of initial public offer-
ings (IPO) in the USA (Average IPO USA) from RBSO foundation to the survey date. 
Since IPOs are the most preferred exit route for venture capitalists, the number of IPOs 
in a well-developed and liquid financial market such as the USA may serve as ‘heat’ 
signal that also influences VC investing in Germany (see for example Di Guo and Kun 
Jiang 2013 for a similar argumentation). In other words, this dissertation assumes that 
an increased IPO activity in the financial markets of the USA affects local VC firms to 
invest in new ventures with the intention to generate similar exits. Further, it is argued 
that although the average number of IPOs in the USA is related to the German VC ac-
tivity regarding RBSO investing, the growth of RBSOs is independent of that measure. 
The latter relationship is an important criteria that has to be satisfied in order for the 
IV approach to generate valid results (Di Guo & Kun Jiang, 2013). In order to test 
whether the variable Average IPO USA is a good instrument, the commonly accepted 
rule that the F-Test after the first stage needs to exceed the value of 10 and has to be 
significant is followed (Staiger & Stock, 1997; Stock & Yogo, 2005). In case the F-Test 
exceeds 10 and is significant, the null hypothesis can be rejected that the instrument is 
“weak”. Further, it is also tested if the instrument is relevant (i.e. correlated with the 
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endogenous regressor VC-Equity and uncorrelated with the remaining variables). There-
fore, the underidentification test is referred to following Kleibergen and Paap (2006). 
If the test statistic is significant, the null hypothesis of irrelevance can be rejected and 
it can be concluded that the variable Average IPO USA is correlated with VC-Equity and 
uncorrelated with the remaining independent and control variables.  
Based on the variables mentioned, the predicted probabilities for both VC-backed and 
non-VC-backed RBSOs to receive VC (VC-Equity (predicted)) are calculated based on 
their individual combination of resources. In a second step, the proxy variables for 
RBSO growth are regressed on the set of the previously mentioned control and inde-
pendent variables (i.e. the growth equation) as well as the newly created coefficient 
(VC-Equity (predicted)) from the first-stage IV regression (Heckman, 1978, 1979). The 
latter variable provides an estimate of the experimental average treatment effect (i.e. 
intercept effect) how a predicted VC participation influences RBSO growth (Colombo 
& Grilli, 2010).  
In addition, a control factor is added that accounts for the fact that the receipt of VC is 
non-random and that the selection process may be based on factors being unobservable. 
To account for that unobserved heterogeneity in the VC investment process (i.e. selec-
tion bias), a Heckman correction method is applied using the inverse Mill’s ratio) (Heck-
man, 1979; Hellmann & Puri, 2002). To derive the inverse Mill’s ratio, this empirical 
contribution first computes a probit selection model that is equal to the selection equa-
tion of the IV regression. Based on the residuals of the predicted probabilities of each 
RBSO to receive VC, the inverse Mill’s ratio is computed (see Bertoni et al. 2011 and 
Engel 2002 for a similar approach). This inverse Mill’s ratio addresses the potential 
selection bias and generates more consistent estimation parameters in the regressions 
(Colombo & Grilli, 2010; Tucker, 2010). Thus, the inverse Mill’s ratio is inserted in the 
growth equation of the IV approach in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity 
and hence, more consistent estimation parameters. As the IV approach first estimates 
the predicted probability of VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms to receive VC and uses 
these predicted probabilities in a second-stage linear regression, it is corrected for pos-
sible correlations of the endogenous explanatory variable (VC-Equity) and the error 
terms of the exogenous explanatory variables.  
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In order to verify the results from the IV regression, this dissertation also employs a 
control function (CF) as a third approach (see Colombo and Grilli 2010 and Vella and 
Verbeek 1999 for a similar approach). Within the control function, a control factor (i.e. 
the estimated value of the generalized residuals) is computed for both VC-backed and 
non-VC-backed RBSOs based on the receipt of VC using the probit regression. Hence, if 
a venture capitalist would act as a scout, all observed and unobserved factors that pos-
itively influence RBSO growth would have a likewise positive impact on the receipt of 
VC. Thus, a positive correlation of the error terms in the selection equation and the 
growth equation would exist resulting in a positive coefficient for the residual lambda 
(Colombo & Grilli, 2010). This residual (Lambda (VC)) is included in the set of covari-
ates of the growth equation including the dummy variable VC-Equity. In this specifica-
tion, the latter expresses the experimental average treatment effect. In case both IV 
regression and control function approach lead to similar results, the analyses are more 
robust (Colombo & Grilli, 2010; Vella & Verbeek, 1999).  
3.5 Empirical Results and Discussion 
Based on the introduction of the variables and methods used, this section summarizes 
and discusses the empirical results derived. For a better overview, the findings are pre-
sented in two sections, starting with the results concerning the RBSOs’ growth rates and 
continuing with the results concerning the role of a VC involvement. In the third sub-
section, a discussion of the results is presented. Table 3 presents the results of the OLS 
regressions referring to RBSO employee growth as dependent variable. First, the control 
and independent variables are presented in separate specifications (models 1-5). Sec-
ond, the full model is presented with all control and independent variables (model 6). 
Positive and significant values in the models indicate a positive association with RBSO 
employee growth. In table 4, the receipt of VC is included in the analysis by controlling 
for endogeneity using the IV and the CF approach (columns 3 and 4). For reasons of 
comparison, the analyses also contain a regular OLS approach including the dummy 
variable VC-Equity without any controls for endogeneity (table 4, column 2). Although 
the analyses might suffer from endogeneity, the results are nevertheless presented for 
reasons of comparison. Further, table 4 reports the results of the probit equation where 
the dichotomous variable VC-Equity is regressed on a set of covariates (i.e. the selection 
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equation) in order to compute the predicted values for each RBSO to receive VC (col-
umn 1). The results represent average marginal effects. Finally, tables 5 and 6 represent 
the results of the analyses using revenue growth as the dependent variable to test the 
robustness of the results. In order to verify whether or not the combination of variables 
suffers from multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF) are used. Due to the fact 
that mean VIF values of the models lie below the suggested threshold level of five as 
suggested by Chatterjee and Hadi (2006) and the maximum VIF values below the 
threshold level of 10 as suggested by O'Brien (2007), this dissertation concludes that 
multicollinearity is not an issue. 
3.5.1 Results Concerning Growth Factors of Research-based Spin-offs 
When the employee growth of the RBSO is considered, the variable Educational Homo-
geneity, measuring whether or not the founding team has a homogeneous educational 
background, has a significantly positive effect at the 1 percent level (table 3, models 2 
and 6). Second, the findings of the OLS regressions find that the proxy variables for 
social capital, TrainingI and TrainingII, significantly influence RBSO employee growth. 
Whilst TrainingI has a significantly negative effect at the 1 percent level, TrainingII has 
a significantly positive effect at the 5 percent level on RBSO employee growth in the 
same models (table 3, models 3 and 6). Third, when evaluating the role of an equity 
investment from the ‘Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’ (PRO-Equity), no statistical model in table 
3 detects a significant effect on employee growth. Fourth, the analyses detect a statisti-
cally significant and positive effect at the 10 percent level of the variable Noveltechnol-
ogy on employee growth (table 3, model 6). 
In table 4, the receipt of VC is included in the scope of analysis. When regarding the 
OLS model without controls for endogeneity (table 4, column 2), the results show a 
positive and significant effect of the variable Educational Homogeneity at the 1 percent 
level on employee growth. When controlling for endogeneity, the IV approach leads to 
a similar result: The variable Educational Homogeneity has a highly significant positive 
effect at the 0.1 percent level on RBSO employee growth (table 4, column 3). When 
referring to the CF approach, the effect of the variable Educational Homogeneity remains 
positive and significant at the 1 percent level when regarding RBSO employee growth 
(table 4, column 4). Further, TrainingI has a highly significant negative effect at the 0.1 
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percent level on RBSO employee growth whereas TrainingII has a significant and posi-
tive impact at the 1 percent level on RBSO employee growth within the OLS and IV 
specification respectively (table 4, columns 2 and 3). Similarly, the direction of the ef-
fects remain unchanged when referring to the CF approach having a level of significance 
at the 1 percent level for the effect of the variables TrainingI and TrainingII on RBSO 
employee growth (table 4, column 4). When evaluating the role of an equity investment 
from the ‘Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’ (PRO-Equity), neither the analyses in table 3, nor the 
analyses incorporating the receipt of VC in the scope of analysis detect a significant 
effect on employee growth (table 4, columns 2, 3, and 4). The OLS regression without 
controls for endogeneity confirms the positive and significant influence of the commer-
cialization of a novel technology on RBSO employee growth at the 10 percent level 
(table 4, column 2). This effect remains positive and significant at the 5 percent level 
when accounting for the endogenous nature of a VC investment using the IV method 
(table 4, column 3). Although the CF approach shows a positive effect of the variable 
Noveltechnology towards RBSO employee growth, the effect is not significant (table 4, 
column 4). 
When considering RBSO revenue growth as dependent variable (tables 5 and 6), the 
findings are rather similar. The effect of a homogeneous educational background of the 
founders on RBSO revenue growth (table 5, models 2 and 6) has the same direction 
compared to the results derived from the analyses on employee growth and is slightly 
not significant. Based on the results regarding the effect of trainings on RBSO revenue 
growth, statistical significance in the same direction as for employee growth can only 
be detected for TrainingII at the 10 percent level (table 5, models 3 and 6). Again, for 
an equity investment from the parent research organization (PRO-Equity), no significant 
effect can be detected concerning revenue growth either (table 5, models 4 and 6). In 
a similar vein, the results neither show any statistical support for the positive effect of 
the variable Noveltechnology when evaluating the effect on revenue growth of the 
RBSOs (table 5, models 5 and 6). In table 6, this dissertation presents the results when 
including the receipt of VC in the scope of analysis regarding RBSO revenue growth. In 
line with the direction of the effect of the variable Educational Homogeneity on RBSO 
revenue growth derived in table 5, both the OLS approach without controls for endoge-
neity and the IV approach (table 6, columns 2 and 3) show a significantly positive in-
fluence at the 5 percent level. Further, the CF approach confirms the positive effect the 
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variable Educational Homogeneity has on RBSO revenue growth at the 10 percent level 
(table 6, column 4). Hence, this dissertation finds support for Hypothesis 1b given the 
positive effect of a homogeneous educational background on the RBSO’s employee and 
revenue growth.  
Considering the effect of trainings on RBSOs’ revenue growth, the OLS approach with-
out controls for endogeneity and the IV approach confirm the positive and significant 
effect of TrainingII at the 5 percent level (table 6, columns 2 and 3). Additionally, the 
CF approach confirms a positive and significant effect at the 10 percent level of Train-
ingII on revenue growth (table 6, column 4). The ‘Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’s’ supporting 
scheme for academic entrepreneurs aimed at building and exploiting networks to out-
side professionals - which is the main content of TrainingII - seems to have a significant 
influence on growth. On the other hand, for a training dedicated to awaken the aca-
demic founders’ awareness to processes of successful technology transfer (which is the 
content of TrainingI), the results do not detect a positive influence on growth. Based on 
that, this dissertation finds partial support for hypothesis 2, too. Further, no analyses of 
an equity investment from the ‘Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’ (PRO-Equity) on the revenue 
growth of the RBSO detects a significant effect (tables 5 and 6). These results are in 
line with the previous analyses on the effect of the variable PRO-Equity on RBSO em-
ployee growth tables (3 and 4). Hence, this dissertation infers from the results that a 
pure bridge-financing from the parent research organization does not serve as initial 
spark accelerating technology commercialization and thus firm growth. Therefore, no 
support for hypothesis 3 is found. In a similar vein, no statistical support for the positive 
effect of the variable Noveltechnology on revenue growth of the RBSOs (tables 5 and 6) 
is found. Hence, the commercialization of a novel technology seems to influence em-
ployment growth rather than revenue growth in the context of RBSOs. Thus, this dis-
sertation finds only partial support for hypothesis 4b.  
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Table 3: Determinants of RBSO Growth (employees) 
The table shows the empirical results when regressing on the dependent variable employee CAGR disregarding the involvement of VC.  
Dependent variable Employee CAGR Employee CAGR Employee CAGR Employee CAGR Employee CAGR Employee CAGR 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6               
  b se b se b se b se b se b se 
 Control variables                           
1 Firm Age -0.003 [0.005] -0.005 [0.005] 0.000 [0.005] -0.001 [0.005] -0.005 [0.005] -0.005 [0.006] 
2 Founders 0.000 [0.014] 0.000 [0.014] 0.011 [0.016] -0.013 [0.020] 0.000 [0.016] 0.008 [0.021] 
3 GDP 5.576 [6.709] 3.434 [6.500] 4.017 [6.332] 5.600 [6.609] 5.560 [6.414] 0.903 [5.409] 
4 B2B 0.166** [0.063] 0.167*** [0.058] 0.173*** [0.060] 0.180** [0.070] 0.204*** [0.076] 0.233*** [0.067] 
5 Entrep. Experience 0.003 [0.017] 0.005 [0.016] 0.004 [0.016] 0.002 [0.016] 0.002 [0.017] 0.007 [0.016] 
6 Patent -0.007 [0.051] 0.007 [0.050] -0.021 [0.045] -0.009 [0.048] -0.007 [0.051] 0.004 [0.045] 
7 Product Business 0.052 [0.051] 0.044 [0.049] 0.029 [0.049] 0.045 [0.051] 0.068 [0.054] 0.047 [0.047] 
8 High-Tech 0.058 [0.050] 0.059 [0.049] 0.051 [0.048] 0.054 [0.049] 0.061 [0.050] 0.054 [0.046] 
 Indep. variables             
9 Educ. Homogeneity - - 0.132*** [0.049] - - - - - - 0.178*** [0.054] 
10 Training I - - - - -0.181*** [0.065] - - - - -0.200*** [0.064] 
11 Training II - - - - 0.201** [0.079] - - - - 0.202** [0.078] 
12 PRO-Equity - - - - - - 0.078 [0.066] - - 0.027 [0.062] 
13 Noveltechnology - - - - - - - - 0.080 [0.066] 0.123* [0.069] 
 No. of observations 77 77 77 77 74 74 
 R-sq 0.17 0.23 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.39 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. 
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Table 4: Determinants of RBSO Growth (employees) incl. VC Equity Investments 
The table shows the empirical results when regressing on the dependent variable employee CAGR including the involvement of VC.  
Dependent variable VC-Equity Employee CAGR Employee CAGR Employee CAGR 
Model Probit OLS (w/o controls                 
for endogeneity) 
IV (w/ controls                   
for endogeneity) 
CF (w/ controls                         
for endogeneity) 
  dy/dx   se b se b se b se 
  Control variables               
1 Firm Age 0.038*** [0.013] -0.004 [0.006] -0.003 [0.005] -0.004 [0.006] 
2 Founders 0.032 [0.027] 0.002 [0.021] 0.007 [0.022] 0.003 [0.023] 
3 GDP 14.562* [7.600] 0.277 [5.499] 0.724 [4.898] 0.333 [5.948] 
4 B2B 0.077 [0.090] 0.216*** [0.068] 0.228**** [0.062] 0.217*** [0.077] 
5 Entrep. Experience -0.032 [0.021] 0.01 [0.015] 0.007 [0.015] 0.01 [0.017] 
6 Patent 0.234**** [0.054] -0.029 [0.054] 0.000 [0.059] -0.025 [0.063] 
7 Product Business 0.258**** [0.067] 0.012 [0.048] 0.040 [0.057] 0.015 [0.059] 
8 High-Tech 0.096 [0.079] 0.036 [0.048] 0.046 [0.045] 0.037 [0.051] 
9 Average IPO USA -0.010**** [0.002] - - - - - - 
10 Inverse Mill's Ratio - - -0.006 [0.023] -0.024 [0.026] -0.008 [0.029] 
  Independent variables               
11 Educ. Homogeneity -0.189** [0.079] 0.188*** [0.057] 0.186**** [0.051] 0.188*** [0.064] 
12 Training I -0.067 [0.083] -0.203**** [0.057] -0.207**** [0.060] -0.203*** [0.072] 
13 Training II -0.346*** [0.106] 0.247*** [0.076] 0.216*** [0.080] 0.243*** [0.094] 
14 PRO-Equity 0.271**** [0.075] -0.016 [0.068] 0.017 [0.064] -0.012 [0.075] 
15 Noveltechnology -0.094 [0.092] 0.134* [0.077] 0.141** [0.069] 0.135 [0.084] 
16 Lambda (VC) - - - - - - 0.017 [0.106] 
17 VC-Equity - - 0.104 [0.082] - - 0.082 [0.137] 
18 VC-Equity (predicted) - - - - -0.061 [0.164] - - 
 No. of observations 74 74 74 
74 
74 
 R-sq (pseudo R-sq) 0.61 0.42 0.36 
0.36 
0.43 
 F-test of excl. instruments - - 11.96**** 
11.96**** 
- 
 Underidentification test - - 9.40*** 
9.40*** 
- 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. For column 4, standard errors are 
based on 10,000 bootstrap replications. Results for the probit regression in column 1 represent marginal effects. Test statistics are calcu-
lated via STATA command ivreg2 (column 3). 
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3.5.2 Results Concerning the Role of VC 
In the second set of analyses, this dissertation aims to evaluate how a VC investment 
influences the growth of the RBSO. First, it is assessed whether venture capitalists act 
as scouts when investing in RBSOs. Second, this dissertation evaluates the role of VC 
investors as coaches by analyzing the experimental average treatment effect towards 
RBSO growth. This experimental average treatment effect is expressed by the variables 
VC-Equity as well as VC-Equity (predicted) in the respective econometric specifications. 
Before turning to the econometric evidence however, this dissertation uses a bivariate 
test and finds that RBSOs with VC grow significantly faster compared to RBSOs without 
VC. In more detail, the bivariate analysis finds that RBSOs with VC show an 11 percent 
higher average employee growth rate compared to RBSOs without such financing. In 
line with this finding, the analysis finds as well that VC-backed RBSOs outperform their 
non-VC-backed peers by about 20 percent on average when their revenue growth is 
considered. Hence, the results are similar to prior empirical studies showing that VC-
backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms (Alperovych & Hubner, 2013; Bertoni et 
al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013; Engel, 2002; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998). 
In order to evaluate if this superior performance is the result of a scouting function, the 
results of the probit estimates (tables 4 and 6, column 1), which give an indication of 
the likelihood of an RBSO to receive VC, have to be considered. When referring to the 
results of the probit regression, the analysis finds that Firm Age positively and signifi-
cantly increases the RBSO’s chances to receive VC at the 1 percent level. This finding is 
not surprising since each additional year the RBSO has been in existence represents 
market acceptance of the product or service. In a similar vein, the analysis finds a pos-
itive and significant effect at the 10 percent level for the variable GDP on the receipt of 
VC. Said differently, the more positive the GDP develops, the more favorable are general 
market conditions increasing the chances of firm growth and the receipt of VC. In addi-
tion, the results also provide evidence that VC investors rely on factors that decrease 
information asymmetries between the investor and the investee. These include for ex-
ample the availability of a patent, which positively and highly significantly increases the 
RBSOs chances to receive VC at the 0.1 percent level (table 6, column 1). This finding 
is not surprising since a patent signals that a technology has reached a certain maturity 
and can be protected. Another factor that highly significantly increases the likelihood 
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to receive VC at the 0.1 percent level is a product-oriented business model (table 6, 
column 1). RBSO’s that follow a product-oriented business model have a 26 percent 
higher likelihood to receive VC compared to RBSOs without a product-oriented business 
model. This finding is in line with latest research which shows that the development of 
a product-based business model is favored by venture capitalists over a service-oriented 
business model (Munari & Toschi, 2011). This aspect becomes particularly relevant in 
case the management team breaks up or if the venture capitalist decides to replace the 
management team, which is not uncommon in the early stages of a RBSO’s development 
(Elitzur & Gavious, 2003; Hellmann & Puri, 2002).  
In contrast, the average number of IPOs in the USA has a highly significantly negative 
effect at the 0.1 percent level on the RBSO’s chances to receive VC. Additionally, the 
analysis finds significant relationships between RBSO resources and the likelihood to 
receive VC for the variables Educational Homogeneity, TrainingII and PRO-Equity. For 
example, the results show a significantly negative effect at the 5 percent level when 
regarding the effect of a homogeneous educational background concerning the likeli-
hood to receive VC. Put differently, the RBSO’s chances to receive VC decrease by about 
19 percent in case the founding team consists of founders with an equal educational 
background (table 6, column 1). Further, this dissertation detects a significantly nega-
tive effect of TrainingII at the 1 percent level towards the receipt of VC (table 6, column 
1). Based on these results, this dissertation concludes that the participation in a training 
intended to build managerial and entrepreneurial skills as well as networks to outside 
professionals (TrainingII) leads to a reduced probability of a VC investment. On the 
other hand, an equity involvement from the research organization has a highly signifi-
cant and positive effect at the 0.1 percent level concerning the likelihood of an RBSO 
to receive VC (table 6, column 1). This implies that the ‘Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’ can 
signal quality of an RBSO by providing a first equity investment. In turn, this qualitative 
signal apparently reduces informational frictions given that it has already been assessed 
to be of sufficient quality so that follow-up VC financing becomes more likely.  
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Table 5: Determinants of RBSO Growth (revenues) 
The table shows the empirical results when regressing on the dependent variable revenue CAGR disregarding the involvement of VC.  
Dependent variable Revenue CAGR Revenue CAGR Revenue CAGR Revenue CAGR Revenue CAGR Revenue CAGR 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6               
  b se b se b se b se b se b se 
 Control variables                           
1 Firm Age -0.015 [0.012] -0.017 [0.011] -0.007 [0.012] -0.010 [0.011] -0.016 [0.012] -0.007 [0.010] 
2 Founders 0.017 [0.021] 0.016 [0.020] 0.019 [0.021] -0.014 [0.027] 0.009 [0.023] -0.018 [0.033] 
3 GDP 20.734 [12.683] 18.613 [12.302] 18.542 [12.178] 20.046* [11.981] 19.188 [12.228] 12.654 [10.795] 
4 B2B 0.105 [0.130] 0.108 [0.136] 0.138 [0.127] 0.127 [0.132] 0.149 [0.160] 0.221 [0.170] 
5 Entrep. Experience -0.029 [0.039] -0.026 [0.038] -0.033 [0.039] -0.033 [0.040] -0.022 [0.039] -0.024 [0.039] 
6 Patent 0.075 [0.136] 0.088 [0.138] 0.048 [0.126] 0.079 [0.137] 0.087 [0.143] 0.072 [0.153] 
7 Product Business 0.126 [0.091] 0.111 [0.093] 0.076 [0.092] 0.109 [0.094] 0.164 [0.108] 0.072 [0.104] 
8 High-Tech -0.060 [0.100] -0.062 [0.101] -0.071 [0.103] -0.063 [0.101] -0.028 [0.098] -0.038 [0.102] 
 Indep. variables             
9 Educ. Homogeneity - - 0.137 [0.106] - - - - - - 0.214 [0.130] 
10 Training I - - - - -0.169 [0.134] - - - - -0.147 [0.136] 
11 Training II - - - - 0.330* [0.175] - - - - 0.353* [0.191] 
12 PRO-Equity - - - - - - 0.178 [0.140] - - 0.123 [0.148] 
13 Noveltechnology - - - - - - - - 0.167 [0.176] 0.153 [0.185] 
 No. of observations 66 66 66 66 63 63 
 R-sq 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.31 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. 
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Table 6: Determinants of RBSO Growth (revenues) incl. VC Equity Investments 
The table shows the empirical results when regressing on the dependent variable revenue CAGR including the involvement of VC. 
Dependent variable VC-Equity Revenue CAGR Revenue CAGR Revenue CAGR 
Model Probit OLS (w/o controls                 
for endogeneity) 
IV (w/ controls                   
for endogeneity) 
CF (w/ controls                         
for endogeneity) 
  dy/dx   se b se b se b se 
  Control variables               
1 Firm Age 0.038*** [0.013] 0.002 [0.011] 0.001 [0.011] 0.002 [0.015] 
2 Founders 0.032 [0.027] -0.038 [0.036] -0.022 [0.036] -0.032 [0.045] 
3 GDP 14.562* [7.600] 11.058 [11.392] 12.946 [10.548] 11.389 [13.217] 
4 B2B 0.077 [0.090] 0.165 [0.178] 0.193 [0.155] 0.183 [0.208] 
5 Entrep. Experience -0.032 [0.021] -0.011 [0.038] -0.015 [0.033] -0.015 [0.045] 
6 Patent 0.234**** [0.054] -0.027 [0.173] 0.028 [0.154] 0.005 [0.194] 
7 Product Business 0.258**** [0.067] -0.016 [0.128] 0.044 [0.126] 0.006 [0.150] 
8 High-Tech 0.096 [0.079] -0.090 [0.094] -0.072 [0.094] -0.079 [0.112] 
9 Average IPO USA -0.010**** [0.002] - - - - - - 
10 Inverse Mill's Ratio - - -0.094 [0.056] -0.112* [0.057] -0.109 [0.076] 
  Independent variables               
11 Educ. Homogeneity -0.189** [0.079] 0.286** [0.138] 0.281** [0.123] 0.288* [0.163] 
12 Training I -0.067 [0.083] -0.176 [0.132] -0.169 [0.133] -0.187 [0.172] 
13 Training II -0.346*** [0.106] 0.508** [0.215] 0.446** [0.222] 0.489* [0.264] 
14 PRO-Equity 0.271**** [0.075] 0.009 [0.152] 0.032 [0.136] 0.035 [0.189] 
15 Noveltechnology -0.094 [0.092] 0.232 [0.213] 0.240 [0.182] 0.241 [0.238] 
16 Lambda (VC) - - - - - - 0.105 [0.194] 
17 VC-Equity - - -0.012 [0.201] - - -0.151 [0.316] 
18 VC-Equity (predicted) - - - - -0.242 [0.286] - - 
 Number of observations 74 63 63 63 
 R-sq (pseudo R-sq) 0.61 0.34 0.31 0.35 
 F-test of excl. instruments - - 12.44**** - 
 Underidentification test - - 11.82**** - 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. For column 4, standard errors are based 
on 10,000 bootstrap replications. Results for the probit regression in column 1 represent marginal effects. Test statistics are calculated via 
STATA command ivreg2 (column 3). 
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In order to assess if the scouting function of venture capitalists is prevalent to the coach-
ing function, the variables influencing RBSOs’ growth should also influence the likeli-
hood of receiving VC. Hence, if resources are available that have a positive influence on 
growth, a venture capitalist should be attracted by them given the increased chances 
that the investment is increasing in value. However, the results provide no empirical 
evidence that RBSO specific resources in the categories of human, social, financial, and 
technological capital that have a positive effect on growth do also positively affect the 
likelihood of the RBSO to receive VC. Further, the IV specification shows a negative and 
significant effect at the 10 percent level for the inverse Mill’s ratio concerning revenue 
growth (table 6, column 3). This finding indicates that unobservable factors that are 
positively associated with RBSO revenue growth are negatively associated with the re-
ceipt of VC. Hence, this dissertation finds no clear indication that the superior growth 
of VC-backed RBSOs over non-VC-backed RBSOs is rather the result of the selection 
capabilities of the expert investors.  
When regarding the venture capitalists role as coach on RBSO growth, measured as the 
experimental average treatment effect, the analyses show mixed results. As aforemen-
tioned, the experimental average treatment effect is approximated with the variables 
VC-Equity and VC-Equity (predicted). Whereas the binary variable VC-Equity measures 
the receipt of a VC investment, the variable VC-Equity (predicted) represents the RBSO’s 
predicted probability to receive VC based on the resource configuration of the firm at 
foundation. Thus, the effect of a VC investment is assessed from the actual receipt of 
VC as well as the RBSO’s calculated probability to receive VC. Based on the OLS speci-
fication without controls for endogeneity and the CF approach, the direction of the ef-
fect of the variable VC-Equity (table 4, columns 2 and 4) on RBSO employee growth is 
positive and slightly not significant. In contrast to the OLS and CF approach, the IV 
specification shows that the direction of the effect of the variable VC-Equity (predicted) 
on RBSO employee growth is negative but insignificant (table 4, column 3). Noteworthy 
is the interpretation of the coefficient Lambda (VC) which describes the correlation be-
tween the error terms of the VC selection and growth equation (table 4, column 4). The 
positive yet insignificant coefficient Lambda (VC) in the CF approach indicates that the 
correlation of the error terms of the growth and selection equation, if any, is positive 
(Engel, 2002; Colombo & Grilli, 2010). Said differently, this analysis shows that there 
exists a positive, yet insignificant, relationship between the unobservable factors that 
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affect RBSO growth and the likelihood to receive VC - indicating a “coaching” effect. 
However, given the fact the effect is insignificant, the relationship could also be spuri-
ous.  
When referring to the experimental average treatment effect calculated for the revenue 
growth of the RBSOs (table 6, columns 2, 3 and 4), the direction of the effect is negative. 
Within the OLS specification without control for endogeneity (table 6, column 2), the 
direction of the effect found for the variable VC Equity on RBSO revenue growth is 
negative and insignificant. Likewise, the IV specification confirms the negative direction 
of the effect (table 6, column 3). Further, the CF approach also indicates a negative but 
insignificant effect (table 6, column 4). In line with the effect found for the variable 
Lambda (VC) regarding RBSO employee growth, the direction of the effect is again pos-
itive but insignificant when regarding RBSO revenue growth. Again, there exists a pos-
itive correlation between unobservable factors that drive RBSO revenue growth and the 
receipt of VC indicating a coaching effect. However, the contribution of the involvement 
of a venture capitalist to RBSO growth (i.e. scouting or coaching function) has to be 
interpreted with caution since the econometric specifications do not show consistent 
results throughout all specifications.  
3.5.3 Discussion of the Empirical Results 
RBSOs are considered one very important instrument towards fostering technology 
transfer. Given this fact, it is of particular interest how universities and research organ-
izations can enhance the technology transfer process by analyzing the resource base 
that contributes positively to RBSO success. Although an increasing amount of studies 
concentrate on analyzing technology transfer processes (Czarnitzki et al., 2014; Festel, 
2013; Fryges & Wright, 2014; Guerrero et al., 2014; Urbano & Guerrero, 2013; Wright, 
2014), the success factors of transfer processes from research institutions have not been 
disentangled so far. This dissertation analyzes the technology transfer process of a re-
search institution focusing on applied research by investigating the influence of the 
spin-offs’ resource base on their growth. An overview of the results for the different 
hypotheses derived can be found in table 7.  
The findings offer important insights into aspects concerning the support of RBSOs. 
When addressing the human capital of the RBSO’s founding team, this dissertation finds 
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support for hypothesis 1b that homogeneity amongst academic founders in the RBSOs 
has a positive influence on their growth (see table 7). Interestingly however, this finding 
is contrary to other empirical studies that find a positive relationship between team 
heterogeneity and firm success (Knockaert et al., 2011; Unger et al., 2011; Visintin & 
Pittino, 2014). The authors for instance argue that a heterogeneous management team 
is more likely capable of dealing with the quickly changing environment young compa-
nies are confronted with and that they can better anticipate changes (Colombo et al., 
2010; Knockaert et al., 2011; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). However, given that ho-
mogeneity/heterogeneity can be expressed by multiple proxy variables, the findings de-
rived may not necessarily show contradicting results since the issue of education has 
not yet been looked at from an empirical point of view. Important however, when ar-
guing that heterogeneity per sè is advantageous, this dissertation clearly relativizes this 
finding.  
Table 7: Overview of Hypotheses Regarding RBSO Growth 
The table gives an overview of the supported and not supported hypotheses.  
Hypothesis RBSO          
Employee 
Growth 
RBSO         
Revenue 
Growth 
Overall        
Result 
 
 
  
 
Human Capital    
H1a 
Homogeneity amongst academic 
founders has a negative influence 
on the RBSO’s growth. 
Not supported Not supported Not           
supported 
H1b Homogeneity amongst academic 
founders has a positive influence 
on the RBSO’s growth. 
Supported Supported Supported 
Social Capital    
H2 Supporting schemes offered by the 
parent research organization in-
tended to develop a broader social 
capital for the RBSOs have a posi-
tive effect on the RBSO’s growth. 
Supported 
(partially) 
Supported 
(partially) 
Supported 
(partially) 
Financial Capital    
H3 A financial investment from the 
parent research organization has a 
positive effect on the RBSO’s 
growth. 
Not supported Not supported Not           
supported 
Technological Capital    
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H4a A higher degree of novelty of the 
technology commercialized has a 
negative effect on the RBSO’s 
growth. 
Not supported Not supported Not           
supported 
H4b A higher degree of novelty of the 
technology commercialized has a 
positive effect on the RBSO’s 
growth. 
Supported Not supported Supported 
(partially) 
 
In addition and although these findings hold probably true when considering the gen-
eral company development and team competencies, this effect seems to be weaker in 
the context of a high-technology research setting. In this circumstance, heterogeneity 
can lead to less common ground between the founding members translating into po-
tential conflict (Amason, 1996; Kamm & Nurick, 1993; Miller, Burke, & Glick, 1998). 
In line with this assumption, Knockaert et al. (2011) and Tsui et al. (1992) argue that 
homogeneity among founding members might strengthen the relationship between the 
founding team - which this dissertation can confirm with regard to the fact that a ho-
mogeneous educational background of the founding team members seems to matter 
when considering the complex environment RBSOs operate in. The findings derived 
indicate that a homogeneous educational background of academic entrepreneurs is not 
per se a barrier to firm growth since the benefits regarding the mutual understanding 
about the core technology seem to outweigh the costs of a knowledge-gap concerning 
other areas of the business (i.e. accounting, marketing), at least in the context of RBSOs. 
RBSOs often develop radically new technologies which are not suited to the various 
customer needs at the stage of invention (Clarysse et al., 2005; Colombo et al., 2014). 
Thus, the academic founding team needs to 1) identify potential customers that could 
benefit from the new technology and 2) develop and adjust the technology so that it 
can be used by them. In other words, during the early stages of product development, 
a homogeneous founding team providing a knowledge base for deepened discussions 
seems to be beneficial for the commercialization of a customer-suited product or service 
(Beckman et al., 2007; Ruef et al., 2003). This collective knowledge allows the founding 
team to anticipate where the technology might be of greatest use by developing appli-
cable use-cases, which then seem to translate into sustainable firm growth (Amason & 
Sapienza, 1997).  
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Concerning the RBSOs’ social capital, this dissertation finds mixed results for hypothesis 
2. Whereas TrainingI provided by the ‘Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’ imposes a significantly 
negative impact on growth, a significantly positive effect is detected for TrainingII. The 
negative influence of TrainingI on growth might be explained by the fact that a training 
intended to shaping the awareness how scientific endeavors can successfully be com-
mercialized (which is the content of this training) does not necessarily focus on growth 
intentions. With Training I, the ‘Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’ intends to awaken the entre-
preneurial spirit of its scientists. Hence, the training might lead to a rising attention of 
its researchers to consider being an entrepreneur and thus increase the number of spin-
offs. However, a lasting effect on RBSOs’ growth cannot be inferred from the results 
derived. Nevertheless, as several studies suggest, effective entrepreneurial trainings fos-
ter the expansion of innovative industries, enhance entrepreneurial intention and action 
in terms of specific steps towards business creation, and ultimately new venture perfor-
mance through increased knowledge, skills, and capabilities acquired during trainings 
(Bergmann, 2017; Keuschnigg & Nielsen, 2001; Martin, McNally, & Kay, 2013; 
Sanchez, 2011; Zhang, Duysters, & Cloodt, 2014). Therefore - although being beyond 
the scope of this dissertation - further analysis of specific components of entrepreneurial 
trainings and the effect on the creation of new spin-offs is strongly encouraged.  
On the other hand, the empirical results find support that a training intended to develop 
entrepreneurial and managerial skills as well as a network to outside professionals (i.e. 
TrainingII) has a positive effect on the RBSO’s development. This finding is in line with 
prior studies showing that a more diversified network has a positive impact on firm 
development since external knowledge can be accessed and exploited (Stam et al., 
2014; Yli-Renko et al., 2001). Thus, the initial homogeneity of academic entrepreneurs, 
as afore-mentioned, can be addressed by offering supporting schemes that allow the 
academic founding team to acquire the relevant knowledge, skills, capabilities, and a 
network of outside business professionals in order to widen their competence fields 
(Agarwal & Shah, 2014; Colombo et al., 2014; Lockett et al., 2003; Murray, 2004; 
Wright et al., 2006). Scholten et al. (2015) find as well that access to a broad range of 
knowledge outside the firm positively influences employee growth of academic spin-
offs. Likewise, Martin et al. (2013) state in their meta-analytic study that entrepreneur-
ship education and trainings positively influence new venture performance. Referring 
to the results derived, the researcher can obviously learn how to act more managerial 
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and entrepreneurial and thus exploit the knowledge provided by the network (Scholten 
et al., 2015; Walter et al., 2006). This finding is also in line with Coleman (1988) re-
garding his assumption that the creation of social capital can contribute to human cap-
ital by acquiring skills and capabilities necessary for a new venture’s successful devel-
opment.  
Within the analyses, this dissertation does not detect a significant impact of an equity 
participation of the research institution towards the growth of the RBSO. Given the fact 
that an increasing number of universities and research institutions initiate own funds 
for supporting their spin-offs (Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Moray & Clarysse, 2005; Night-
ingale et al., 2009; Shane, 2002) this finding is surprising given that the results suggest 
that these initiatives are not relevant for the growth of RBSOs. However, the finding 
has to be interpreted in a broader context. Jensen and Thursby (2001) for example 
show theoretically that equity participations by universities are pareto-superior to e.g. 
technology transfer incentives in the form of royalty payments or patenting. This finding 
is empirically confirmed by Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) who detect that equity in-
vestments lead to increased firm creation rates compared to patenting and licensing as 
equity investments are adequate to align the interests of the individual researchers, the 
industry, as well as the universities and lead to the highest returns for universities (Bray 
& Lee, 2000; Feldman et al., 2002). It may thus be the case that the university funds 
are important to support the commercialization of business ideas in the seed stage of 
the spin-off’s development, a life cycle stage most venture capital investors would not 
invest in (Moray & Clarysse, 2005). Therefore, in line with the findings of Di Gregorio 
and Shane (2003), Fraunhofer’s equity funds may be relevant for a higher number of 
spin-offs created whereas a direct effect for later spin-off growth cannot be detected in 
this research setting. Further, when considering European universities in comparison, 
the available amounts that can be invested are limited. In order to finance academic 
spin-offs during their growth phase, this dissertation could recommend to structure 
these funds in a way that they can invest higher amounts along with venture capitalists 
in later financing rounds. Further studies are encouraged to find out whether a direct 
investment of public funds may be effective when co-invested with venture capitalists 
by leveraging the financing provided with the coaching function of a professional VC 
investor. 
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Finally, the empirical results provide support for hypothesis 4b as the analyses find that 
RBSOs that invent and commercialize a novel technology are more likely to face growth 
compared to RBSOs that do not. This finding supports the view that the introduction of 
innovations of a more radical type have a positive effect on firm performance (DeCarolis 
& Deeds, 1999; Guo, Lev, & Zhou, 2005; Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001), particularly in 
the context of young firms (Rosenbusch et al., 2011). In this regard, Aspelund et al. 
(2005) find for example that radical compared to incremental innovations increase the 
probability of survival. The authors further explain this by arguing that incremental 
innovations in comparison to radical innovations offer only a minor competitive ad-
vantage to the firm since they are more likely to find imitators. On the other hand, 
radical innovations raise the entry barriers for potential competitors and leave the RBSO 
more time to exploit the value of the product or service, especially in niche markets in 
which small firms such as RBSOs often operate (Porter, 2008; Rosenbusch et al., 2011). 
Further, Clarysse et al. (2011) argue that radical innovations offer a greater applicabil-
ity and unprecedented use-cases of the technology invented leading to an increased 
growth potential. This finding is supported regarding the results for RBSO employee 
growth showing that the commercialization of a novel technology increases growth. On 
the contrary however, the findings are not supported when referring to the analyses 
concerning revenue growth. This circumstance might however be explained as follows. 
The development of a (radically) new technology normally requires additional expert-
employees (e.g. programmers, developers) who translate the business opportunity into 
a marketable product or service (Bower, 2003). In addition, marketing efforts directed 
towards identifying early technology adopters might also explain the increase in em-
ployees (i.e. business development, sales). However, the technology implementation 
and testing requires time so that generating revenues on the basis of the technology 
commercialization requires more time. Thus, revenues are deferred into the future.  
When considering the results of the second set of analyses for the influence of a VC 
investment on the RBSOs’ growth, this dissertation finds for example that an equity 
investment from the ‘Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’ has a significantly positive impact on re-
ceiving VC. This finding supports the assumption that new ventures that have under-
gone an investment process signal firm quality (Bertoni et al., 2011; Davila et al., 2003; 
Gubitta et al., 2016). In the case of RBSOs, the equity investment from the ’Fraunhofer 
Gesellschaft’ (PRO-Equity) serves as such a signal and obviously attracts VC investments. 
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However, although an investment from the ’Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’ serves as a positive 
signal for VC investors, the results do not show that the same influences RBSO growth. 
Neither do the analyses show that other factors which drive company growth to have a 
significant influence on the likelihood to receive VC. This finding is of particular interest 
as logic implies that factors influencing RBSO growth would also influence the receipt 
of VC. Thus, receiving VC equity would indicate that venture capitalists are able to select 
those RBSOs with the highest growth prospects. In other words, since this dissertation 
does not find such a congruence, it can be inferred that venture capitalists do not nec-
essarily select RBSOs based on factors that are positively associated with growth. Hence, 
no clear indication of a selection effect of venture capitalists concerning investments in 
RBSOs is found when referring to the different empirical methods applied within this 
dissertation. Instead however, the empirical results rather point to a coaching function 
which is mainly prevalent concerning employee growth when elucidating whether ven-
ture capitalists exert a selection or a coaching function for the RBSOs’ development. 
This finding might be explained as follows. First, a VC investment is likely to trigger 
recruiting efforts of the RBSO leading to an increase in employees in various areas (pro-
grammers, business development and sales experts, accountants, etc.) in order to reach 
agreed objectives relating to growth. Given the innovative nature of these firms how-
ever, generating first revenues based on (radically) new technologies takes a longer 
period of time so that the effect does not yet manifest in revenue growth (Aspelund et 
al., 2005). Hence, based on the fact that the analyses find no strong support that ven-
ture capitalists act as scouts when investing in RBSOs, the superior performance is more 
likely attributable to a venture capitalist acting as a coach rather than a scout. 
To this end, the findings indicate that encouraging technology transfer is a beneficial 
strategy for universities and research institutions as several spin-offs from the ‘Fraun-
hofer-Gesellschaft’ are effective and show substantial growth rates. But the results de-
tect as well that academic institutions need to evaluate diligently which support 
measures prove efficient given the financial limitations these institutions typically face 
and hence, the measures initiated should be evaluated constantly. In addition, it can be 
inferred from the analyses that individual researchers involved in a spin-off process 
should provide detailed feedback to their technology transfer office and should demand 
offers they specifically need in order to smoothen the growth of their firms.  
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3.6 Limitations and Further Research Concerning Research-based Spin-offs 
Although the analyses find robust relationships between RBSO resources and firm 
growth, the results are not devoid of limitations. Due to the fact that the analyses in-
vestigate RBSOs that have spun out from one research institution, it would be interest-
ing to verify whether the empirical results derived can be found for other research in-
stitutions which have implemented similar or different spin-out processes and dispose 
of another resource provision or a different culture and strategy, too. However, given 
the fact that the ‘Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’ is large and has different industry focuses 
with different centers and also varying cultural facets, it can be well argued that the 98 
firms are a representative sample for the large variety of RBSOs. Simultaneously, it has 
to be acknowledged that this dissertation does not presume this sample to be repre-
sentative for all RBSOs. For one thing, the definition of RBSOs is not as straightforward 
and does not follow one clear definition. For another, the absence of reliable and com-
prehensive statistics on RBSOs on a German or European level makes it very difficult to 
define the total population of these firms and draw universal conclusions for them (Co-
lombo & Grilli, 2010). 
In addition, one could comment that the study is subject to further sample selection 
biases. The primary reason is that the analyses suffer from survivorship bias given that 
it refers to surveyed firms which were still existing at the time the data was collected. 
This limitation is however common to the majority of survey-based studies (Bertoni et 
al., 2011). Since the effects on firm growth and not firm survival are studied, it is rea-
sonable to analyze surviving companies. Another limitation that has to be acknowl-
edged is related to a potential single respondent bias. This is however difficult to cir-
cumvent since part of the data is gathered by surveying the academic founders. Thus, 
it is difficult if not even impossible to assure that the founders have actually filled out 
the survey accurately and to the best of their knowledge. This dissertation was however 
able to complement and verify the reliability of the founders’ answers by secondary data 
gathered by the research institution based on objective facts. In addition, the collected 
data is more reliable for another reason as well. First, the number of spin-offs from 
research organizations is per se not large and second, the dissertation managed to col-
lect data on quite a substantive share of the spin-offs that were created from the largest 
research organizations in Germany. According to a study from Acatech (2010) on aca-
demic entrepreneurship in Germany, the total number of academic spin-offs created 
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within the largest public research institutes in Germany amounted to 687 in July 2010, 
of which 432 spun-out from the ‘Fraunhofer Gesellschaft’. Thus, the sample analyzed is 
representative for the population of spin-offs from the largest German research organi-
zations to a substantial degree.  
The analyses and findings may serve as a basis for further investigations on RBSOs 
which have spun-off from research organizations. A fruitful avenue for future research 
might be to consider analyzing the RBSO’s resource base of different research organi-
zations in combination and try to analyze to what extent the resource provision differs 
among the varying public and private organizations and how the differences translate 
in the RBSOs’ development. In future research, it would also be interesting to gather 
information on more mature RBSOs with or without public listings and analyze their 
resource base. Further, as the findings suggest that the content and design of various 
entrepreneurial trainings and professional support is important for the spin-offs’ devel-
opment, this dissertation also encourages both qualitative and quantitative research on 
this type of support offered by the various research institutions and universities. When 
considering the diverse landscape of these institutions, it is likely that the large array of 
supporting schemes differs depending on the ecosystem the institution is located in. 
However, not all supporting schemes may be suited to the context of RBSOs and their 
specific circumstances. In order to streamline and support the institutions in their de-
velopment of training programs and to ensure that public funding is spent in accordance 
with the overall objective (i.e. foster growth), this dissertation encourages detailed re-
search on training programs and professional supporting schemes and the consequences 
for RBSO development and growth.  
3.7 Conclusion and Contribution Concerning Research-based Spin-offs 
This empirical contribution investigates RBSO’s resource endowments and aims to iden-
tify important resources that affect growth. The analyses are built upon a consistent set 
of hypotheses based on the resource-based view of the firm. The empirical findings are 
deducted from 98 German-based RBSOs that have spun-out from the ‘Fraunhofer Ge-
sellschaft’ in the period 1997 through 2012. With this study, this dissertation comple-
ments the current literature on RBSOs and entrepreneurial finance towards understand-
ing growth factors of RBSOs involving the role of VC investments. Hence, the contribu-
tion is twofold. First, the findings complement the resource-based view of the firm by 
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providing novel insights about growth factors that are decisive for RBSOs. Second, the 
findings complement prior studies in the area of academic entrepreneurship by address-
ing the growth of RBSOs while simultaneously focusing on VC. This extended viewpoint 
is particularly relevant for policy makers, TTOs, and academic entrepreneurs alike.  
When referring to the literature addressing academic entrepreneurship, RBSOs are of-
ten characterized to be homogeneous and to lack valuable networks to business profes-
sionals outside academia (Agarwal & Shah, 2014; Colombo et al., 2014; Lockett et al., 
2003; Murray, 2004; Wright et al., 2006). At the same time however, particularly het-
erogeneity in both the management team and networks are found to be valuable for 
firm growth (Cleyn, Braet, & Klofsten, 2015; Stam et al., 2014; Visintin & Pittino, 2014). 
The empirical results derived find evidence that homogeneity within the academic 
founding team is not a disadvantage to the growth of their firms per se. Instead, this 
dissertation finds that a homogeneous founding team with an equal academic back-
ground is positively associated with employment and revenue growth. Additionally, this 
dissertation finds that the lack of entrepreneurial and managerial skills as well as net-
works to outside partners can be successfully addressed with training programs. Fur-
ther, the empirical results confirm that trainings provided by the ‘Fraunhofer Gesell-
schaft’ intended to coach an entrepreneurial mindset as well as providing a platform to 
network with external business professionals positively affects RBSO growth. Lastly, 
this dissertation also finds that the commercialization of a novel technology has a posi-
tive impact on RBSO growth. On the contrary, an investment from the parent research 
organization has no effect on RBSO growth based on the analyses.  
Beyond the internal resources of the academic founding team, the analyses also confirm 
that VC-backed RBSOs show a higher performance in terms of employment and revenue 
growth rates compared to non-VC-backed RBSOs. Hence, this dissertation disentangles 
the value-adding effect of a VC investment by evaluating the venture capitalist’s role as 
a scout or coach. Many academic scholars argue that the superior growth of VC-backed 
firms over non-VC-backed firms may be the result of venture capitalists scouting prom-
ising firms that would also grow well in the absence of VC. Another view is that venture 
capitalists coach the investee which may lead to superior performance. This dissertation 
finds no such support that venture capitalists scout RBSOs based on factors that deter-
mine their growth. In contrast, the empirical results suggest that venture capitalists 
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prefer signals (‘hard facts’) of firm quality such as patents or prior investments from the 
parent research organization, which they obviously interpret as signals reducing infor-
mational frictions. Despite the fact that these factors signal firm quality to a venture 
capitalist, this dissertation does not find that these factors contribute to RBSO growth. 
Further, the empirical analyses show inconclusive results of a positive effect based on 
the venture capitalist’s role as coach. However, this dissertation infers from the results 
that the superior performance of VC-backed compared to non-VC-backed RBSOs is 
likely the result of a venture capitalist coaching the RBSO rather than scouting it. Over-
all, the findings derived support the importance of research on academic entrepreneur-
ship and hence, more empirical work towards understanding growth factors of RBSOs 
and the role of VC is encouraged in order to design suitable policy measures and train-
ings that support the development of these important firms.  
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4 The Signaling Value of Crowdfunding in a VC Context 
Given the increasing popularity of crowdfunding as a new means to finance new ven-
tures, this dissertation assesses whether and how crowdfunding campaign-specific sig-
nals that affect campaign success influence venture capitalists’ selection decisions in a 
new venture’s follow-up funding process. Further, the empirical analyses also focus on 
how the presence of a crowdfunding campaign influences the syndication behavior of 
venture capitalists against the background of other new venture-related characteristics. 
The analyses to follow rely on cross-referencing a dataset of 66,000 crowdfunding cam-
paigns that ran on Kickstarter between 2009 and 2016 with 100,000 investments in the 
same period from the Crunchbase dataset. Drawing on signaling theory and the micro-
finance literature, the empirical findings reveal that a successful crowdfunding cam-
paign leads to a higher likelihood to receive follow-up venture capital financing, and 
that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between the funding received com-
pared to the funding desired and the probability to receive VC funding. Further, the 
analyses find statistical evidence that a special endorsement of campaigns by the crowd-
funding platform provider as well as word-of-mouth volume on social media platforms 
has a likewise positive impact on the probability to receive VC.4  
In addition to the campaign related signals, this dissertation also focuses on the role of 
a crowdfunding campaign itself while simultaneously controlling for other new venture-
specific circumstances, too. The data used are also extracted from cross referencing the 
Kickstarter and Crunchbase dataset. The final sample includes a total of 504 new ven-
tures of which 193 had a crowdfunding campaign before receiving venture capital. 
Drawing on signaling theory and the syndication literature, the overarching empirical 
finding is that crowdfunding influences the syndication behavior of venture capitalists. 
First, crowdfunded new ventures have a lower likelihood of a syndicated investment as 
                                            
4 This empirical contribution has been presented at various conferences and is currently 
under revision for publication at the Journal of Small Business Management. The 
conference contributions are as follows: Thies, F., Huber, A., Bock, C., & Benlian, A. 
(2017) - Do venture capitalists follow the crowd? – The relevance of crowdfunding 
campaigns for venture capitalists’ investment decisions. European Academy of Man-
agement, Glasgow – Scotland. Thies, F., Huber, A., Bock, C., & Benlian, A. (2017) - Do 
venture capitalists follow the crowd? – The relevance of crowdfunding campaigns for 
venture capitalists’ investment decisions. Interdisziplinäre Jahreskonferenz Entre-
preneurship, Innovation und Mittelstand („G-Forum“), Leipzig – Germany. 
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well as a smaller number of syndicate partners. Second, the findings reveal that crowd-
funded new ventures facilitate the formation of international syndicates. More broadly, 
the results support the assumption that a crowdfunding campaign can mitigate infor-
mation asymmetries between the investor and the investee and is hence factored into 
the investment decision of venture capitalists reducing their need to form syndicates.5  
The remainder of this empirical contribution is structured as follows. Section 4.1 pro-
vides a literature review to develop an understanding of crowdfunding and its role in 
the context of VC financing. Further, this section identifies gaps in the current micro-
finance and VC literature dedicated to syndication and derives a coherent set of hypoth-
eses. In section 4.2, the sample is introduced and the methods used for the empirical 
analyses are outlined. Thereafter, section 4.3 presents and discusses the empirical re-
sults. The limitations of the empirical contribution are outlined in section 4.4, followed 
by a subject-specific conclusion in section 4.5. 
4.1 Literature Review on Crowdfunding and VC 
4.1.1 Signaling Theory and Classical Signals in VC Investing 
Signaling theory deals with understanding why certain signals such as a product war-
ranty might be a reliable signal for consumers and could thus be relevant to them in 
buying decisions (Spence, 1973). Extensive research has been conducted on what is 
collectively referred to as signaling theory, to understand which signals might be relia-
ble and could thus be relevant for the consumer in buying situations (Spence, 1973; 
Spence, 2002). Transferred to the context of entrepreneurship and new venture crea-
tion, signaling theory describes efforts of the capital-seeking party (i.e. the entrepre-
neur) to reduce information asymmetries by providing information about the inherent 
quality of the new venture to the capital providing party (i.e. the venture capitalist). In 
other words, signaling theory circumscribes that entrepreneurs signal the quality and 
viability of their new venture to a venture capitalist in order to stand out and suggest 
superior quality and ability compared to other capital-seeking ventures (Arthurs et al., 
2009; Busenitz et al., 2005; Connelly et al., 2011). In its basic form, signals share the 
characteristic of being 1) observable and 2) costly. Hence, a signal must be noticeable 
                                            
5 This empirical contribution is currently under revision for publication in Research 
Policy. 
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by outsiders and the costs of producing the signal must not outweigh its benefits (Con-
nelly et al., 2011; Moss et al., 2015). 
As mentioned before, empirical evidence concerning the value of different signals in the 
context of VC investing is versatile. Most importantly, Petty and Gruber (2011) conclude 
that a good management team with sufficient business experience pursuing a promising 
business idea might already be valued as a good signal from a venture capitalist’s per-
spective so that a deal proposal is not rejected. Thus, human capital characteristics play 
an important role in VC decision-making since human capital is also associated with 
firm growth (Baeyens et al., 2006; Knockaert et al., 2010; Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000). 
Further, venture capitalists clearly favor a product-oriented business model over a ser-
vice business given that the latter is fully dependent on their founding team (Munari & 
Toschi, 2011). As mentioned in the introductory section, the latter aspect is particularly 
relevant if the management team breaks up, or if the venture capitalist decides to re-
place the management team (Elitzur & Gavious, 2003; Hellmann & Puri, 2002). Fur-
thermore, patents are commonly referred to have a strong signaling value to outside 
investors since they allow to buffer a firm from competitors (Conti et al., 2013; 
Haeussler et al., 2014). Lastly, venture capitalists can reduce information asymmetries 
concerning a new venture by mainly investing in new ventures that have already been 
evaluated (i.e. undergone a due diligence) by a preceding investor, such as business 
angels or other VC funds from prior investment rounds (Bertoni et al., 2011; Davila et 
al., 2003). This practice implies that prior investors have already assessed the new ven-
ture to be of high-quality what may reduce the perceived investment risk from a venture 
capitalist’s perspective (Bonardo et al., 2010; Lerner, 1999, 2002). Still, crowdfunding 
campaigns usually represent new ventures including their products and services that 
are in their infancy, i.e. their seed and start-up stage of development. Hence, the above-
named signals such as a patented technology or a history of investment rounds are 
unlikely available. Thus, a new venture without the above-mentioned signals can nev-
ertheless show superior quality over other capital seeking new ventures by providing 
crowdfunding campaign-related signals that could in turn serve as a substitute or com-
plement to the traditional signals relevant in VC decision making.  
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4.1.2 Signaling in Crowdfunding and Hypotheses 
Signaling in crowdfunding is an important concept since campaign initiators are often 
first-time entrepreneurs (Vismara, 2016), and the commercialization and financing of 
new products and services via crowdfunding is also subject to information asymmetries 
between backers (e.g. investors) and campaign owners (e.g. entrepreneurs) (Belle-
flamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 2014). Crowdfunding in its present form com-
prises various forms, yet reward-based (e.g. Colombo et al. 2015; Mollick 2014; Wessel 
et al. 2015; and Wessel et al. 2016), lending-based (Dushnitsky et al., 2016), and eq-
uity-based (e.g. Ahlers et al. 2015; Lukkarinen et al. 2016; Roma et al. 2017; and 
Vismara 2016) crowdfunding campaigns have been subject to increased attention 
lately. However, and given that lending- and equity-based crowdfunding is still in its 
infancy and hardly available to a broad range of investors as mentioned before, partic-
ularly in Germany, the most popular and by far largest venues in terms of funding vol-
ume are reward-based platforms (Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; Roma et al., 2017). 
These platforms allow individuals to donate (i.e. pledge) graduated amounts to a pro-
ject in exchange for a product prototype or other similar token-items gifts (Antonenko 
et al., 2014; Xu et al., 2016). In this regard, relevant scholarly work finds that campaign 
success is negatively related to a campaign’s funding goals (Colombo et al., 2015; Mol-
lick, 2014). Put differently, the higher the desired funding the entrepreneurs seeks to 
collect through the crowd, the less likely the chances that the full funds are provided. 
Further, Colombo et al. (2015) find that the more capital is acquired in the early phase 
of the campaign, the more likely its success. Concerning social capital, measured as the 
number of campaigns supported by the campaign initiator, the authors find a positive 
influence of social capital in reward-based campaigns on both the number of early back-
ers and the amount of pledges received (Colombo et al., 2015). In a similar vein, Mollick 
(2014) confirms that the number of friends on Facebook (i.e. a proxy of network size) 
is positively related to campaign success. Further, Mollick (2014) also finds that both a 
video that explains the project in more detail as well as updates that demonstrate the 
project’s progress are positively related to campaign success. Lastly, an interesting find-
ing provided is that geographic distance still plays a role in crowdfunding campaigns. 
Although the availability of online services should relax the accessibility of campaigns 
by backers as suggested by Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2011), the location of the 
campaign initiators still plays a role for campaign success (Mollick, 2014).  
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Whilst the above-named signals lead to success in reward- and equity-based crowdfund-
ing campaigns collectively or individually, the success of a campaign per se can be con-
sidered one of the strongest signals a crowdfunding campaign can create. In other 
words, a successful crowdfunding campaign demonstrates a positive assessment of the 
new product or service and allows the entrepreneur to better assess the market poten-
tial. In turn, the demonstrated market demand could translate into a positive assess-
ment by the venture capital investor since it is one key indicator when screening deals 
(Petty & Gruber, 2011). This circumstance is clearly demonstrated in the introductory 
example of Lifx. Once the entrepreneurial team behind Lifx completed their crowdfund-
ing campaign with a record amount of pledges worth USD 1.3m, the new venture 
quickly raised another USD 12m through a series A venture capital funding round led 
by Sequoia Capital (Dingman, 2013), a leading and reputable Silicon Valley VC inves-
tor. On the other hand, entrepreneurs with unsuccessful campaigns may not necessarily 
be deprived from venture capital. For example, the entrepreneur could, given the rea-
sons that caused the campaign to be unsuccessful, adjust the product or service and 
apply for VC funding with an improved business concept and still receive funding. 
Hence, the crowdfunding campaign may not only signal quality to a third party such as 
a venture capitalist, it also provides valuable feedback to the entrepreneur and its prod-
uct or service. However, in the reward-based example mentioned above, the crowd 
served as an initial catalyst by assessing the idea via their investments. Thereafter, Lifxs 
was able to collect substantial amounts of VC. Thus, the signaling value in regard to a 
post campaign follow-up investor is clearly in the spotlight.  
Given this noteworthy example, the novelty of crowdfunding and its importance in the 
financing process of new ventures, the analysis of success drivers of crowdfunding cam-
paigns are gaining momentum (e.g. Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb 2015; Colombo et 
al. 2015; and Mollick 2014). However, little is known about the impact of crowdfunding 
campaigns on the post-campaign funding events for entrepreneurial initiatives and the 
signaling value of campaign-characteristics to expert investors. Despite the fact that 
both crowdfunding and venture capital have been subject to increased academic atten-
tion (Xu et al., 2016), research on a combined view of these two forms of entrepreneur-
ial finance is still very scarce. An exception are Mollick and Kuppuswamy (2014), who 
present a working paper and survey-based article on 286 reward-based crowdfunding 
projects, both successful and unsuccessful, and the post-campaign development of the 
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new ventures. They find for example that 90 percent of the firms remain in operation 
after their campaign at survey date in 2013. Further, their preliminary results show that 
about 59 percent of respondents used the campaign to secure seed-funding to start a 
business. An additional study is provided by Roma et al. (2017) who focus on technol-
ogy new ventures and state that crowdfunding can ignite professional investor’s interest 
if accompanied by rather traditional signals of quality such as the availability of patents 
or a large network of social ties. Further, Drover, Busenitz, Matusik, Townsend, Anglin, 
and Dushnitsky (2017) also find that a crowdfunding campaign can serve as a certifi-
cation mechanism that is factored into the venture capitalist’s investment decision. 
Based on this preliminary argumentation and given that peer opinions receive increased 
attention in financial markets (Chen, De, Hu, & Hwang, 2014), this dissertation firstly 
focuses on the value of the success or failure of the crowdfunding campaign itself, the 
role of platform endorsements, as well as brand exposure on social media platforms and 
how these campaign-related characteristics affect venture capitalist decision-making. 
Thereafter, the role of a crowdfunding campaign is assessed when considering the syn-
dication behavior of a venture capitalist.  
The role of campaign success in VC financing 
In order to reduce the risk involved when investing in a new venture, venture capitalists 
use a variety of mechanisms through which new ventures are evaluated. As noted be-
fore, venture capitalists assess the potential of business models (Munari & Toschi, 
2011), the availability of a patented technology (Conti et al., 2013; Haeussler et al., 
2014; Hoenen, Kolympiris, Schoenmakers, & Kalaitzandonakes, 2014; Munari & Toschi, 
2011), as well as preceding investments by other professionals (Bertoni et al., 2011; 
Davila et al., 2003) amongst a variety of other tangible and intangible factors during 
their screening process. When considering the early stages of crowdfunding projects in 
the life cycle of a firm, however, these signals are hardly available when evaluating 
investment proposals. Based on that, the human capital of the founding team as well as 
an indication of market acceptance are likely the only signals that can be considered by 
a venture capitalist when assessing the prospects of the entrepreneurial initiative. Nev-
ertheless, when assessing a new venture, both backers (amateurs) and venture capital-
ists (experts) share a common interest by looking for information that signal quality 
and thus reduce information asymmetries (Mollick, 2013).  
  
82 
Against this background, it can be argued that crowdfunding does not only give the 
campaign initiators the option to seek funding for their idea, it also allows them to pre-
test the market acceptance for their product or service (i.e. assess potential demand). 
According to Petty and Gruber (2011), the potential of the target market is one key 
indicator for a venture capitalist when screening deals. In that regard, entrepreneurs 
can signal the market potential of their idea through their campaign supporters. In other 
words, a large collective of individuals that support a crowdfunding initiative assesses 
the idea to be superior to others and also attests demand which can reduce informa-
tional frictions concerning market acceptance (Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal, 2012; Mollick 
& Nanda, 2016). Hence, a successful crowdfunding campaign may serve as positive 
signal for outside investors since the funded project received positive feedback from a 
large group of individuals that could turn into future customers (Ahlers et al., 2015; 
Mollick & Kuppuswamy, 2014; Vismara, 2016). As a result, a venture capitalist may 
rely on the decision of the crowd in order to evaluate the future potential of the entre-
preneurial initiative and to infer whether the new venture and its product or service is 
worth investing (Agrawal et al., 2016; Mollick & Nanda, 2016). Given that a successful 
campaign signals market acceptance and superior quality, the following is hypothe-
sized:   
H1: A successful reward-based crowdfunding campaign has a positive influence 
on receiving VC funding. 
Despite the fact that the success of a campaign per se is one major signal of market 
acceptance that is produced by the backers, the level of campaign funding is another 
important signal a campaign initiator can create. Put differently, attractiveness of an 
entrepreneurial initiative is also expressed by the degree of funding the new venture 
received compared to the funding it initially demanded from the crowd. As previously 
noted, the new venture Lifxs raised a record amount of pledges worth USD 1.3m, 13-
times the initial funding goal (Dingman, 2013). Thus, the degree of overfunding can be 
considered another distinct signal of attractiveness being considered in the evaluation 
process of venture capitalists. Although the funding goal is negatively related to cam-
paign success (Colombo et al., 2015; Mollick, 2014), a supply of finance from the back-
ers that exceeds the demand from the campaign initiators can nevertheless be inter-
preted as a signal of above-average acceptance. However, from the entrepreneurs view, 
  
83 
the degree of (over-)funding might also affect the need for additional finance. New 
ventures having collected a high amount of funding through the crowd are a) attractive 
for a venture capitalist as outlined before, but also b) less in urge of additional funding 
given that their financial need is saturated. Hence, given the fact that the amount re-
ceived relative to the amount required (i.e. funding ratio) is another signal of market 
acceptance and quality, the following hypothesized: 
H2: The receipt of VC funding has a curvilinear (an inverted U-shaped) rela-
tionship with the funding ratio of the campaign. 
The role of campaign endorsement in VC financing 
Beyond the signal of market potential of the product or service, third-party endorse-
ments play a crucial role in reducing information asymmetries between two parties 
(Mollick, 2013). Endorsements are signals of reputation provided by a third party, 
which are based on objective factors. In the context of venture capital for example, 
endorsements represent investments from prior investors that have already evaluated 
the potential investee (Bertoni et al., 2011; Davila et al., 2003; Kim & Wagman, 2016). 
In that regard, a venture capitalist can infer from a positive assessment by another in-
vestor that the potential investee is of superior quality and can incorporate this signal 
in the decision-making process in order to reduce information asymmetries ex-ante 
(Bonardo et al., 2010; Lerner, 1999, 2002). Again, when considering the early stages 
of development of firms using reward-based crowdfunding, endorsements by prior in-
vestors are rather unlikely since these entrepreneurial initiatives usually did not acquire 
other investments prior to crowdfunding. 
However, reward-based crowdfunding campaigns may also be subject to an endorse-
ment process in which platform-staff assesses a campaign’s quality (Mollick, 2014; Wes-
sel et al., 2015). These so called ‘staff picks’ represent campaigns that are of exceptional 
quality in terms of the degree of innovation, campaign description, and the use of mul-
timedia technology (Kickstarter, 2016b). Objectivity is ensured by the fact that ‘staff 
picks’ cannot be altered by the campaign creators themselves but are rather based on 
their effort in comparison to competing campaign owners. In that case, a ‘staff pick’ 
gives some sort of credit and special attention to a campaign as well as its creators and 
also helps potential backers to a) gain awareness of the project and b), to assess the 
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quality and seriousness of the campaign. In other words, a ‘staff pick’ can help a poten-
tial investor to distinguish good campaigns from bad ones. Mollick (2014) and Wessel 
et al. (2015) provide empirical evidence that a ‘staff pick’ has a positive influence on 
campaign success and the number of backers respectively. Given the large universe of 
potential projects to support, individual investors can rely on this qualitative signal 
when selecting campaigns which they prefer to support. By relying on a ‘staff pick’, 
backers can assume that the campaign is more likely to reach its funding goal and pro-
vide the promised reward in exchange. Likewise, in the process of screening potential 
investments, a professional investor can also rely on the judgement provided by the 
platform owner in selecting high-quality campaigns that are superior to others. In other 
words, platform endorsements pre-select a certain amount of campaigns outperforming 
others in various aspects. This superiority can ultimately translate into an increased 
level of seriousness pursued by the entrepreneurs and signal trust to outside parties, 
such as venture capitalists. Based on these arguments, the following is proposed:  
H3: The endorsement of a reward-based crowdfunding campaign by the plat-
form provider has a positive influence on receiving VC funding. 
The role of brand exposure on social media platforms in VC financing 
Given that reward-based crowdfunding campaigns enjoy increased popularity, project 
creators are urged to increase appearance and demonstrate superior quality in order to 
stand out compared to competing campaigns. However, individuals are restricted by 
few available informational cues which can be used in the individuals’ assessment of a 
new venture’s or project’s quality in the context of crowdfunding (Dellarocas, 2003; 
Godes et al., 2005). Amongst them, the primary source of information about a project 
(i.e. project description, videos, updates, etc.) largely stems from a single source - the 
project creator. Hence, backers are confronted with potentially biased information, 
which they have to assess upon plausibility. As a result, other sources of trust and qual-
ity become more valuable for potential backers when assessing projects (Thies, Wessel, 
& Benlian, 2016). Besides platform-relevant cues such as ‘staff picks’, the use of word-
of-mouth (WoM), or more suitable for the context of crowdfunding platforms, elec-
tronic word-of-mouth (eWoM), is an additional signal which individuals can rely on in 
a crowdfunding context (Dellarocas, 2003). The latter circumscribes a comment about 
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a product and/or company from potential, actual, or former customers (Hennig-
Thurau, Gwinner, Walsh, & Gremler, 2004). 
These comments, both positive and negative, inherit the power to influence the relia-
bility, credibility, and trustworthiness of the product or company under scrutiny and 
can support an individuals’ decision-making process (Arndt, 1967; Brown, Broderick, & 
Lee, 2007). According to Thies et al. (2016), “spreading the word in social media raises 
awareness for the respective crowdfunding campaign without requiring financial in-
vestments and can be central in persuading prospective backers to invest” (Thies et al., 
2016, p. 848). Hence, eWoM can lead to more backers being aware of a campaign and 
increase credibility and trustworthiness if backers hear from interesting projects from 
their personal network. Thies et al. (2016) test this hypothesis in their study on 23,340 
reward-based crowdfunding campaigns and find empirical evidence that eWoM in the 
form of comments on the campaign website and Facebook-shares today indeed influ-
ence the number of backers tomorrow. They conclude that consumers are positively 
influenced by recommendations and feedback from their network. Further, eWoM may 
also help ambitious campaigns to raise awareness from venture capitalists. Following 
this argumentation, the following is proposed: 
H4: The volume of electronic-Word-of-Mouth in a reward-based crowdfunding 
campaign has positive influence towards receiving VC.  
In addition to the value of campaign-related signals towards their importance in the 
post-campaign allocation of funding through venture capitalists, this dissertation also 
evaluates how the presence of a campaign itself influences the syndication behavior of 
venture capitalists against the background of other new venture-related characteristics. 
In essence, a syndicate is formed if at least two investors jointly invest in a portfolio 
company by acknowledging both risk and reward involved in the transaction (Hopp & 
Lukas, 2014; Terjesen et al., 2013; Wright & Lockett, 2003). Syndicates have been 
formed as a means for investors to gain access to deals that would otherwise be impos-
sible for small and less-reputable VC firms (Hopp & Lukas, 2014; Manigart et al., 2006). 
Further, while being part of an investment syndicate, less experienced investors learn 
from more experienced investors and gain reputation which poses an additional ad-
vantage (Chou, Cheng, & Chien, 2013). Lastly, when joining a syndicate, the syndicate 
partners can define a process through which the investee’s potential is evaluated from 
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multiple perspectives given the larger amount of experience that is available in the syn-
dicate. Hence, joining a syndicate might lead to improved project selection (Altintig et 
al., 2013; Brander, Amit, & Antweiler, 2002; Bygrave, 1987), and an increase in port-
folio diversification given that a larger amount of investments can be made (Hopp, 
2010; Kogut, Urso, & Walker, 2007). 
On the contrary and despite the advantages that come along with the syndicate net-
work, joining a syndicate comes at a cost. For one thing, the experience of the syndicate 
partners has a lasting impact on the syndicate as well as the investee’s performance. In 
that regard, less experienced venture capitalists are more likely motivated to join a syn-
dicate in comparison to more experienced venture capitalists in order to benefit from 
the knowledge spillover and experience of the more senior syndicate members (Casa-
matta & Haritchabalet, 2007; Cestone, Lerner, & White, 2006). Moreover, suboptimal 
syndicate contracts among participants allow syndicate members to exploit the benefits 
of the syndicate, while providing insufficient resources, translating into syndicate costs 
outweighing the benefits (Chou et al., 2013; Cumming, 2007). In these situations, syn-
dicate members are subject to a loss in reputation, limited access to future deal flow, 
and exclusion from further investment rounds (Wright & Lockett, 2003). Obviously, the 
reduced risk also comes at the cost of reduced reward, since a syndicate that shares the 
risk collectively has to share the expected profits, too (Brander et al., 2002; Hopp & 
Lukas, 2014). To conclude, although a VC syndicate may entail several advantages to 
the individual investor, a syndicate also has its downsides (Barringer, 2000; Dimov & 
Milanov, 2010).  
In order to avoid the detriments that come along with syndication while simultaneously 
exploiting the advantages of risk diversification, venture capitalists can rely on the as-
sessment of an even larger collective - the crowd. Thus, a successful crowdfunding cam-
paign may truly serve as signal of quality by representing the opinion of market ac-
ceptance through the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ (Agrawal et al., 2016; Bruton et al., 2015; 
Mollick, 2014; Mollick & Nanda, 2016). Therefore, the support of a campaign can be 
interpreted as a signal of firm quality and thus reduce information asymmetries between 
the investor and the investee. Based on this overarching assumption and the fact that 
peer opinions receive increased attention in financial markets (Chen et al., 2014), this 
dissertation draws its attention on how crowdfunding affects the venture capitalist’s 
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decision to syndicate. Manigart et al. (2006) give a comprehensive overview of motiva-
tions that can influence VC syndication, highlighting the financing, the value adding, 
the deal flow, and the deal selection motive. This dissertation focuses on the deal flow 
and deal selection motives in theorizing the link between crowdfunded ventures and 
venture capitalists’ syndication behavior for two main reasons: First, the latter two suit 
the intended research context of this empirical contribution with the focus on crowd-
funding and its presumed positive signaling value to reduce information asymmetries. 
That is, the argumentation outlined above highlights that crowdfunding can have a cer-
tification effect for a new venture that can ignite professional investors’ interest based 
on the objectified feedback towards a product or service a crowdfunding campaign pro-
vides (Drover et al., 2017; Roma et al., 2017). Second, the motives outlined by Manigart 
et al. (2006) offer the right degree of precision while being mutually exclusive. The first 
two motives - the finance and the value adding motive - are of lesser importance for 
this empirical contribution and the theoretical framework drawing on signaling theory 
as these motives are more related to the context of the resource based view of the firm 
(Barney, 1991; Barney et al., 2001; Penrose, 1996; Wernerfelt, 1984). That is, these 
motives draw on the resources of the VC funds in terms of financial means, skills, and 
capabilities in regard to value adding activities. Hence, the financing and value adding 
motive would go beyond the scope of signaling theory and are thus not considered.  
In line with that, the deal selection motive - according to Brander et al. (2002) and 
Manigart et al. (2006) - states that venture capitalists syndicate in order to reduce com-
pany-specific risk. As such, when a potential portfolio company is assessed from more 
than one investor, the risk of adverse selection is reduced given the increased capacity 
of the syndicate in assessing the available information (Lehmann, 2006; Lerner, 1994; 
Plummer et al., 2016; Sah & Stiglitz, 1984). This aspect is particularly relevant for ven-
ture capitalists investing in new ventures in their early stages of development, since 
uncertainty about the new ventures’ potential is large and thus the need for syndication 
is higher compared to VC firms investing in ventures in later development stages (Man-
igart et al., 2006). In addition to the human capital of the founding team, new ventures 
in this life cycle stage often have no other tangible- (e.g. patents) and intangible assets 
(e.g. a brand) that could serve as a signal that reduces the unsystematic investment risk 
from a venture capitalist’s perspective. In line with that, Bygrave (1988) finds a positive 
relation between uncertainty about the investment object and willingness to syndicate. 
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Further, Lerner (1994) provides evidence that established VC firms tend to syndicate 
more with similar established peer investors in first round investments that are charac-
terized by high information asymmetries. In later rounds, he finds, syndicates also com-
prise a joint investment of established and less-established VC firms.  
When screening potential investments, the potential of the target market is amongst the 
most important indicators being scrutinized by investors (Petty & Gruber, 2011). Before 
the occurrence of crowdfunding, the assessment of the target market’s potential in terms 
of product or service acceptance and demand was largely the product of an investors’ 
individual assessment and experience. With crowdfunding however, entrepreneurs can 
attest market demand which can reduce informational frictions in a VC screening pro-
cess (Burtch et al., 2012; Mollick & Nanda, 2016). Hence, the opinion of a large collec-
tive assessed in a crowdfunding campaign reduces uncertainties about market ac-
ceptance and thus the risk of failure may be decreased, a factor of utmost importance 
in the screening of portfolio firms (Petty & Gruber, 2011). As a result, uncertainty is 
reduced and likewise the need to syndicate is affected when arguing against the back-
ground of the deal selection motive (Bygrave, 1988; Manigart et al., 2006). As such, 
and given the fact that crowdfunding is likely to decrease information asymmetries be-
tween the new venture and the investor, the following is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 5: Venture capitalists are less likely to syndicate when investing in 
crowdfunded ventures compared to investing in non-crowdfunded ventures. 
Beyond the selection motive, venture capitalists also syndicate in order to have access 
to many investment opportunities (Manigart et al., 2006; Sørenson & Stuart, 2001). 
Deal flow circumscribes a venture capitalist’s access to a large number of potential in-
vestments that fit to the VC fund’s overall portfolio strategy (Manigart et al., 2006). In 
that regard, Lerner (1994) and Manigart et al. (2006) argue that the probability to have 
access to investments of high quality increases with the size of the individual investor`s 
syndicate network due to increased status and visibility. For instance, an investor might 
be invited to join a syndicate even though he was not involved in sourcing the deal 
(Bovaird, 1990).  
Before being considered a valuable syndication partner however, venture capitalists 
with a smaller network and fewer resources might actively invest in a large number of 
  
89 
syndicated investments and thus increase their deal flow in order to increase the aware-
ness from the potential partners’ perspective (Hopp & Lukas, 2014). Hence, less expe-
rienced venture capitalists are more likely motivated to join a syndicate as non-lead 
investors compared to more experienced ones in order to profit from the knowledge 
and experience of the syndicate’s lead investors (Casamatta & Haritchabalet, 2007; 
Cestone et al., 2006). In addition, inexperienced VC funds may find it more difficult to 
diversify their portfolios based on the scarcity of their available resources (Huntsman & 
Hoban, 1980; Murray, 1999). Hence, access to a larger array of deals does not only 
increase an inexperienced VC fund’s visibility, but also allows the fund to access 
knowledge and gain experience from investment opportunities it would otherwise be 
withheld from. As a result of this resource constraint, there exists an inverse relationship 
between fund size and syndication necessity - the smaller the fund, the higher the need 
to seek syndicate partners. 
When considering that crowdfunding can raise awareness about an entrepreneurial 
venture on a global level, also small venture capital funds can uncover these ventures. 
Since many investment opportunities are often captured by well-connected and experi-
enced funds with diverse social capital before other funds outside that network could 
make investment offers, easy access to potentially new portfolio firms via crowdfunding 
allows less experienced venture capitalists to learn about investment opportunities they 
would not have heard of before. Thus, less experienced VC funds profit from the in-
crease in potential deals to source from in order to improve their track record by gaining 
deal exposure. Nevertheless, less experienced VC funds are still confronted with large 
information asymmetries concerning the new venture that can better be addressed in a 
syndicate. Put differently, given their resource scarcity, less experienced funds may rely 
more heavily on the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ compared to more experienced funds when 
building their own investment track record. Hence, crowdfunding allows less experi-
enced VC funds to access a larger number of investments and simultaneously reduces 
the risk of adverse selection given that the investment object is assessed from both, the 
crowd as well the syndicate members (Lehmann, 2006; Lerner, 1994; Plummer et al., 
2016; Sah & Stiglitz, 1984). Taken together, this dissertation argues that crowdfunding 
opens a new channel to discover attractive investment opportunities for less experi-
enced VC funds in order to gain investment exposure. Given this assumption, the fol-
lowing is hypothesized:  
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Hypothesis 6: VC syndicates of crowdfunded ventures are less experienced than 
VC syndicates of non-crowdfunded ventures. 
Another argument that supports the assumption that crowdfunding influences the deal-
flow of investment syndicates is the degree of internationality. Traditionally, investors 
often invest in firms which are located nearby in order to interact (i.e. monitor) and 
exchange information with the portfolio company (French & Poterba, 1991; Seasholes 
& Zhu, 2010; van Nieuwerburgh & Veldkamp, 2009). Thus, spatial proximity enables 
the VC investor to monitor the new venture and thus reduces costs resulting from in-
formation asymmetries during the investment phase. Therefore, new ventures being 
close to the VC investor have increased chances of receiving an investment (Agrawal et 
al., 2016). However, Sørenson and Stuart (2001) show that a VC firm is more likely to 
invest in a more distant venture if a syndicate partner exists that the VC has a) previ-
ously worked with and b), is located near the portfolio firm. In other words, interna-
tional syndicates require at least one local firm to deal with the portfolio firm directly, 
whereas co-investors could be located far away. In line with Manigart et al. (2006), for 
a fund with a broad investment scope, this fact is particularly relevant as it increases 
possibilities to invest in ventures that are located far away but fit the portfolio strategy. 
However, without the local partner, the likelihood that such funds invest in interesting 
investment opportunities that are not close by are rather small (Manigart et al., 2006). 
As crowdfunding platforms are accessible worldwide and offer information about the 
entrepreneurial ventures, these platforms provide investors with a new and globally 
available channel to source deals. For example, investors with a broad investment scope 
have access to a large number of investment opportunities by getting to know about 
them via crowdfunding platforms. Hence, their deal flow is positively influenced from 
a quantitative perspective. Thus, crowdfunding provides an unprecedented opportunity 
for remote investors to locate deals and then syndicate with a partner who is located 
close to the targeted new venture. Hence, crowdfunding as a new deal channel does 
not only create opportunities to syndicate over remote distances, but the syndicates are 
likely to become more heterogeneous in terms of internationality at the same time. 
Based on this argumentation, the following is hypothesized:  
Hypothesis 7: VC syndicates of crowdfunded ventures are more international 
than VC syndicates of non-crowdfunded ventures. 
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4.2 Data and Research Methodology 
4.2.1 Dataset and Descriptive Statistics 
The primary source of information consists of campaign-level data from Kickstarter, 
which is currently the worldwide leading reward-based crowdfunding platform. Since 
its launch in 2009, Kickstarter raised over USD 2.8 billion with more than 12 million 
pledges funding over 110,000 successful projects (Kickstarter, 2016c).  
The data was gathered automatically using a self-developed web-crawler to retrieve the 
available information of every campaign. The data includes all projects that ran on Kick-
starter, starting in 2009 until June 2016, resulting in nearly 300,000 campaigns, both 
successful and unsuccessful, that sought funding from the crowd. Following previous 
studies focusing on entrepreneurial initiatives on crowdfunding platforms (Kuppus-
wamy & Bayus, 2015; Mollick & Kuppuswamy, 2014; Mollick & Robb, 2016; Yang & 
Hahn, 2015), this dissertation limits the dataset for the main analysis. Even though 
Kickstarter offers 15 distinct categories for projects, this empirical contribution focusses 
on three major categories: “Games”, “Design”, and “Technology”. Unlike the remaining 
categories, nearly all projects in these three categories are related to entrepreneurial 
activities that are not just one-off projects (Yang & Hahn, 2015). Campaigns that re-
ceived follow-up external funding were identified using the Crunchbase database that 
is commonly used in other studies investigating the funding behavior of investors (e.g. 
Alexy, Block, Sandner, and Ter Wal 2012; Ter Wal, Alexy, Block, and Sandner 2016). 
As of October 2016, the Crunchbase database consists of 115,481 legal entities that 
were established and legally registered. Further, the database contains information on 
a total of 146,847 investment rounds comprising 48,337 investors and is hence consid-
ered more accurate, concerning small and medium-sized enterprises as well as large 
multinationals, compared to other sources (Alexy et al., 2012). Given that the invest-
ment process requires time after a campaign took place, only campaigns in the period 
2010 through 2015 are considered so that new ventures having performed crowdfund-
ing had sufficient time to seek funding and thus be included in Crunchbase.  
In order to answer research question two and three and to match the data retrieved 
from Crunchbase with the initial dataset from Kickstarter, the sources had to be com-
bined. Therefore, a string matching method was applied that provides a similarity score 
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between two different text strings by performing different string-based matching tech-
niques. It returns a new numeric variable containing the similarity score, which ranges 
from zero to one. A score of one implies a perfect similarity according to the string 
matching technique and decreases when the match is less similar (Raffo & Lhuillery, 
2009). The method was applied to two pairs of variables from each dataset. First, the 
names of the creator of the campaign were matched, which is usually a person or a 
company on Kickstarter, with the company name provided by Crunchbase. The second 
relevant pair of variables was the website from the campaign (Kickstarter) and the com-
pany (Crunchbase). Following this procedure, the resulting matches were sorted by 
their similarity score and the first 5000 matches were checked manually to guarantee 
the validity of the process. The process of manually correcting the false positives is a 
desirable action, since the purpose of the string matching is to identify a dataset with a 
minimum of false positives. The manual check was extremely important as only 684 
corresponding investments made into crowdfunding campaigns were correctly 
matched. On the other hand, the possible elimination of false negatives induced by the 
matching algorithm should not introduce any systematic bias due to an assumed ran-
dom distribution (Raffo & Lhuillery, 2009). Given the focus on the period 2010 through 
2015, 610 out of the 684 campaigns identified represent the final sample. Table 8 pro-
vides an overview of the categorical distribution of crowdfunding campaigns in the pe-
riod 2010 through 2015. 
Table 8: Category Overview of Crowdfunding Campaigns 2010 through 2015 
The table shows an overview of the absolute number of firms without (column 1) and 
with (column 2) follow-up VC financing in the respective categories provided by Kick-
starter (N=610).  
Category 
Campaigns w/o                   
follow-up VC 
 
Campaigns w/                             
follow-up VC 
  N. of firms  
(abs.) 
N. of firms  
(in %) 
  N. of firms  
(abs.) 
N. of firms  
(in %) 
      
Art 19,770 7.6%  6 1.0% 
Comics 6,428 2.5%  - - 
Crafts 5,168 2.0%  2 0.3% 
Dance 2,923 1.1%  - - 
Design 17,295 6.6%  133 21.8% 
Fashion 13,663 5.2%  31 5.1% 
Film/Video 50,326 19.3%  19 3.1% 
Food 16,928 6.5%  20 3.3% 
Games 20,321 7.8%  75 12.3% 
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Journalism 3,141 1.2%  4 0.7% 
Music 42,035 16.1%  3 0.5% 
Photography 8,115 3.1%  3 0.5% 
Publishing 28,075 10.8%  11 1.8% 
Technology 18,346 7.0%  302 49.5% 
Theatre 8,721 3.3%  1 0.2%      
Total 261,255 100%   610 100% 
 
The majority of crowdfunding campaigns without follow-up VC concentrate in the areas 
of Film/Video (19 percent), Music (16 percent), and Publishing (11 percent). This dis-
tribution is in accordance with the fact that the majority of reward-based crowdfunding 
campaigns are initiated against the background of cultural events (Schwienbacher & 
Larralde, 2010). When considering campaigns that received follow-up financing iden-
tified by the matching technique, the distribution changes. Here, investments mainly 
concentrate in the categories of Technology (50 percent), Design (22 percent), and 
Games (12 percent) since new ventures’ need for external investors is typically higher 
in these categories. This distribution further strengthens the argument to limit the da-
taset for the analysis to these categories. Hence, the final sample used in the analyses 
concerning research question two comprises 510 crowdfunding campaigns initiated in 
the period 2010 through 2015 in the categories of “Games”, “Design”, and “Technology”.  
The analyses concerning research question three relies on the data description elabo-
rated on so far, applies an additional approach, however. As research question three 
focusses on the presence of a crowdfunding campaign itself as a signal of new venture 
quality rather than the campaign-related signals themselves, the analyses also consider 
other firm-relevant information. Hence, the perspective shifts from campaign-related 
informational cues to new venture related informational cues. Hence, the 510 identified 
campaigns need to be matched to legal entities, representing 267 new ventures. Based 
on this final sample that comprises firms having completed at least one crowdfunding 
campaign before their first round of VC, a matched sample of VC-backed firms without 
a crowdfunding campaign was constructed according to a set of predefined character-
istics (Bertoni, Croce, & Guerini, 2015; Chemmanur et al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013; 
Engel & Keilbach, 2007; Tian, 2012). A reason for this approach is that the allocation 
of VC is non-random and subject to a certain selection bias. First, firms with or without 
crowdfunding are subject to choose whether to apply for VC funding. Second, venture 
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capitalists can choose from a large universe of firms having similar characteristics. In 
order to address the selection bias, a matching estimator is chosen by selecting control 
group firms based on a propensity score matching algorithm (e.g. Bertoni et al. 2015; 
Croce et al. 2013). Thus, the entire Crunchbase database was used in order to sample 
the most similar peers for each of the 267 new ventures identified that have completed 
at least one reward-based crowdfunding campaign in their history.  
Figure 7 provides an overview of the industry allocation of the entire population of 
potential firms included in Crunchbase with and without crowdfunding. Following the 
standard industry classification codes (SIC), one can conclude the Crunchbase database 
primarily includes new ventures that can be allocated to the Services industry (60 per-
cent). This industry allocation is not surprising given the fact that many new ventures 
provide (digital) platform-based solutions and are thus allocated to the service industry. 
Beyond a relatively large proportion of new ventures that did not indicate any industry 
classification (11 percent), the categories of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate and Re-
tail Trade show the third highest proportion with 8 percent respectively. Only 7 percent 
of new ventures can be allocated to the Manufacturing industry.  
Figure 7: Industry Overview According to the SIC Industry Classification 
The figure shows an overview of industry affiliation separated by the total sample and the 
respective percentage allocation. 
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When comparing the 267 identified new ventures with the total number of potential 
new ventures that could serve as a control group member, some differences should be 
pointed out, however. As such, table 9 provides an overview of industry allocations of 
new ventures with crowdfunding (column 1) and without a prior crowdfunding cam-
paign (column 2). When referring to new ventures with a crowdfunding campaign, the 
majority (56 percent) of new ventures can be allocated to the services industry again 
(table 9, column 1). This this allocation is not different compared to new ventures with-
out crowdfunding (table 9, column 2). Nevertheless, the second largest industry repre-
sented with new ventures having used crowdfunding is Manufacturing with 19 percent 
(table 9, column 1). This allocation is not surprising since many initiatives on Kick-
starter develop a physical and product-like prototype which is, according to the SIC 
definition, an act of manufacturing and thus belongs to this respective category. Note-
worthy is also the difference of new firms belonging to the Retail Trade category. Whilst 
new ventures with crowdfunding are represented with 13 percent in this category (table 
9, column 1), only 8 percent of the total Crunchbase database of new ventures without 
crowdfunding belong to this category (table 9, column 2). On the contrary, the SIC 
category Finance, Insurance and Real Estate is underrepresented for new ventures having 
used crowdfunding (5 percent) compared to new ventures without (8 percent) (table 
9, columns 1 and 2). 
Table 9: Industry Overview of New Ventures 
The table shows an overview of industry affiliation separated by new ventures with crowd-
funding (column 1) and new ventures without crowdfunding (column 2). 
SIC Industry Classification 
New Ventures w/              
Crowdfunding 
 New Ventures w/o               
Crowdfunding 
N. of firms  
(abs.) 
N. of firms  
(in %) 
  N. of firms  
(abs.) 
N. of firms  
(in %) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3 1% 
 
217 0% 
Mining 0 0% 
 
235 0% 
Manufacturing 52 19% 
 
5,858 7% 
Transportation, Communica-
tions, Electric, and other       
Services 
12 4% 
 
4,827 6% 
Retail Trade 36 13% 
 
7,049 8% 
Finance, Insurance and        
Real Estate 
14 5% 
 
6,547 8% 
Services 149 56% 
 
49,605 59% 
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Public Administration 1 0% 
 
258 0% 
No indication 0 0% 
 
8,786 11% 
Total 267 100%   83,382 100% 
 
To derive a suitable control group from the vast amount of potential new ventures avail-
able, a probit-model is used in which the dependent variable is the probability of per-
forming a crowdfunding campaign. The independent firm-specific variables include the 
firm-age, the number of founders and employees, and industry dummies.6 By applying 
this matching algorithm, this dissertation aims to find for each VC-backed firm with a 
preceding crowdfunding campaign the three most similar peers (i.e. nearest neighbors) 
of VC-backed firms without a preceding crowdfunding campaign. Given that no optimal 
ratio of treated and control groups exist and that larger matches do not lead to gains in 
efficacy (Sørensen & Stuart, 2000; Sørenson & Stuart, 2008), larger control groups are 
used only to test the robustness of the results. The final sample derived contains 504 
unique new ventures, of which 193 had completed at least one reward-based crowd-
funding campaign on Kickstarter before they received funding from venture capitalists. 
The remaining 311 new ventures comprise similar peers without a crowdfunding cam-
paign in their history. 
4.2.2 Variables and Methods Concerning VC Investing 
For the econometric model, the occurrence of follow-up funding from a venture capi-
talist after a crowdfunding campaign was used as a binary dependent variable. Logit 
models are well established and used for binary outcomes. The probability of an out-
come is modeled as a function of one or more regressors (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). 
In this case, the probability of a crowdfunding project receiving VC as a follow-up in-
vestment was modeled depending on a set of control variables and the hypothesized 
effects regarding market demand, endorsement, and brand exposure. The applied 
method is thus formalized as follows: 
                                            
6 The control group was constructed using nearest-neighbor matching with Mahalano-
bis distance (see e.g. Croce, Marti, and Murtinu 2013) using STATA command 
psmatch2). Further, the sampling of the control group with replacement was per-
formed. This approach allowed that each potential control group firm has the chance 
to be selected more than once.  
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 pi=PR[yi=1|xi]=Φ(β1+β2xi) (1) 
Here 𝑦𝑖 is the occurrence of external VC funding (0/1) depending on crowdfunding 
campaign characteristics 𝑥𝑖. As the event of external funding is extremely rare (i.e. 510 
investments out of 56,000 campaigns), a penalized maximum likelihood logistic regres-
sion is applied with the Stata function firthlogit. This technique is suitable for dealing 
with such rare events in a sense that the binary dependent variable of an external fol-
low-up investment (1) occurs approximately a hundred times fewer than a non-event 
(0) (Firth, 1993; Hilbe, 2009). 
In order to assess the proposed influence of campaign success, endorsement, and brand 
exposure, several proxy variables are used in the regression analysis. Concerning the 
role of market demand, success (Success) is considered in the data as whether or not 
the campaign reached its funding goal (see hypothesis 1). Kickstarter uses an all-or-
nothing funding mechanism, meaning that funds are only paid out if the funding goal 
is reached. This measurement of success is well established in the crowdfunding litera-
ture (Mollick 2014). Further, the ratio of the actual funding received in relation to the 
funding required is used as an alternative measure (Funding Ratio) (see hypothesis 2). 
Again, for campaign endorsement this analysis follows Mollick (2014) and Wessel et al. 
(2015), as this dissertation uses a binary variable (Staff Pick) that was coded with the 
value of one in case the campaign was a so-called ‘staff pick’ and zero otherweise (see 
hypothesis 3). As mentioned before, being endorsed by the platform provider entails 
several advantages (e.g. exposure on a separate list of campaigns recommended by 
Kickstarter) and is reserved for campaigns that are selected by Kickstarter staff because 
they are particularly compelling (Kickstarter, 2016b). Lastly, brand exposure was meas-
ured by a variable reflecting the accumulated volume of eWOM by the campaign in the 
form of the logarithmic shares on the social network Facebook (Facebook Shares (LN)) 
(see hypothesis 4) (Thies et al., 2016). 
In addition, several other control variables that were used in recent reward-based-
crowdfunding studies identifying success factors, other quality signals, and creator ex-
perience in crowdfunding are employed. One key control variable is whether the cam-
paign includes a video (Video) (Mollick, 2014). Uploading a video is strongly recom-
mended by Kickstarter, claiming that it highly improves the success rate (Kickstarter, 
2016a). The binary variable was coded with the value of one in case the campaign had 
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a video and zero otherwise. Additional controls are the campaign’s funding goal in log-
arithmic terms (Funding Goal (LN)) and the number of offered rewards (No. of Rewards) 
(Agrawal et al., 2011; Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2015). Further, the description length of 
the campaign (Description Length (LN)) is controlled for, assuming that a longer and 
more detailed description can reduce information asymmetries (Wessel et al., 2016). 
Additionally, the analyses controls for the category (Games, Design, and Technology) 
and the year (2010-2015) in which the campaign ran on Kickstarter. In addition to 
these controls, a variable counting the number of campaigns (No of Campaigns) a crea-
tor has launched on Kickstarter previously is included to assess his experience with the 
platform (Zhang, 2006). Finally, the number of backers that supported the campaign 
(Project Backers) is accounted for.  
However, given that campaign success (Success), the funding ratio (Funding Ratio), an 
endorsement (Staff Pick), and brand exposure (Facebook Shares (LN)) are partly a result 
of the campaigns’ intrinsic quality, the analyses are able to test if these signals are of 
additional value to a venture capitalist beyond the campaign itself. In case the methods 
applied detect that the campaign success, the funding ratio, a project endorsement, and 
increased brand exposure have an additional signaling value to a VC investor, an in-
crease in the goodness of fit of the model could be expected. Further, a typical two-step 
Heckman correction method (i.e. the inverse Mill’s ratio) is used to account for the 
unobserved heterogeneity in the VC investment process, referred to as selection bias 
(Heckman, 1979; Hellmann & Puri, 2002). To derive the inverse Mill’s ratio, a selection 
equation is computed with campaign success as binary dependent variable. Using a pro-
bit estimator, the analyses regress the campaign’s success on a set of independent and 
control variables that have empirically proven to influence campaign success. The vari-
ables used represent the independent and control variables as outlined above.  
In addition, both the number of project updates and project comments are used in log-
arithmic terms in the selection equation. This procedure follows the assumption that 
the number of project updates and comments are related to campaign success (Arndt, 
1967; Brown et al., 2007; Thies et al., 2016), but do not influence the receipt of VC. 
Based on the calculated residuals of the predicted probabilities of each campaign to be 
successful, the inverse Mill’s ratio is computed (see for example Bertoni et al. 2011 and 
Engel 2002 for a similar approach). This inverse Mill’s ratio addresses the potential 
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selection bias and generates more consistent estimation parameters in the regressions 
(Colombo & Grilli, 2010; Tucker, 2010). In a second step, the inverse Mill’s ratio is 
inserted in combination with the previously introduced independent and control varia-
bles in the second-stage regression in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity. 
To test the robustness of the results, calculations are repeated using standard logit re-
gressions and secondly use the full dataset including all categories. In order to avoid 
using potential outliers distorting the results, the 99 percentile is used for the analyses. 
Finally, the analyses also consider whether multicollinearity between the covariates is 
an issue for the analyses by considering variance inflation factors (VIF). Due to the fact 
that mean VIF values of the models lie below the suggested threshold level of five as 
suggested by Chatterjee and Hadi (2006) and the maximum VIF values below the 
threshold level of 10 as suggested by O'Brien (2007), multicollinearity is not an issue. 
4.2.3 Variables and Methods Concerning VC Syndication 
In order to test whether crowdfunding influences the syndication behavior of venture 
capitalists (i.e. hypothesis 5), two different dependent variables are used. First, a binary 
variable Syndicate is employed that is coded with the value of one in case the new ven-
ture received funding from a syndicate and zero otherwise (e.g. Dimov and Milanov 
2010). Second, a count variable named Syndicate Size is used representing the number 
of investors in the syndicate (Jolink & Niesten, 2016; Ferrary, 2010; Wang, Wuebker, 
Han, & Ensley, 2012; Wang & Wang, 2012). Concerning the experience level of the 
syndicate investors (i.e. hypothesis 6), three different dependent variables are used. 
First, the average (i.e. Average Investments) and total number of investments (i.e. Total 
Investments) are used as a proxy for the syndicates’ experience based on their number 
of deals in the past (e.g. Chemmanur, Hull, and Krishnan 2016). Further, this disserta-
tion also accounts for the average age of the syndicate partners as a proxy for the syn-
dicate’s experience with the dependent variable Average Age. Lastly, it is also tested how 
crowdfunding influences cross-border syndication (i.e. hypothesis 7) with the binary 
dependent variable International Syndicate that is coded with the value of one in case 
the syndicate comprises at least two investors from different countries of origin and 
zero otherwise. Furthermore, this dissertation also tests for the number of investor 
countries of origin with the dependent variable # of investor countries as another proxy 
for the internationality of the syndicate. The independent variable in all analyses is the 
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binary variable Crowdfunding that is coded with the value of one in case the new ven-
ture completed a crowdfunding campaign before their first funding round with one or 
more VC investors and zero otherwise.  
In addition, several control variables are employed, too. First, the new ventures’ age is 
accounted for as well as the number of founding team members by the variables Venture 
Age and Number of Founders (e.g. Alexy et al. 2012; Criaco et al. 2014; Scholten et al. 
2015; Wang et al. 2012; and Wang and Zhou 2004). Second, the new venture’s respec-
tive SIC industry is included with the variable Industry Dummy (see e.g. Jolink and 
Niesten 2016). Third, following studies in a similar context, this dissertation also ac-
counts whether or not the new venture is a US-based firm with the binary variable US 
Firm that takes the value of one in case the new venture is based in the US and zero 
otherwise (e.g. Chahine, Arthurs, Filatotchev, and Hoskisson 2012). Lastly, this disser-
tation also accounts for the number of employees the new venture has with the cate-
gorical variable Number of Employees. Using the variables outlined above, the empirical 
analyses rest upon three different methodological approaches. 
As the hypotheses concerning the syndication behavior of venture capitalists deals with 
different types of outcomes (i.e. dependent variables), the econometric analysis has to 
be adjusted accordingly. For the dichotomous dependent variables whether or not a 
syndicated VC investment followed a crowdfunding campaign (hypothesis 5, Syndica-
tion (0/1)) and whether or not this syndicated investment is international (i.e. hypoth-
esis 7, International Syndicate (0/1)), a logit model is applicable. Here, the model spec-
ifies the probability of an outcome as a function of one or more independent variables 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005) and can be formalized as follows: 
 𝐏𝐫(𝑦 = 1|𝒙) =  𝐹(𝒙𝜷) (2) 
where 𝑭 is the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution for the logit 
model (Long, 1998). The probability of observing an event given 𝒙 is the cumulative 
density evaluated at 𝒙𝜷. 
For the dependent variables Syndicate Size and # of investor countries (hypothesis 5 and 
7), a Poisson regression is used as these dependent variables are count variables (Cam-
eron & Trivedi, 2013). The model is formalized as follows: 
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 𝐸[ 𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖 , 𝜀𝑖] =  exp (𝛼 + 𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖) (3) 
where 𝑦𝑖 denotes the dependent count variable, 𝑥𝑖 represents the investment specific 
independent variable (Crowdfunding) and all controls, while 𝜀𝑖 acts as the error term. 
All three remaining dependent variables are count variables (hypothesis 6, Average In-
vestment, Total Investments, and Average Age) as well. Still, as these variables are all 
significantly over dispersed, using a negative binominal regression instead of a Poisson 
regression is advised (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013; Long, 1998). All results are robust to 
the Poisson specification. The formalization is concurrent with (3). The baseline models 
include the before-mentioned control variables. In the full model, the indicator Crowd-
funding (0/1) is included respectively.  
4.3 Empirical Results and Discussion 
4.3.1 Results Concerning Crowdfunding and VC Investing 
Before turning to the econometric evidence, this dissertation provides descriptive sta-
tistics for all variables that are used in the econometric models concerning the analyses 
of campaign-specific signals in table 10. The descriptive statistics are divided in the full 
dataset, including all crowdfunding campaigns without follow-up VC from the entre-
preneurial focused categories “Games”, “Design”, and “Technology”, and the identified 
campaigns that received follow-up VC investments. Here, some differences should be 
pointed out. Surprisingly, no significant differences in the aspired funding goal of the 
campaigns and funding ratios can be identified. To be more precise, 32 percent of cam-
paigns that received follow-up VC were not successful on Kickstarter in the first place 
measured with the variable Success. Still, compared to all campaigns from the entrepre-
neurial focused categories, their success rate is much higher. The same applies to all 
other campaign characteristics that have empirically shown to have an influence on 
campaign success (e.g. Agrawal et al. 2015; Mollick 2014, or Thies et al. 2016). Further, 
table 10 also shows that crowdfunded campaigns that received follow-up VC received 
significantly more support from backers (No. of Backers), had a significantly higher 
funding goal (Funding Goal), and were also significantly more trending (Facebook 
Shares (LN)) on social media platforms.  
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Table 10: Summary Statistics of Crowdfunding Campaigns 
The table shows an overview of the crowdfunding campaign-specific characteristics of 
new ventures without VC follow-up financing and new ventures with follow-up VC fi-
nancing.  
Summary Statistics 
All Campaigns w/o   
follow-up VC 
Campaigns w/        
follow-up VC 
Mean Diff. 
Mean SD Mean SD T-value 
Number of Campaigns 2.50 7.37 1.94 1.89 1.87* 
No. of Backers 86.95 779.27 1,391 3,128 -40.59*** 
Funding Goal 42,516 1,092 72,720 130,839 -0.68 
No. of Updates 2.48 4.45 7.04 6.45 -25.18*** 
No. of Rewards 7.68 4.76 10.56 4.52 -14.95*** 
Video (0/1) 0.71 0.45 0.95 0.22 -12.96*** 
Description Length (LN) 7.65 1.00 8.75 0.81 -27.22*** 
Success (0/1) 0.37 0.48 0.68 0.47 -15.98** 
Funding Ratio 3.71 178.44 3.62 7.17 0.01 
Staff Pick (0/1) 0.10 0.29 0.39 0.49 -14.83** 
Facebook Shares (LN) 1.57 2.36 4.35 3.20 -28.97*** 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
Further, table 11 and table 12 present the results of the penalized maximum likelihood 
logistic regressions referring to the receipt of VC as dependent variable using the full 
data set including all categories available on Kickstarter (table 11) as well as the re-
duced dataset referring to the categories Games, Design, and Technology (table 12). 
Further, to test the robustness of the results, table 13 and table 14 repeat the analyses 
using a standard logit method and the receipt of VC as dependent variable. Hereby, the 
dependent variable is regressed on campaign-specific signals of all campaigns available 
on Kickstarter (table 13) as well as the reduced categories (table 14). In each analysis, 
the independent variables are presented in separate specifications (models 1-6). Posi-
tive and significant values in the models indicate an increased likelihood of receiving 
post-campaign follow-up VC funding.  
Considering the focal variable Success, indicating whether the reward-based crowdfund-
ing campaign reached its funding goal, reveals that the variable has a positive and 
highly significant effect at the 0.1 percent level on the likelihood for the campaign own-
ers to receive follow-up VC funding (tables 11 and 12, model 2). This effect remains 
positive and significant at the 0.1 percent level when referring to the results concerning 
the logit estimates (tables 13 and 14, model 2). In other words, the results imply - in 
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line with hypothesis 1 - that a successful crowdfunding campaign increases the entre-
preneur’s chance to receive follow-up VC significantly. Based on these results, the anal-
yses find that crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to pre-test the market acceptance of 
their business idea, where a positive outcome becomes a valuable signal concerning the 
likelihood to receive VC (Petty & Gruber, 2011). Hence, this dissertation infers from the 
results that the decision of a large collective of individuals to support a crowdfunding 
initiative strengthens the notion that the supported project is superior to others. Fur-
ther, a successful campaign attests demand which can further reduce informational fric-
tions about future uncertainties (Burtch et al. 2012; Mollick & Nanda, 2016). Hence, 
the success of a crowdfunding campaign is a positive signal for venture capitalists since 
the funded project received positive feedback from a large group of individuals (Ahlers 
et al., 2015; Mollick & Kuppuswamy, 2014; Vismara, 2016). Given this finding, one can 
state that venture capitalists apparently rely on the wisdom of the crowd in order to 
evaluate the potential of the entrepreneurial initiative and whether the new venture 
and its product or service is worth investing.  
Further, the empirical findings also detect a positive and highly significant effect at the 
0.1 percent level of the variable Funding Ratio towards the receipt of follow-up VC fund-
ing (tables 11 and 12, model 3). Again, this finding is positive and significant at the 0.1 
percent level when referring to the results of the logit analysis (tables 13 and 14, model 
3). Put differently, the higher the campaign’s ratio of the amount collected in relation 
to the campaign’s initial funding goal, the more likely a funding. Nevertheless, as out-
lined before, the penalized maximum likelihood logistic regressions confirms that this 
relationship turns negative at a certain point and remains highly significant at the 0.1 
percent level (table 11 and 12, model 4). Regarding the results of the logit analysis, this 
effect is confirmed both for the direction of the effect as well as the level of significance 
(tables 13 and 14, model 4). In other words, the empirical findings confirm - in line 
with hypothesis 2 - an inverted u-shaped relationship between the funding ratio of a 
crowdfunding campaign and the likelihood of post-campaign follow-up VC financing. 
Figure 7 illustrates this effect by showing that the probability of receiving VC follow-up 
financing increases until a crowdfunding campaign is about 14x overfunded. For cam-
paigns having collected about 14 times or more of their initial funding goal, the likeli-
hood of a VC follow-up funding decreases.  
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Figure 8: Curvilinear Effect on VC Follow-up Funding  
The figure shows that there exists a curvilinear relationship between the funding received 
compared to the funding desired (i.e. funding ratio in percent) and the probability to re-
ceive follow-up VC funding. 
 
In line with the previous findings so far, the campaign endorsement through Kickstarter, 
measured by the variable Staff Pick has a positive and highly significant effect at the 0.1 
percent level on the likelihood to receive VC when referring to the analyses concerning 
all categories available on Kickstarter (table 11, model 5). Regarding the analysis con-
sidering only the categories Game, Design, and Technology, the effect remains positive 
and is significant at the 1 percent level (table 12, model 5). This finding finds support 
when referring to the logit analysis. While the direction of the effect is similarly positive 
when regarding the analysis using both, the full as well as the reduced categories (tables 
13 and 14, model 5), the level of significance differs. When regarding the logit estimates 
including all categories, the variable Staff Pick is highly significant at the 0.1 percent 
level (table 13, model 5). The analyses focusing on the reduced categories show a level 
of significance at the 1 percent level, however, (table 14, model 5). Hence, campaigns 
endorsed by Kickstarter have a higher chance of receiving venture capital compared to 
non-endorsed campaigns. The results hint at evidence that third-party endorsements 
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play a crucial role in reducing information asymmetries between two parties (Mollick, 
2013). Given that other endorsements such as prior investment rounds are likely una-
vailable in the early stages of development of new ventures using crowdfunding, a ‘staff 
pick’ gives a degree of reputation to a campaign as well as its creators. In other words, 
this endorsement supports the campaign to a) gain awareness from the viewpoint of 
potential investors, both backers and venture capitalists and b), supports both in as-
sessing the quality and seriousness of the campaign in order to distinguish good cam-
paigns from those of lower quality. Given these findings, one can conclude that third-
party endorsements on crowdfunding platforms reduce informational frictions and thus 
positively influence the decision-making behavior of both amateur and expert investors 
alike. Hence, the analyses find empirical evidence for hypothesis 3.  
Lastly, the results regarding the role of social media interaction, measured by the vari-
able Facebook Shares (LN) finds a positive and significant relationship of the campaign-
related signals for the receipt of post-campaign VC follow-up funding at the 1 percent 
level when considering all Kickstarter categories (table 11, model 6). The effect remains 
positive and significant at the 5 percent level when regarding the findings derived based 
on the analysis using only Games, Design, and Technology as available categories (table 
12, model 6). Likewise, the logit estimates show that the variable has a positive and 
significant effect at the 1 percent level when regarding the analysis including all cate-
gories (table 13, model 6) and is positive and significant at the 5 percent level when 
referring to the results focusing on the reduced categories (table 14, model 6). Given 
these results, the findings show empirical evidence that social media interaction 
amongst crowdfunding backers influences VC decision-making. Hence, similar to ama-
teur investors such as backers, venture capitalists seem to rely on the signaling value of 
social-media awareness demonstrating reliability, credibility, and trustworthiness of the 
product or company under scrutiny (Arndt, 1967; Brown et al., 2007; Thies et al., 
2016). In that regard, expert investors such as venture capitalists are likely to be influ-
enced by trending ‘hot’ products and companies that are being currently ‘en vogue’ on 
the market. Based on that, the findings support hypothesis 4.  
Concerning the control variables, the campaign’s Funding Goal has a positive and sig-
nificant effect at the 0.1 percent level for receiving VC (tables 11 through 14). Second, 
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the Description Length has a likewise positive and significant effect considering the like-
lihood of VC follow-up funding throughout all specifications (tables 11 through 14). 
Third, the campaigns’ number of updates has a negative and significant effect at the 5 
percent level, the 1 percent level as well as the 0.1 percent level towards receiving fol-
low-up VC (tables 12 through 14). Fourth, the inverse Mills ratio is negative and highly 
significant at the 0.1 percent level in all specifications (tables 11 through 14). This im-
plies that the use of the two-step Heckman procedure is adequate (Heughebaert & Man-
igart, 2012; Knockaert, Foo, Erikson, & Cools, 2015). 
Given the bayesian information criterion (BIC) indicator of goodness-of-fit, the analyses 
can verify that campaign success, endorsement, and brand exposure increase the model 
fit beyond the baseline model (i.e. model 1 in tables 11 through 14 respectively), point-
ing towards additional value for expert investors. 
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Table 11: Determinants of VC Funding - All Categories (Firthlogit) 
The table shows the empirical results when regressing on the dependent variable receipt of VC while focusing on all categories.  
Dependent variable Receipt of VC Receipt of VC Receipt of VC Receipt of VC Receipt of VC Receipt of VC 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
ß t ß t ß t ß t ß t ß t 
 
Control variables 
        
  
  
1 Category (control) Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - 
2 Year (control) Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - 
3 Number of Campaigns -0.004 [-0.372] -0.005 [-0.493] -0.010 [-0.793] -0.013 [-1.016] -0.003 [-0.295] -0.003 [-0.325] 
4 No. of Backers 0.000** [2.668] 0.000 [1.670] 0.000 [-0.112] 0.000 [-0.688] 0.000* [2.385] 0.000* [2.183] 
5 Funding Goal (LN) 0.650*** [17.810] 0.681*** [18.422] 0.710*** [18.596] 0.721*** [18.963] 0.626*** [16.799] 0.608*** [15.310] 
6 No. of Updates -0.021* [-2.429] -0.028** [-3.145] -0.031*** [-3.501] -0.034*** [-3.831] -0.019* [-2.193] -0.018* [-2.156] 
7 No. of Rewards -0.007 [-0.667] -0.008 [-0.769] -0.003 [-0.272] 0.000 [0.006] -0.008 [-0.831] -0.008 [-0.749] 
8 Video 0.178 [0.892] 0.250 [1.244] 0.210 [1.046] 0.263 [1.304] 0.186 [0.926] 0.192 [0.963] 
9 Description Length (LN) 0.232*** [3.376] 0.261*** [3.769] 0.200** [2.887] 0.206** [2.974] 0.236*** [3.426] 0.238*** [3.465] 
10 Inverse Mills Ratio -0.949*** [-17.278] -0.696*** [-10.981] -0.842*** [-15.337] -0.723*** [-12.574] -0.884*** [-15.211] -0.847*** [-12.723] 
 
Independent variables             
11 Success   0.866*** [6.854]         
12 Funding Ratio     0.116*** [9.555] 0.328*** [8.577]     
 Funding Ratio#Funding Ratio       -0.013*** [-5.448]     
13 Staff Pick         0.327*** [3.351]   
14 Facebook Shares (LN)           0.070** [2.675] 
 pseudo R-sq -  -  -  -  -  -  
 BIC 6,249.9  6,207.6  6,065.6  6,030.9  6,246.7  6,247.9  
 ll -2,950.4  -2,922.9  -2,852.1  -2,828.4  -2,942.5  -2,943.1  
 
chi2 1,939.2  1,963.2  1,967.9  2,006.6  1,955.3  1,941.2  
 
N 261,158  261,158  259,566  259,566  261,158  261,158  
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. T-values in brackets. Test statistics are calculated via STATA command Firthlogit. Year controls cover the periods 2010 through 2015. Cate-
gory controls include all categories outlined in table 8 (column 1). 
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Table 12: Determinants of VC Funding - Reduced Categories (Firthlogit) 
The table shows the empirical results when regressing on the dependent variable receipt of VC while focusing on Games, Design and Technology.  
Dependent variable Receipt of VC Receipt of VC Receipt of VC Receipt of VC Receipt of VC Receipt of VC 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
ß t ß t ß t ß t ß t ß t 
 
Control variables 
        
  
  
1 Category (control) Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - 
2 Year (control) Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - 
3 Number of Campaigns -0.004 [-0.347] -0.004 [-0.410] -0.007 [-0.638] -0.010 [-0.792] -0.003 [-0.261] -0.003 [-0.276] 
4 No. of Backers 0.000 [1.135] 0.000 [0.651] 0.000 [-0.839] 0.000 [-1.181] 0.000 [0.970] 0.000 [0.878] 
5 Funding Goal (LN) 0.722*** [17.029] 0.731*** [17.165] 0.780*** [17.632] 0.781*** [17.690] 0.695*** [15.992] 0.671*** [14.138] 
6 No. of Updates -0.025** [-2.649] -0.029** [-3.092] -0.034*** [-3.520] -0.036*** [-3.697] -0.022* [-2.406] -0.022* [-2.345] 
7 No. of Rewards -0.014 [-1.230] -0.014 [-1.233] -0.010 [-0.840] -0.007 [-0.601] -0.016 [-1.361] -0.015 [-1.298] 
8 Video 0.283 [1.205] 0.349 [1.476] 0.302 [1.280] 0.346 [1.459] 0.286 [1.214] 0.285 [1.213] 
9 Description Length (LN) 0.293*** [3.818] 0.310*** [4.019] 0.253** [3.258] 0.253** [3.270] 0.294*** [3.822] 0.294*** [3.836] 
10 Inverse Mills Ratio -0.904*** [-16.328] -0.683*** [-10.365] -0.804*** [-14.518] -0.707*** [-12.071] -0.847*** [-14.419] -0.807*** [-11.791] 
 
Independent variables             
11 Success   0.776*** [5.429]         
12 Funding Ratio     0.107*** [8.107] 0.276*** [6.763]     
 Funding Ratio#Funding Ratio       -0.010*** [-4.146]     
13 Staff Pick         0.308** [2.877]   
14 Facebook Shares (LN)           0.070* [2.337] 
 pseudo R-sq -  -  -  -  -  -  
 BIC 4,618.1  4,593.8  4,463.6  4,442.9  4,616.4  4,616.5  
 ll -2,221.6  -2,203.9  -2,138.9  -2,123.1  -2,215.3  -2,215.3  
 
chi2 1,016.0  1,054.8  1,036.1  1,060.7  1,031.3  1,017.2  
 
N 56,220  56,220  55,656  55,656  56,220  56,220  
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. T-values in brackets. Test statistics are calculated via STATA command Firthlogit. Year controls cover the periods 2010 through 2015. Cate-
gory controls include Games, Design, and Technology. 
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Table 13: Determinants of VC Funding - All Categories (Logit) 
The table shows the empirical results when regressing on the dependent variable receipt of VC while focusing on all categories.  
Dependent variable Receipt of VC Receipt of VC Receipt of VC Receipt of VC Receipt of VC Receipt of VC 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
ß t ß t ß t ß t ß t ß t 
 
Control variables 
        
  
  
1 Category (control) Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - 
2 Year (control) Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - 
3 Number of Campaigns -0.007 [-0.632] -0.009 [-0.744] -0.013 [-1.035] -0.016 [-1.250] -0.006 [-0.560] -0.007 [-0.587] 
4 No. of Backers 0.000* [2.262] 0.000 [1.421] 0.000 [-0.257] 0.000 [-0.806] 0.000* [2.013] 0.000 [1.825] 
5 Funding Goal (LN) 0.651*** [17.805] 0.682*** [18.473] 0.711*** [18.597] 0.723*** [18.963] 0.627*** [16.807] 0.609*** [15.325] 
6 No. of Updates -0.021* [-2.476] -0.028** [-3.188] -0.031*** [-3.550] -0.035*** [-3.877] -0.019* [-2.240] -0.019* [-2.205] 
7 No. of Rewards -0.007 [-0.693] -0.008 [-0.795] -0.003 [-0.308] 0.000 [-0.029] -0.009 [-0.856] -0.008 [-0.774] 
8 Video 0.191 [0.949] 0.263 [1.299] 0.224 [1.105] 0.277 [1.364] 0.198 [0.982] 0.205 [1.019] 
9 Description Length (LN) 0.233*** [3.398] 0.262*** [3.791] 0.202** [2.911] 0.207** [2.999] 0.237*** [3.447] 0.239*** [3.487] 
10 Inverse Mills Ratio -0.954*** [-17.331] -0.700*** [-11.033] -0.847*** [-15.394] -0.727*** [-12.611] -0.889*** [-15.266] -0.852*** [-12.782] 
 
Independent variables             
11 Success   0.869*** [6.876]         
12 Funding Ratio     0.117*** [9.518] 0.331*** [8.614]     
 Funding Ratio#Funding Ratio       -0.013*** [-5.496]     
13 Staff Pick         0.326*** [3.342]   
14 Facebook Shares (LN)           0.070** [2.676] 
 pseudo R-sq 0.297  0.303  0.301  0.305  0.298  0.298  
 BIC 6,346.2  6,307.9  6,169.3  6,146.3  6,347.6  6,351.4  
 ll -3,011.4  -2,986.1  -2,916.8  -2,899.1  -3,005.9  -3,007.8  
 
chi2 2,543.8  2,594.6  2,508.5  2,543.9  2,554.8  2,551.0  
 
N 251,834  251,834  250,300  250,300  251,834  251,834  
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. T-values in brackets. Test statistics are calculated via STATA command Logit. Year controls cover the periods 2010 through 2015. Category 
controls include all categories outlined in table 8 (column 1). 
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Table 14: Determinants of VC Funding - Reduced Categories (Logit) 
The table shows the empirical results when regressing on the dependent variable receipt of VC while focusing on Games, Design and Technology.  
Dependent variable Receipt of VC Receipt of VC Receipt of VC Receipt of VC Receipt of VC Receipt of VC 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
ß t ß t ß t ß t ß t ß t 
 
Control variables 
        
  
  
1 Category (control) Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - 
2 Year (control) Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - 
3 Number of Campaigns -0.007 [-0.612] -0.008 [-0.669] -0.011 [-0.890] -0.013 [-1.037] -0.006 [-0.531] -0.006 [-0.544] 
4 No. of Backers 0.000 [0.945] 0.000 [0.485] 0.000 [-0.981] 0.000 [-1.303] 0.000 [0.788] 0.000 [0.685] 
5 Funding Goal (LN) 0.724*** [17.126] 0.733*** [17.252] 0.782*** [17.642] 0.783*** [17.697] 0.697*** [16.083] 0.674*** [14.214] 
6 No. of Updates -0.025** [-2.700] -0.030** [-3.140] -0.034*** [-3.572] -0.036*** [-3.747] -0.023* [-2.458] -0.022* [-2.398] 
7 No. of Rewards -0.015 [-1.252] -0.015 [-1.257] -0.010 [-0.871] -0.007 [-0.632] -0.016 [-1.382] -0.015 [-1.320] 
8 Video 0.303 [1.276] 0.369 [1.546] 0.323 [1.353] 0.366 [1.532] 0.305 [1.284] 0.304 [1.283] 
9 Description Length (LN) 0.295*** [3.844] 0.312*** [4.045] 0.255** [3.285] 0.255*** [3.298] 0.296*** [3.847] 0.296*** [3.861] 
10 Inverse Mills Ratio -0.909*** [-16.413] -0.687*** [-10.424] -0.810*** [-14.583] -0.711*** [-12.116] -0.852*** [-14.496] -0.813*** [-11.867] 
 
Independent variables             
11 Success   0.779*** [5.446]         
12 Funding Ratio     0.107*** [8.077] 0.279*** [6.799]     
 Funding Ratio#Funding Ratio       -0.010*** [-4.193]     
13 Staff Pick         0.308** [2.867]   
14 Facebook Shares (LN)           0.069* [2.332] 
 pseudo R-sq 0.218  0.223  0.222  0.225  0.219  0.219  
 BIC 4,722.3  4,701.8  4,575.2  4,566.4  4,725.1  4,727.7  
 ll -2,273.6  -2,257.9  -2,194.7  -2,184.9  -2,269.6  -2,270.9  
 
chi2 1,264.7  1,296.2  1,252.4  1,272.2  1,272.9  1,270.2  
 
N 56,220  56,220  55,656  55,656  56,220  56,220  
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. T-values in brackets. Test statistics are calculated via STATA command Logit. Year controls cover the periods 2010 through 2015. Category 
controls include Games, Design, and Technology. 
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4.3.2 Results Concerning Crowdfunding and VC Syndication 
The key descriptive statistics for the analyses regarding the effect of a crowdfunding 
campaign towards the syndication behavior of venture capitalists are presented in table 
15. As mentioned before, the sample includes a total of 504 investments with an aver-
age of 1.9 founding members and an average age of 4.2 years. Regarding the correlation 
matrix (table 15), one can see that correlation levels are low, both from a numeric and 
significance-level perspective. In addition, the presence of multicollinearity is controlled 
for between the covariates by considering variance inflation factors. Given that the  
mean VIF values do not exceed the suggested threshold level of five (Chatterjee & Hadi, 
2006), and the maximum VIF values are below the threshold level of 10 as suggested 
by O'Brien (2007), multicollinearity is not an issue. 
Table 15: Correlation Table of Independent and Control Variables 
The table shows an overview of the correlation between independent and control vari-
ables.  
 
Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Number of 
Founders 
(1) 
1.857 1.272 1 18 1.000 
     
Venture 
Age       
(2) 
4.151 4.205 1 34 -0.166* 1.000 
    
Industry 
Dummy 
(3) 
5.601 1.710 1 8 0.079* 0.127* 1.000 
   
Number of 
Employees 
(4) 
1.589 0.685 1 5 0.024 0.160* 0.055 1.000 
  
US Firm 
(5) 
0.637 0.481 0 1 -0.082* 0.023 0.005 0.017 1.000 
 
Crowd-
funding 
(6) 
0.383 0.487 0 1 -0.021 -0.075* 0.093* -0.088* 0.272* 1.000 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
The descriptive statistics are divided into new ventures with and without crowdfunding 
(table 16). When regarding the sample distribution, some differences should be pointed 
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out. First, entrepreneurial ventures without and with crowdfunding show a significant 
mean difference concerning the receipt of syndicated VC as well as syndicate size. Sec-
ond, syndicates investing in entrepreneurial ventures without crowdfunding show on 
average less investments measured by the variable Average Investments. When regarding 
the number of total investments as well as the average age of the syndicate members, 
the relationship changes. Investment syndicates investing in new ventures without 
crowdfunding show on average a higher number of total investments (Total Invest-
ments) and tend to be older (Average Age) compared to syndicates investing in entre-
preneurial ventures that used crowdfunding. Lastly, international syndicates are on av-
erage more represented with entrepreneurial ventures having not used crowdfunding 
compared to those who have. Likewise, the number of syndicate countries is higher for 
new ventures without a crowdfunding campaign compared to firms with a crowdfund-
ing campaign. Given the fact that this empirical contribution aims at finding the most 
similar peers to each crowdfunded venture, the firm-specific characteristics are not sig-
nificantly different thus showing that the ventures analyzed are as similar as possible 
(results not tabulated).  
Table 16: Summary Statistics of Crowdfunding Campaigns 2010 through 2015 
The table shows the summary statistics regarding the syndication behavior of venture 
capitalists and new venture-specific information of new ventures without and with 
crowdfunding. 
Summary Statistics 
New Ventures w/o 
crowdfunding 
New Ventures w/ 
crowdfunding 
Mean Diff. 
Mean SD Mean SD T-value 
Syndicate .4758842 .500223 .2849741 .4525761 4.3174 *** 
Syndicate Size 2.086817 1.576701 1.756477 1.629088 2.2574 * 
Average Investments 149.455 241.5224 202.7253 286.1809 -2.0250 * 
Total Investments 268.6688 386.6001 243.3523 406.7999 0.7004 
Average Age 15.49766 13.66055 13.56009 12.90934 1.3373 
Int. Syndicate .1672026 .373758 .1295337 .336663 1.1418 
# of VC countries 1.176849 .5366362 .8497409 .7240025 5.8037 *** 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
Now, the focus shifts to the econometric modelling, which is based on the sample of 
504 new ventures of which 193 had a crowdfunding campaign before they have re-
ceived VC. Table 17 presents the results of the logistic and poisson regressions referring 
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to Syndication as well as Syndicate Size as dependent variables. In the first set of anal-
yses, this dissertation focuses on the influence of crowdfunding on the syndication be-
havior of venture capitalists. When regressing on the dependent dummy variable Syn-
dicate, the negative and highly significant coefficient for the variable Crowdfunding in 
the analyses indicate a negative influence towards receiving syndicated VC (table 17, 
column 2). This effect is also found for the size of the syndicate as dependent variable. 
Here, the variable Crowdfunding is significant and negative at the 5 percent level when 
referring to the variable Syndicate Size as dependent variable (table 17, column 4). 
Hence, support for hypothesis 5 is found in that crowdfunding negatively influences 
syndication. When turning to the empirical results concerning the influence of crowd-
funding concerning the experience of the syndicate and its members, the dependent 
variables include the average (Average Investments) and total number of investments 
(Total Investments) of the syndicate members (table 18, columns 1-4), as well as the 
average age (Average Age) of the syndicate members (table 19, columns 1 and 2). How-
ever, the results do not reveal a strong level of significance how crowdfunding influ-
ences the collective experience of the syndicate. The empirical results show that crowd-
funding has a positive effect on the average and total number of investments at the 10 
percent level of significance (table 18, columns 2 and 4), whereas the effect on the 
average age of the syndicate members is negative but insignificant (table 19, column 
6). Hence, one can infer from the results that crowdfunding has only a marginal effect 
on the experience of the syndicate that provides funds. Thus, hypotheses 6 has to be 
rejected. In the third set of analyses, it is evaluated how crowdfunding influences the 
internationalization of syndicated VC investments following crowdfunding campaigns. 
Thus, the dependent variables are whether or not the syndicate is international (i.e. 
contains at least two different countries of origin of the venture capitalists) (table 20, 
columns 1 and 2), and the absolute number of the venture capitalists’ countries of origin 
(table 20, columns 3 and 4). The results reveal that crowdfunding has a positive and 
significant effect at the 5 percent level towards receiving funding from an international 
syndicate (table 20, column 2). This effect is similarly positive and significant at the 5 
percent level when the number of investor countries is considered (table 20, column 4). 
Hence, from the results one can infer that having realized a crowdfunding campaign 
prior to receiving VC increases international syndication, which supports hypothesis 7. 
This dissertation also repeated the calculations using different numbers of matching 
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neighbors and also completed the analyses against the background of the entire data-
base available in Crunchbase. The results confirmed the main effects and thus support 
the robustness of the findings (results not tabulated).  
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Table 17: Determinants of the Syndication Behavior of Venture Capitalists 
The table shows the empirical results when regressing on the dependent variables Syndicate (columns 1 and 2) and the variable Syndicate 
Size (column 3 and 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Baseline Model Full Model  
 
Baseline Model Full Model  
 
Dependent Variable Syndicate Syndicate Syndicate Size Syndicate Size 
Method Logit Logit Poisson Poisson 
 
b t b t b t b t 
1. Number of Founders 0.043 [0.489] 0.035 [0.470] 0.011 [0.381] 0.010 [0.348] 
2. Venture Age -0.007 [-0.271] -0.017 [-0.673] -0.015* [-2.098] -0.017* [-2.409] 
3. Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
4. Number of Employees 
    (reference: 4) 
        
Number of Employees: 1 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 
Number of Employees: 2 0.515* [2.543] 0.469* [2.268] 0.112 [1.439] 0.097 [1.239] 
Number of Employees: 3 0.943* [2.351] 0.864* [2.075] 0.361* [2.272] 0.333* [2.105] 
Number of Employees: 5 0.923 [0.881] 0.696 [0.685] 0.109 [0.325] 0.052 [0.157] 
5. US Firm 0.206 [1.049] 0.455* [2.200] 0.097 [1.278] 0.151* [2.053] 
6. Crowdfunding   -0.901*** [-4.240]   -0.204** [-2.649] 
7. Constant -1.251 [-1.540] -1.162 [-1.505] 0.193 [1.429] 0.219 [1.749] 
pseudo R-sq 0.032 
 
0.060 
 
0.011 
 
0.016 
 
BIC 738.9  726.1  1776.3  1773.9 
 
ll -329.0  -319.5  -847.7  -843.4 
 
chi2 20.8  38.2  35.7  46.6 
 
N 504  504  504  504 
 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. T-values in brackets. Test statistics are calculated via STATA command Logit (column 1 and 2) and Poisson 
(columns 3 and 4). Industry dummies include the industries outlined in table 9 (column 1). 
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Table 18: Determinants of a VC Syndicate’s Level of Experience (1/2) 
The table shows the empirical results when regressing on the dependent variables Average Investments (columns 1 and 2) and Total 
Investments (column 3 and 4). 
Model Baseline Model Full Model  
 
Baseline Model Full Model  
 
Dependent Variable Average Investments Average Investments Total Investments Total Investments 
Method Neg. Bin. Reg.  Neg. Bin. Reg.  Neg. Bin. Reg.  Neg. Bin. Reg.  
 
b t b t b t b t 
1. Number of Founders 0.124 [1.564] 0.126 [1.649] 0.100 [1.471] 0.106 [1.584] 
2. Venture Age 0.003 [0.098] 0.004 [0.130] -0.018 [-0.637] -0.017 [-0.626] 
3. Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
4. Number of Employees 
    (reference: 4) 
        
   Number of Employees: 1 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 
Number of Employees: 2 0.186 [1.011] 0.235 [1.308] 0.223 [1.343] 0.246 [1.489] 
Number of Employees: 3 0.339 [1.152] 0.412 [1.366] 0.782* [2.306] 0.832* [2.414] 
Number of Employees: 5 -0.494 [-0.756] -0.395 [-0.612] -0.252 [-0.361] -0.174 [-0.251] 
5. US Firm 0.627** [3.172] 0.559** [2.889] 0.635*** [3.344] 0.571** [3.028] 
6. Crowdfunding   0.328* [1.845]   0.293* [1.771] 
7. Constant 3.310*** [7.246] 3.373*** [7.457] 4.072*** [9.303] 4.125*** [9.503] 
pseudo R-sq 0.008  0.009  0.008  0.009  
BIC 2416.7  2419.2  2866.40  2869.4  
ll -1173.8  -1172.4  -1398.7  -1397.5  
chi2 -  -  -  -  
N 203  203  203  203  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. T-values in brackets. Test statistics are calculated via STATA command Nbreg. Industry dummies include the 
industries outlined in table 9 (column 1). 
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Table 19: Determinants of a VC Syndicate’s Level of Experience (2/2) 
The table shows the empirical results when regressing on the dependent variable Average Age (column 1 and 2). 
Model Baseline Model Full Model  
 
Dependent Variable Average Age Average Age 
Method Neg. Bin. Reg.  Neg. Bin. Reg.  
 
b t b t 
1. Number of Founders -0.039 [-0.850] -0.041 [-0.879] 
2. Venture Age 0.023 [1.843] 0.022 [1.727] 
3. Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  
4. Number of Employees 
    (reference: 4) 
    
   Number of Employees: 1 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 
Number of Employees: 2 0.336** [3.006] 0.332** [2.972] 
Number of Employees: 3 0.504** [3.200] 0.494** [3.175] 
Number of Employees: 5 -0.271 [-0.660] -0.307 [-0.734] 
5. US Firm -0.083 [-0.721] -0.069 [-0.597] 
6. Crowdfunding   -0.103 [-0.887] 
7. Constant 2.245*** [12.957] 2.237*** [13.062] 
pseudo R-sq 0.033  0.034  
BIC 1428.0  1432.2  
ll -679.9  -679.3  
chi2 -  -  
N 191  191  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. T-values in bracktes. Test statistics are calculated via STATA command Nbreg. Industry dummies include the 
industries outlined in table 9 (column 1). 
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Table 20: Determinants of International Syndication of Venture Capitalists 
The table shows the empirical results when regressing on the dependent variables International Syndicate (columns 1 and 2) and the 
Number of VC countries (column 3 and 4). 
Model Baseline Model Full Model  
 
Baseline Model Full Model  
 
Dependent Variable Int. Syndicate Int. Syndicate # of VC countries # of VC countries 
Method Logit Logit Poisson Poisson 
 
b t b t b t b t 
1. Number of Founders -0.058 [-0.368] -0.051 [-0.296] -0.034 [-1.162] -0.033 [-1.072] 
2. Venture Age 0.070 [1.818] 0.082* [1.969] 0.011 [1.884] 0.013* [2.121] 
3. Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
4. Number of Employees 
    (reference: 4) 
        
Number of Employees: 1 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 
Number of Employees: 2 0.272 [0.807] 0.305 [0.882] 0.057 [0.806] 0.061 [0.885] 
Number of Employees: 3 0.329 [0.596] 0.428 [0.728] 0.145 [1.267] 0.157 [1.338] 
Number of Employees: 5 0.526 [0.437] 0.874 [0.738] 0.007 [0.042] 0.072 [0.462] 
5. US Firm -0.976** [-2.999] -1.180*** [-3.360] -0.242*** [-3.632] -0.278*** [-4.180] 
6. Crowdfunding   0.860** [2.233]   0.175** [2.394] 
7. Constant -0.190 [-0.339] -0.480 [-0.797] 0.266** [2.943] 0.293** [3.190] 
pseudo R-sq 0.067  0.088  0.013  0.017 
 
BIC 306.9  306.7  579.1  582.8 
 
ll -124.3  -121.5  -254.9  -254.2 
 
chi2 15.5  17.6  169.4  177.6 
 
N 200  200  203  203 
 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. T-values in bracktes. Test statistics are calculated via STATA command Logit (column 1 and 2) and Poisson 
(columns 3 and 4). Industry dummies include the industries outlined in table 9 (column 1). 
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4.4 Limitations and Further Research Concerning Crowdfunding and VC 
Although the analyses find robust relations between crowdfunding and post-campaign 
follow-up VC financing, this empirical contribution is however also subject to limita-
tions. First, although all crowdfunding platforms rely on the same principle (Agrawal 
et al., 2013; Bruton et al., 2015; Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; Mollick, 2014), many 
forms of different crowdfunding platforms exist today. Despite the fact that they share 
the common objective of capital sourcing, the availability of informational cues that 
reduce information asymmetries may differ. Further, the research mainly concentrates 
on the categories “Games”, “Design”, and “Technology” of the Kickstarter platform given 
the assumption that campaigns in these categories are unlikely to be one-off projects 
but rather serious entrepreneurial initiatives with a more likely need for external inves-
tors (Yang & Hahn, 2015). Hence, caution should be exercised when referring from the 
conclusion to other forms of crowdfunding platforms and categories.  
Second, the research data includes a possible elimination of false negatives induced by 
the matching algorithm applied. Thus, this method cannot make any reliable interfer-
ence about how many crowdfunding campaigns truly received follow-up investments. 
But the method chosen should not introduce any systematic bias (Raffo & Lhuillery, 
2009). Furthermore, due to data availability, this empirical analysis was not able to 
consider other firm-specific characteristics of the crowdfunded projects, which might 
have served as additional signals for the VC investment. These include for example the 
human- and social capital of the founders or the availability of patents. Third, it has to 
be acknowledged that this study may be subject to an identification problem. That is, 
the intrinsic quality of a crowdfunding project may cause that a) the campaign itself is 
successful and b), that follow-up VC can be acquired. Hence, a positive investment de-
cision by a venture capitalist may also be triggered by the inherent project quality rather 
than the campaign success itself. However, when considering that the intrinsic quality 
is largely unobservable in crowdfunding, the methods chosen nevertheless controlled 
for a project’s quality using proxies that have empirically proven to influence campaign 
success. In addition, the inclusion of the two-step Heckman correction method (i.e. the 
inverse Mill’s ratio) to account for the unobserved heterogeneity adds to the quality of 
the analyses by addressing a potential selection bias. Further, the findings show that 
   
120 
the variables representing campaign success, a project endorsement, and brand expo-
sure increase model fit beyond the quality of the project itself. Based on these findings, 
this dissertation shows that expert investors rely on factors that go beyond the project’s 
observable quality. At the same time, this dissertation also recommends to refrain from 
over-interpreting the findings since the methods chosen cannot fully isolate the effect 
of campaign success, a project endorsement, and brand exposure.  
A fruitful avenue for future research would be to investigate crowdfunding campaigns 
on other platforms and their post-campaign financing in more detail. For example, 
given the large variety of crowdfunding forms, this dissertation encourages to investi-
gate lending- or equity-based crowdfunding platforms and to assess whether the cam-
paign-related signals prevalent in these forms of crowdfunding influence the receipt of 
VC. In particular, the latter is of interest since equity crowdfunding has gained increased 
attention both from entrepreneurs as well as researchers (e.g. Ahlers et al. 2015 and  
Colombo et al. 2015) and is considered a potential alternative to traditional financing 
provided by business angels or venture capitalists. Hence, it would be interesting to see 
whether equity crowdfunding has the potential to substitute traditional forms of risk-
capital for new ventures or if it complements the traditional forms as reward-based 
crowdfunding does.  
4.5 Conclusion and Contribution Concerning Crowdfunding and VC 
With these two empirical contribution, this dissertation focuses on the question whether 
successful crowdfunding campaigns are more likely to receive VC than unsuccessful 
campaigns, and if the existence of a crowdfunding campaign influences the syndication 
behavior of venture capitalists. Based on the research question two and three derived 
in the literature review, this dissertation firstly directs the focus to reward-based crowd-
funding campaigns and their signaling value for post-campaign follow-up VC invest-
ments. Given the increased popularity amongst commercially-oriented entrepreneurs to 
use crowdfunding as a new means of entrepreneurial finance (Schwienbacher & Lar-
ralde, 2010), this dissertation investigates if and how crowdfunding campaign-related 
factors influence the decision-making process of venture capitalists in post-campaign 
follow-up financing rounds. The analysis builds upon a consistent set of hypotheses and 
the empirical findings are deducted using a dataset comprising data from Kickstarter 
and Crunchbase.  
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Within the context of reward-based crowdfunding, amateur investors such as backers 
share similar objectives compared to experts such as venture capitalists when selecting 
investment objects (Mollick, 2013). In other words, both individuals face informational 
asymmetries and share an equal interest by searching for clues that signal quality and 
thus reduce the investment risk (Mollick, 2013). Hence, this dissertation investigates if 
informational cues that may influence a large collective of individuals similarly influ-
ence the investment decision of professional investors such as venture capitalists. Given 
this research question, the study contributes to advancing signaling theory against the 
background of the microfinance literature by showing that the effectiveness of quality 
signals is similar for expert and amateur investors in some aspects regarding the cam-
paign while it differs in others. For instance, the analyses find that a campaign endorse-
ment provided by Kickstarter does not only positively influence the campaign’s chances 
of success (Wessel et al., 2015), but also increases the likelihood of post-campaign fol-
low-up investments from a venture capitalist. Further, the analyses conclude that elec-
tronic-word-of-mouth also positively influences the receipt of VC after a crowdfunding 
campaign. This finding is in line with prior research showing that the success of a cam-
paign is positively linked to the number of Facebook-shares and comments on the cam-
paign website (Thies et al., 2016). One reason for this effect might be the herding be-
havior of amateur investors that can be explained by short decision times given the 
duration of the campaign or the emotional bonding between the amateur investor and 
his social-media network (Baddeley, 2010; Kuan, Zhong, & Chau, 2014). Apparently, 
VC investors are also subject to a certain degree of herding behavior given that they are 
apparently influenced by the fact how successful campaigns are on social media chan-
nels. Finally and most importantly, the results find empirical evidence that a successful 
campaign has a positive impact for the campaign initiator’s chances to receive post-
campaign follow-up VC financing. This finding is clearly in line with the expectation 
that a positive assessment of the potential of a campaign works as a signal for outside 
investors (Ahlers et al., 2015; Mollick & Kuppuswamy, 2014; Vismara, 2016). In other 
words, a large group of individuals assessed a project to be worth investing and likely 
to succeed in the market, an assessment which venture capitalists obviously value. Fur-
ther, this dissertation finds an inverted u-shaped relationship between a campaign’s 
funding received compared to the funding desired and the probability of a follow-up 
VC investment. Hence, if a campaign achieved a low level of funding success, the need 
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for capital remains intact, whereas campaigns with a high level of funding success have 
a reduced need and thus reduced likelihood of acquiring VC funding.  
In order to provide novel insights if and how crowdfunding influences the investment 
behavior of venture capitalists in terms of their need to form syndicates, this dissertation 
takes the perspective of the venture capitalist in selecting portfolio firms. Following 
Manigart et al. (2006) and relying on two major motives why venture capitalists form 
syndicates - deal selection and deal flow - this dissertation shows that crowdfunding 
does in fact influence both motives. Roma et al. (2017) already pointed out that crowd-
funding has a positive and lasting value for technology entrepreneurs in their follow-up 
financing round after the campaign. This positive effect of a crowdfunding campaign is 
largely due to the fact that crowdfunding offers entrepreneurs a platform through which 
they can show a potential investor that there exists a certain degree of demand (Roma 
et al., 2017). Hence, if the crowd supports a campaign, it simultaneously attests demand 
which can reduce informational frictions concerning potential market acceptance 
(Burtch et al., 2012; Mollick & Nanda, 2016). As such, a successful crowdfunding cam-
paign may serve as a valuable signal for outside investors since the funded project re-
ceived feedback from a large group of individuals that could turn into future customers 
(Ahlers et al., 2015; Moen, Sørheim, & Erikson, 2008; Mollick & Kuppuswamy, 2014; 
Vismara, 2016; West & Noel, 2009). Beyond the signaling value the campaign inherits, 
the entrepreneur additionally collects valuable feedback about the products’ or services’ 
use from the campaign backers which he can use in the iterative process of product/ser-
vice improvement. As such, information asymmetries may be reduced given that the 
business opportunity received validation from a market perspective (Roma et al., 2017). 
As one main motive for venture capitalists to syndicate is to assess company-specific 
risk prior to investing (Brander et al., 2002; Manigart et al., 2006). This dissertation 
finds that crowdfunding apparently reduces perceived informational frictions and thus 
also the need to form syndicates. In addition, the findings provide empirical evidence 
that a previous crowdfunding campaign also alters the composition of syndicates. This 
dissertation argues that crowdfunding, given its global availability, offers remotely lo-
cated investors a channel through which they can increase their deal flow, by forming 
more internationally oriented syndicates. Contrary to the expectations however, the as-
sumed effect of a crowdfunding campaign to attract smaller and thus likely less-experi-
enced VC funds could not be confirmed as the analyses do not find strong support for 
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this hypothesis. Overall, the findings indeed show that crowdfunding does not only in-
fluence whether or not expert investors form syndicates, they also show how the com-
position of syndicates changes if an investee used crowdfunding before.  
Based on these results, the contribution of this work is twofold. First, this dissertation 
contributes to advancing signaling theory against the background of the microfinance 
and VC literature. It does so by assessing if signals relevant for amateur investors such 
as the crowd have an equal value to experts such as venture capitalists. Based on the 
results derived, the findings show that collective investment decisions from amateur 
investors indeed influence the decision-making process of expert investors such as ven-
ture capitalists. Hence, it can be inferred from the results that the decision of a large 
crowd to support a product or service supported on Kickstarter may give sufficient evi-
dence about the potential of the entrepreneurial initiative. In addition, the suggested 
potential apparently reduces information asymmetries between the campaign initiator 
and the investor increasing the chances of a post-campaign follow-up VC investment.  
In addition to the theoretical contribution this empirical contribution provides, the prac-
tical implications for the entrepreneur and venture capitalists are also noteworthy. 
Given the increasing popularity of crowdfunding amongst entrepreneurs, this source of 
entrepreneurial finance turned into an important form of funding for commercially-
oriented new ventures (Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2010). For instance, 45 out of the 
50 largest crowdfunding campaigns in 2012 turned into new firms after they had col-
lected their first funds through individual investors (Mollick, 2014). Hence, for those 
successful crowdfunding entrepreneurs who still need funding in order to expand busi-
ness operations further, the findings show that entrepreneurs can use their campaigns 
as signaling instrument to a) shape awareness in the competitive environment of new 
ventures seeking VC funding and b), show superiority over other ideas or projects, 
which increases their chances to finance their growth. In addition, the findings show 
that syndicated investments are less likely. This implies that the entrepreneur is not 
necessarily obliged to deal with multiple investors simultaneously and satisfy individual 
requirements. Furthermore, as his campaign proved to be a valuable signal, the entre-
preneur’s bargaining position is greatly enhanced. Another important practical contri-
bution is that entrepreneurs seeking expansion can profit from the more internationally 
oriented syndicates that the results show. In other words, the increased internationality 
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also increases access to have local expert investors in the network even though they 
might be remotely located.  
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5 Overall Conclusion and Contribution 
The growth and survival of new ventures is probably the most important aspect regard-
ing the effect entrepreneurs have on economic integration and growth (Alhorr et al., 
2008). The societal well-being in the form of innovation (Acs & Audretsch, 1988; Ku-
ratko, 2005), job creation (Blanchflower, 2000; Parker, 2009), and productivity in-
creases (van Praag & Versloot, 2007) are all subject to flourishing new ventures that 
have the resources and capabilities in order to exploit newly identified opportunities 
and thus strive from being small incumbents to well-established corporations. Yet, and 
although the concept of entrepreneurship is gaining an ever-increasing attention from 
both research and policy makers, the outcomes of all means that are intended to in-
crease the number of new ventures created is all but satisfactory when considering the 
case of for example Germany. Despite the fact that public research institutions and uni-
versities have tremendously increased their focus on entrepreneurship (Munari et al., 
2015), the number of founders as well as the ratio of founders in comparison to the 
total population reached its lowest level in 2016 since the burst of the new economy at 
the beginning of the new century (KfW, 2017a; KfW, 2017b). As a consequence of these 
unsatisfactory conditions, this dissertation is motivated to develop new insights about 
growth drivers of new ventures with a particular focus on academic entrepreneurship. 
Further, this dissertation also elaborates how crowdfunding as a new means of entre-
preneurial financing influences the selection and syndication behavior of venture capi-
talists. The latter aspect is particularly relevant when considering that the survival and 
growth of new firms strongly depends on the availability of financial capital (Binks & 
Ennew, 1996; Cassar, 2004; Ebben & Johnson, 2006). Further, the focus towards the 
financing of new ventures is insofar important that the financing decision made at the 
beginning has a lasting imprint on the development of the new venture (Berger & Udell, 
1998; Cassar, 2004).  
5.1 Theoretical Contribution 
Overall, the empirical findings derived from the three research questions are intended 
to enhance the ever increasing number of dedicated entrepreneurship research in gen-
eral, as well as the number of research contributions focusing on academic entrepre-
neurship (e.g. Cleyn et al. 2015; Goel et al. 2015; Guerrero et al. 2014; McAdam and 
McAdam 2008; and Stam et al. 2014) and new venture financing such as crowdfunding 
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and VC (e.g. Mollick 2014; Roma et al. 2017) in particular. Hence, the results concern-
ing the role of venture capital towards the growth of RBSOs complements literature 
towards understanding growth factors of RBSOs against the background of the re-
source-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; Barney et al., 2001; Penrose, 1996; Wer-
nerfelt, 1984). The results derived provide novel insights about the growth of RBSOs 
by widening the focus, i.e. incorporating venture capital into the analysis. Although 
research argues that academic founding teams in RBSOs are often homogeneous and 
lack valuable networks to business professionals outside academia (Agarwal & Shah, 
2014; Colombo et al., 2014; Lockett et al., 2003; Murray, 2004; Wright et al., 2006), 
this dissertation finds evidence that homogeneity is not a disadvantage to new venture 
growth per se. Second, the results provide empirical evidence that the lack of entrepre-
neurial and managerial skills as well as networks to outside partners, another short-
coming of academic founders (Cleyn et al., 2015; Stam et al., 2014; Visintin & Pittino, 
2014), can be alleviated provided that the research institution offers trainings that 
coach an entrepreneurial mindset as well as provides a platform to network with exter-
nal business professionals. Third, the empirical results find that VC-backed RBSOs show 
a higher performance in terms of employment and revenue growth compared to non-
VC-backed RBSOs. Although VC positively contributes to the RBSO’s employment 
growth, the empirical results do not verify that effect for revenue growth. However, the 
empirical results provide sufficient evidence that the superior performance of VC-
backed compared to non-VC-backed RBSOs is likely the result of a venture capitalist 
coaching the RBSO rather than scouting it. 
When regarding the signaling value of crowdfunding in a venture capital context, this 
dissertation aims to develop new empirical insights regarding signaling theory (Buse-
nitz et al., 2005; Spence, 1973, 2002) against the background of the microfinance and 
VC literature. For one thing, the empirical findings confirm that venture capitalists ap-
parently rely on the wisdom of the crowd when scouting new ventures (Agrawal et al., 
2016; Bruton et al., 2015; Mollick, 2014; Mollick & Nanda, 2016). Said differently, the 
empirical findings confirm that a crowdfunding project that has convinced a large col-
lective of individual supporters (i.e. reached its funding goal) is more likely to receive 
post-campaign VC funding. However, the analyses also discovered that there exists an 
inverted u-shaped relationship between the funding received versus the funding de-
manded and the probability of follow-up VC funding. In other words, new ventures that 
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have received only a fraction of their required funding are more likely to be in need of 
additional post-campaign financing. On the contrary, new ventures with a high funding 
ratio are less likely to be in need of additional post-campaign VC funding given that 
their financial demand is satisfied with crowdfunding already. Furthermore, the find-
ings also provide empirical evidence that endorsements of crowdfunding campaigns 
and increased social media attention signal campaign quality and thus increase the new 
venture’s probability to receive post-campaign VC funding.  
Beyond the value of crowdfunding-campaign related signals, this dissertation also pro-
vides new insights about the syndication behavior of venture capitalists. Given the fact 
that venture capitalists syndicate in order to reduce company specific risk and thus the 
risk of adverse selection (Brander et al., 2002;Lehmann, 2006; Lerner, 1994; Plummer 
et al., 2016; Sah & Stiglitz, 1984), particularly when investing in early-stage firms 
(Manigart et al., 2006), this dissertation finds that crowdfunding reduces the perceived 
company specific risk and thus decreases the need to syndicate as well as the absolute 
syndicate size. In addition, the empirical evidence suggests that crowdfunding also of-
fers a new channel of deal sourcing for venture capitalists in order scout new ventures 
to invest in. Said differently, the findings confirm that new ventures using crowdfund-
ing are more likely funded by international syndicates compared to new ventures with-
out. This finding is particularly surprising given the fact that local proximity enables the 
investor to reduce costs associated with information asymmetries and translates into an 
increased chance of early stages investments (Agrawal et al., 2016). Hence, crowdfund-
ing serves as a catalyst reducing the perceived risk of new ventures and thus advances 
signaling theory and provides important implications for the microfinance and VC liter-
ature. 
5.2 Practical Contribution 
Beyond the theoretical contributions, this dissertation provides a number of practical 
recommendations deducted from the research questions addressed in the literature sec-
tion of this dissertation.  
Considering the fact that RBSOs often comprise a founding team as well as a technology 
that is in the early stages of development (i.e. and thus not yet market ready) (Clarysse 
et al., 2005; Colombo et al., 2014), it is exclusively subject to the founding team to a) 
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find market participants that could use the new technology invented and b), to trans-
form the invented technology to a product or service that serves an array of different 
customer requirements. Hence, in the early stages of product creation, homogeneous 
founding members are to the benefit of technology commercialization given that a man-
agement team that shares a similar educational background seems to work better to-
gether and shares an advanced understanding of the new technology (Beckman et al., 
2007; Ruef et al., 2003). Hence, initiatives undertaken by research organizations in-
tended to create heterogeneous teams with a large degree of heterogeneity are not a 
prerequisite of growth in the long run. More importantly however, well-developed sup-
porting schemes that develop or strengthen a heterogeneous skills set that goes beyond 
the skills and capabilities already possessed by the academic entrepreneur leaves a last-
ing imprint on the RBSO’s development. Given the fact that the empirical findings do 
not find a positive influence of pure equity investments from the research organization 
on growth, the RBSO might be better off receiving, for example, further trainings or 
access to business professionals such as accountants, lawyers, consultants free of 
charge. 
Further, this dissertation also provides practical insights how crowdfunding affects the 
post-campaign financing of new ventures. First, entrepreneurs can use crowdfunding as 
a new means to introduce a new product or service and acquire new customers (Ahlers 
et al., 2015; Mollick & Kuppuswamy, 2014; Vismara, 2016), while simultaneously re-
ducing informational frictions by signaling an investor that there exists market demand, 
a critical factor in the evaluation of new ventures (Burtch et al. 2012; Mollick & Nanda, 
2016). Second, striving for an endorsement by the platform provider may not only sup-
port the entrepreneur’s campaign to be successful (Mollick, 2014; Wessel et al., 2015), 
it also reduces informational asymmetries ex-ante and thus increases the probability of 
VC funding (Bonardo et al., 2010; Lerner, 1999, 2002). Third, from the perspective of 
the VC investor, a crowdfunding campaign can also serve as a means to reduce adverse 
selection and thus reduce the need to syndicate.  
In conclusion, this dissertation develops new empirical insights towards understanding 
the dynamic nature of financing choices of new ventures and how they affect the post-
funding development of the newly created entrepreneurial entity. In a nutshell, venture 
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capitalists act rather as coaches than scouts in the context of new ventures in an aca-
demic setting. Further, crowdfunding as a new means of entrepreneurial finance affects 
both the selection and syndication behavior of venture capitalist, a novel finding in the 
entrepreneurial finance discipline. This dissertation including its empirical findings de-
rived shall provide impetus for further analysis on the financing of new ventures in 
order to generate new insights to better understand the survival and growth of these 
important firms. The latter aspect is of utmost importance when considering the nega-
tive trend of newly created entrepreneurial activities on a European level in general, 
and Germany in particular, as new knowledge can support to reverse this trend in order 
for both the economy and the society to be prepared for the new challenges to come 
within this century. 
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